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BATTERY AND BEYOND: A TORT LAW RESPONSE TO
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM
KATHY SEWARD NORTHERN*

As the millennium approaches, the quest for
environmental justice-the fair and equitable
allocation of environmental benefits and
burdens--constitutes a challenge of Herculean
proportions.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past ten years, a consensus has evolved that, in the United
States, racial and ethnic minorities bear a significant and disproportionate
burden with respect to the location of hazardous waste facilities, the
distribution of funds available for the remediation of hazardous waste sites,
and the imposition of a myriad of other environmental burdens. Indeed, race,
as an independent factor irrespective of class, has been found to be the single
best predictor of the distribution of air pollution, the location of municipal
landfills, and the siting of hazardous waste facilities.' The magnitude of this
environmental dilemma is illustrated in a story from ancient Greek
mythology.
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In Greek mythology, we are regaled with the epic adventures of
Hercules, a human endowed with great physical prowess and special gifts,
who constantly strove with both gods and humans to overcome evil.2 In his
arrogance, Hercules offended the gods, who required him to perform twelve
labors.' We are told that Augeias, King of Ellis, was, in terms of flocks and
herds, the wealthiest man on earth. By divine dispensation, his sheep and
cattle were unfailingly fertile and immune to disease. As a consequence, his
flocks and herds were the largest and most productive in the known world.'
As do most successful commercial enterprises, the herds created a significant
amount of waste by-product. For many years, King Augeias disposed of this
waste excrement on-site.5 The dung in Augeias' cattle yard and sheepfolds
was not cleared away and thus presented a significant environmental
challenge.6 Although its highly offensive stench did not affect the beasts
themselves, the dung spread a pestilence across the Peloponnese.7 Moreover,
the valley pastures could no longer be ploughed for grain because they were
so deep in dung.'
Hercules proposed to King Augeias that he would remedy the
problem and cleanse the cattle yard before nightfall in return for one-tenth of
the cattle.' Hercules proposed this seemingly impossible task because he
already had arranged with the river gods for their assistance. 0 First, Hercules
"breached the wall of the yard in two places, and next diverted the
neighboring rivers Alpheus and Peneius so that their streams rushed through
the yard, swept it clean, and then went on to cleanse the sheepfolds and the
valley pastures."" Thus, Hercules accomplished his labor in a single day,
restoring King Augeias' land to pristine condition, and revitalizing the

See 2 ROBERT GRAVES, GREEK MYTHS 101-58 (1958).

2

See id.at 101.
See id. at 116.
See id.
See id.

7 See id.
S See id.
See id.
10

See id.
Id. at 117.
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surrounding Peloponnese." The river gods, of course, did not ask their
riparian neighbors whether they wished to have the rivers used for this
purpose. One only can imagine the horrific environmental impact Hercules'
waste management program had on the Rivers Alpheus and Peneius and the
King's poorer, less powerful downstream neighbors.
While this Herculean saga illustrates our current waste disposal
dilemma, Garrett Hardin explains it in The Tragedy of the Commons. 3
Hardin argues that efforts to maximize individual or corporate wealth can
lead to the disproportionate allocation of environmental burdens. 4 He asks
us to picture a pasture that is open to all to use. 5 Herdsmen are attracted to
the pasture for its ample resources.16 It is to be expected that each herdsman
will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. That is, each
herdsman will attempt to use the available resources to maximize his own
wealth.' 7 Such an arrangement works for a while, and circumstances such as
war, pestilence, and other natural phenomena keep the total number of cattle
in check.'" In time, an increase in the number of herdsmen, social stability,

12 See id.
'

14
IS

162 Sci. 1243 (1968).
See id. at 1244-46.
See id. at 1244.

16 See id.
'7

See id.

As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain.
Explicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, "What is the
utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?" This utility has one
negative and one positive component.
1) The positive component is a function of the increment of one
animal. Since the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the
additional animal, the positive utility [of acquiring that animal] is nearly
+1.
2) The negative component is a function of the additional
overgrazing created by one more animal. Since, however, the effects of
overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen, the negative utility for any
particular decision-making herdsman is only a fraction of - 1.
Id.
'g

See id.
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and scientific advancement allow the cattle to flourish. 9 At this point, the
inherent logic of the commons can lead to a tragic conclusion.
[T]he rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible
course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd.
...But this is the conclusion reached by each and every
rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy.
Each man is locked into a system that compels him to
increase his herd without limit-in a world that is limited.
Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each
pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the
freedom of a commons. Freedom in the commons brings ruin
to all. 20
Hardin argues that the inverse of this picture of the tragedy of the
commons is found in the picture of pollution.2"
Here it is not a question of taking something out of the
commons, but of putting something in-sewage, or chemical,
radioactive, and heat wastes into water; noxious and
dangerous fumes into the air .... The calculations of utility
are much the same as before. The rational man finds that his
share of the cost of the wastes he discharges into the
commons is less than the cost of purifying his wastes before
releasing them. Since this is true for everyone, we are locked
into a system of "fouling our own nest," so long as we behave
only as independent, rational, free-enterprisers.22
The rational man, upon fouling his nest, seeks to clean it up. He may very
well decide that he can best cleanup by removing the waste to the farthest

'9 See id.
20

Id.

2 See id. at 1245.
22

Id.
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comer of the commons.
The commons, known as the United States, has developed into one of
the wealthiest, most productive, and most advantaged nations in the world.
In large part, it has done so because of the breadth of its physical commons,
the wealth of its resources, and the labor, both forced and free, of its people.
Its citizens, both public and private, benefit to varying degrees from its
technological and economic prowess. The same commercial enterprises that
generate this wealth and supply these benefits, however, also generate
environmental toxins and impose other forms of environmental burdens. As
a technologically advanced, consumption-oriented society, we must resolve
how to fairly allocate scarce environmental resources, justly distribute
environmental burdens, and remediate existing environmental degradation.
To accomplish this we must first recognize what appears as an intractable
truth-while each of us hopes to benefit from living in this society, few of us
want to shoulder the burden of the unwanted by-products of our prosperity,
to endure the inconvenience and discomfort of living near a malodorous
facility, or to risk exposure to harmful levels of environmental toxins.
Therefore, until industry fully complies with environmental regulations,
commits adequate resources to remediate environmental pollution, and finds
methods to altogether eliminate hazardous waste generation, the
environmental protection mechanisms currently in place must be
implemented in fair and just ways-ones that do not disproportionately affect
people of color and the poor. As a society, we must acknowledge those who
derive the greatest benefits from the technological and industrial prowess of
this nation and not allow them to dispose of their "stable waste" by
concentrating its disposal in those areas of the commons occupied by people
of color and the poor.
From the beginning of the industrial revolution, commercial
enterprises have generated pollution and other waste by-products and
imposed the associated environmental burdens upon others in surrounding
communities." As the millennium comes to an end, the sheer magnitude of

The environmental problems of this nation are widely documented. From the latter part
of the nineteenth century to the enactment of environmental protection statutes in the 1960s
and 1970s, the industrial and economic growth of this nation often was accompanied by a
23
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the problems involved in remediating past environmental degradation and
mitigating the effects of present-day waste generation presents one of this
country's most daunting challenges. As a society, we must garner the
political will to resolve how to fairly allocate scarce economic, social, and
environmental resources dedicated to the enforcement of environmental
regulations, and how to locate appropriately both solid and hazardous waste
disposal facilities.2 In addition, we must commit the necessary resources to

laissez faire approach to natural resource management and pollution control. See F. William
Futrell, The History ofEnvironmentalLaw, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: FROM RESOURCES TO
RECOVERY 1-49 (Celia Campbell-Mohn, Barry Breen, and F. William Futrell eds., 1993).
The enormity of the problem is described in the legislative history of environmental
protection legislation. See, e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), Pub.
L. No. 94-580, 90 stat. 2795 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1994)); Clean
Water Act of 1972, amended by 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387: Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974,
amended by 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300t-13; Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 69016992k (1994); Clean Air Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994); Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1994). See also Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive
EnvironmentalResponse, Compensation and Liability ("Superfiind") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM.
J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1982) (providing the legislative history of CERCLA); Robert J. Rauch, The
Federal Water Pollution ControlAct Amendments of 1972: Ambiguity as a Control Device,
10 HARV. J. LEGIS. 565 (1973) (providing the legislative history of the Clean Water Act of
1972).
24 In A New Agenda for Modern Environmental Law, Richard Brooks states:
Most current environmental policy is guided toward the effective
achievement of environmental objectives yet the proper goal of
environmental law is not only effectiveness or efficiency but also
environmental justice-the proper distribution of environmental amenities,
the fair correction and retribution of environmental abuses, the fair
restoration of nature, and the environmentally fair exchange of resources.
... Any balancing of economics and environmental protection must take
into account the different notions of justice-distributive, corrective,
retributive, restorative, and exchange-all of which can arguably play a
role in environmental protection policy.
6 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1, 26-27 (1991); see also KENNETH A. MANASTER, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AND JUSTICE-READINGS AND COMMENTARY ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND

PRACTICE 19 n.1 (1995) (providing a broader definition of "environmental justice" than
addressed in this article, which focuses on the demands of communities of color for equitable
environmental enforcement and facility siting).
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develop effective and affordable waste disposal technologies.
It is only in the last decade that social scientists, legal scholars, and
environmental policy analysts have focused their efforts to address the
unequal distribution of environmental burdens.
In Environmental
Justice/Racism/Equity: Can We Talk?,25 Marc Poirer considers the historical
reasons why people of color and the poor have borne the disproportionate
burden of "environmental disamenities." He observes that "Iffrom the very
beginning of the environmental movement, in the early 1970s and even
before, expressions of concern ... about the disproportionate impact of
various environmental stresses on racial minorities and the urban and rural
poor were available."26 Little was done, however, to address the disparities.
Indeed, it was not until the 1980s that the disparities attained widespread
recognition as "problems."" Poirer explains that, until the latter part of the
1980s, the divergent demographics and the differing political discourse of the
primarily white, middle class environmental movement and the AfricanAmerican civil rights movement precluded a convergent approach to issues
of environmental and social justice.28 These historical divergences are
reflected in the range of current environmental justice/racism/equity
theoretical approaches. 29 Although tort doctrine is used widely by advocates
in both the environmental and civil rights movements, few proponents have
argued for tort-based approaches in the context of environmental racism.3 °
As in many other areas of social policy, however, tort law has its role in this
marketplace of ideas. This article suggests that tort law, through the rubric
of the intentional tort doctrine, provides a viable substantive approach to the

25

96 W. VA. L. REV. 1083 (1994) (considering the historical reasons why environmental

justice/racism/equity received little attention until the 1980s).
26 Id. at 1085 & n.4 (providing examples of early studies relating to the disproportionate
impact of environmental stresses on racial minorities).
27 See id. at 1084 n.3 (providing a brief discussion of the period when the environmental
justice/equity/racism movement took hold).
_ See id. at 1086.
.9 See id. at:1086-88.
30 See, e.g., Serena M. Williams, The Anticipatory Nuisance Doctrine: One Common Law
Theoryfor Use in EnvironmentalJustice Cases, 19 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
223, 223 (1995).
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problem of environmental racism.
Tort law has long recognized the preeminence given to the right of an
individual, regardless of race or socio-economic status, to be free from
uninvited, non-consensual, harmful, or offensive contacts with his or her
person. 3' Tort law protects the right of all individuals to use, possess, and
enjoy their own property free of unreasonable interference, and to prevent
interference with such rights that individuals have in common with the
general public.32 Moreover, the law recognizes, through constitutional
interpretation and legislative initiative, the right of ethnic and racial
minorities to be treated equally with their white counterparts with respect to
the availability of certain entitlements and in the protection of civil rights.33
Equality of treatment in the distribution of public accommodations, public
benefits, public protections, and public burdens is a fundamental notion of
distributive justice, a central concern to the law of torts. Tort law is a tool
often used by citizens to vindicate both individual rights and public policy.34
The disproportionate allocation of environmental burdens to low income
areas and persons of color3" is not only unfair, it is offensive; it interferes with
the use and enjoyment of both public and private property, and it
fundamentally increases the risk of exposure to environmental toxins. It is

'
32

See discussion of battery infra note 306 and accompanying text.
See discussion of toxic tort theories-trespass, nuisance, and strict liability infra Part

II.C. 1-4.

See discussion of civil rights infra Part II.A-B.
For example, the tort of wrongful, or retaliatory, discharge is available to an at-will
employee who can demonstrate that their employment was terminated for reasons contrary
to public policy. See, e.g., Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 833 P.2d 1218, 1225 (Okla. 1992)
(concluding racially motivated discharge would contravene public policy and constitute an
exception to employment-at-will doctrine); Collins v. Rizkana, 652 N.E.2d 653, 656 (Ohio
1995) (recognizing that wrongful discharge on the basis of sexual harassment states a cause
of action and constitutes a public policy exception to the general rule of employment-at-will).
" The problems detailed in this Article affect both people of color and the poor. However,
when controlled for socio-economic factors, many of the studies indicate that the
disproportionate allocation is greatest in communities of color. See infra Part I.B. 1.
Therefore, the main focus of this article is upon communities of color. As will be indicated
where appropriate, however, the proposed theories of relief also may apply to those
disproportionately impacted because of their presence in low-income communities.
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a problem, then, to which tort law should speak.
This article begins in Part I.A. with an explanation of how a person
who lives in a community in close proximity to a hazardous waste disposal
site or other source of environmental burdens may become exposed to, or
affected by, those toxins, and the types of harms such exposures might cause.
It continues in Part I.B. with an examination of evidence that there is a
disproportionate concentration of such environmentally burdensome facilities
in minority communities. Part I.C. describes historical patterns of
discrimination in housing, land use planning, and distribution of public
benefits-in addition to current political and economic influences-that have
caused and continue to perpetuate the disproportionate distribution of
environmental burdens in minority communities, specifically with respect to
solid and hazardous waste disposal activities.
Part II focuses upon the failures and limitations of current equal
protection and Title VI litigation theory and environmental tort theory. Such
theories have been used to address the unique injuries suffered by persons
living in communities of color who have been forced to endure a
disproportionate share of environmental harm.
Part III suggests that the tort of battery, specifically with respect to
liability for a harmful or offensive contact with environmental toxins, may
provide a viable, though limited, basis to address harms arising from
exposure to environmental toxins and the dignitary harms arising from
environmental racism. Part IV moves beyond battery to explore whether tort
theory supports the recognition of a new tort, "racially disproportionate
exposure to environmental burdens." This new tort would provide a distinct
cause of action in those cases in which an actor 36 intentionally engages in an
environmental management practice or course of conduct that
disproportionately exposes people of color, and those who are in the
community with them, to environmental toxins. This article concludes that

" As documented in Part I, government decisions also may contribute to environmental
racism. This Article focuses on claims against private actors because of the special problems
of sovereign immunity and limited duties associated with government actors. Note, however,
that imposing tort constraints on private actors would contribute significantly to reducing
environmental racism.

494

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.

[Vol. 21:485

these intentional tort theories can be useful tools to protect individual
interests and to facilitate community activism.
I. CURRENT STATUS OF ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM IN THE UNITED STATES

The central feature of environmental racism is that residents living in
minority communities often are surrounded by environmentally burdensome
facilities, and at times, inundated with environmental toxins. 37 In order to
assess the resulting burden, first it is necessary to understand the mechanisms
of exposure.
A. Mechanisms of Exposure to Environmental Toxins
The basic premise of this article is that hazardous waste disposal
facilities and other pollution generating enterprises can, and often do, release
sufficient quantities of noxious or toxic substances into their environs to
discommode nearby communities and, at times, cause their residents physical
harm. A hazardous waste disposal facility, an unregulated landfill, or an
industrial complex can release hazardous material into the environment in
several ways. Chemicals may be released into the atmosphere through smoke
stacks, effluent pipes, or other emission devices. 38 Landfills may leach their
contents into the ground or ground water sources. 39 Releases can occur when

" See Robert D. Bullard, Decision Making, in FACES OF ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM:
CONFRONTING ISSUES OF GLOBAL JUSTICE 3 (Laura Westra & Peter S. Wenz eds., 1995).

Professor Bullard has written widely on the issues of environmental racism and justice in the
past ten years and is a key figure in the environmental justice debate.
38See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 873 (N.Y. 1970) (explaining
that discharge of large quantities of dust upon plaintiffs' properties and excessive blasting
deprived nearby property owners of reasonable use of their property, entitling them to
payment for nuisance).
'9 See, e.g., State v. Schenectady Chem. Inc., 459 N.Y.S.2d 971, 974 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983)
(reviewing allegations regarding chemical dump site located in low-lying swamp that was
used by agent of chemical manufacturer and contained chemicals such as phenol, benzene,
toluene, xylene, vinyl chloride, lead, copper, chromium, and arsenic that migrated into air,
surface, and groundwater, contaminating local drinking wells and threatening to pollute
aquifer that served as sole source of water for thousands of area residents).
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cargoes of waste are transported to, received by, and transferred for further
treatment or handling within, the waste disposal site. 4' A variety of factors
determine the risk of human exposure, including circumstances of disposal
or release, ambient air or water temperature, hydrogeological structures, wind
conditions, and physical properties of the chemicals in question.4 For
example, the movement of chemicals through soil may be fairly slow and is
influenced by the discontinuities of soil composition, permeability of soil
substrate, porosity of soil structure, viscosity of the chemical, the chemical's
stability in water, its temperature, and chromatographic properties of the
soil. 42 In contrast, because of the natural movement of both air and water,
chemicals dispersed therein can come into contact with people a significant
distance away. 3
Airborne pollution presents a significant challenge to communities
near a hazardous waste incinerator or other chemical manufacturing or
processing facility. A contaminant released as a gas eventually is distributed
throughout the air.44 Liquid and solid materials released into the air as
particulate matter also can become widely dispersed, depending, in part, on
their size and density.45 Larger particulates are likely to settle to the ground;

40

See JAMES T. O'REILLY, SHEPARD'S ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SERIES, Toxic TORTS

PRACTICE GUIDE §3.3 1, at 3-79 (2d ed. 1995).
"' See id.

See id. at 3-80.
"' See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1212 (6th Cir. 1988) (noting
pollutants from defendant's landfill contaminated property within a three-mile radius).
" See O'REILLY, supra note 40, § 3.03, at 3-6.
45 See id. Particulate matter dispersed in the air may be classified into at least seven
forms: Aerosol - a dispersion of solid or liquid particles of microscopic size in a gas; dust solid particles larger than colloidal and capable of temporary suspension in air or other gases;
fog - visible aerosols usually formed by condensation;fumes - solid particles generated by
condensation from the gaseous state, generally after volatilization, often accompanied by a
chemical reaction such as oxidation; mist - dispersion of liquid particles large enough to be
individually visible; smog - a combination of smoke and fog; smoke - small gas borne
particles resulting from incomplete combustion. See id. at 3-7 (citing B. Dinman, The Mode
42

of Entry and Actions of Toxic Materials, in 1 PATTY'S INDUSTRIAL HYGIENE AND
TOXICOLOGY 136 (G. Clayton ed., 1978)).
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smaller ones may remain suspended. 46 The larger the particulate mass, the
more likely it is to contaminate an area in close proximity to the source.
Smaller particles may travel greater distances.47 If the particulates do settle,
they are likely to become deposited on someone's property." It is also
possible that the particulates will land in the water or on food supplies. Even
if the particulates remain suspended, they still may be harmful if they are
inhaled by people located within the dispersion region. The movement of
toxins through air, soil, and water, the potential for their wide-ranging
dispersion, their toxicity relative to their concentration in a given medium,
and the mechanism of exposure determine their effect upon surrounding
communities.4 It follows then that persons residing in communities or using
public facilities in close proximity to an environmentally burdensome
enterprise, or those who draw their water from an affected water supply, are
those most likely to be "impacted" by the exposure, or potential for exposure,
to these air and water-borne toxins.5"
It is not only actual or threatened physical exposure to environmental
toxins that affects persons residing in close proximity to environmentally
burdensome enterprises. Such enterprises also may produce foul and
discomforting odors or fumes that plague local residents, thereby reducing

4 See id. at 3-8.
4' See id.
The inevitability of this fact was recognized in Bradley v. American Smelting & Ref
Co.. 709 P.2d 782 (Wash. 1985), wherein the court noted:
The defendant has known for decades that sulfur dioxide and particulates
of arsenic, cadmium and other metals were being emitted from the tall
smokestack. It had to know that the solids propelled into the air by the
warm gases would settle back to earth somewhere. It had to know that a
purpose of the tall stack was to disperse the gas, smoke and minute solids
over as large an area as possible . . . but that while any resulting
contamination would be diminished as to any one area or landowner, that
nonetheless contamination, though slight, would follow.
Id. at 786.
'9 See O'REILLY, supra note 40, at §§ 3.03-3.04.
'o See Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1212 (6th Cir. 1988) (recognizing
different zones of contamination, and proportionate degrees of property damage, based upon
distance from landfill).
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their use and enjoyment of property and overall quality of life. 5 The
interference with everyday living conditions caused by the noxious odors is
particularly exacerbated in poorer communities, where air conditioning is rare
or unavailable and windows are opened to allow air into the home. With
respect to waste disposal facilities, the wastes often are transported by trucks,
sometimes hundreds a day, causing a constant stream of traffic in and through
the community. 2 The mere presence of an environmentally burdensome
enterprise, as well as the threat or perceived threat of exposure to
environmental toxins, can depress property values, decrease use of public
facilities, and generally degrade community lifestyles. 3 Moreover, the
greater the concentration of environmental burdens, the more significant the
actual and perceived harm to surrounding communities. These mechanisms
of exposure, and the potential risks arising therefrom, are central to the grave
concern over environmental racism. 4
B. DisproportionateExposure to Environmental Burdens Experienced by
Those Residing in Minority Communities
Although there was a delayed acknowledgment of the
disproportionate allocation of environmental burdens, 5 there is presently a

5' See, e.g., Bartleson v. United States, 96 F.3d 1270, 1275 (9th Cir. 1996) (recognizing
that the classic example of a continuing nuisance includes foul odor).
" See East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb Planning & Zoning
Comm'n, 706 F. Supp 880, 882 (M.D. Ga. 1989), aff'd, 896 F.2d 1264 (11 th Cir. 1989)
(explaining that siting commission initially denied a conditional use permit, in part, because
the facility would subject the area to heavy truck traffic).
" See Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex.
1979), aff'd mem.. 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986); see also discussion of West Dallas smelter
injra text accompanying notes 117-49.
"' See generally Patsy Ruth Oliver, Living on a Superfund Site in Texarkana; Regina
Austin & Michael Schill, Black, Brown, Red, and Poisoned; Jane Kay, California's
Endangered Communities of Color, in UNEQUAL PROTECTION: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR (Robert Bullard ed., 1994) [hereinafter UNEQUAL
PROTECTION] (surveying community reactions to the presence of significant environmental

burdens).
5' See generally Poirer, supra note 25.
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strong consensus that, in the United States, the benefits associated with
industrial and economic growth inure to the rich and politically empowered,
but the burdens associated with the national effort to control pollution fall on
those who are poor or politically weak.56 Those living in low-income and
minority communities" are more likely to be exposed to hazardous58
environmental conditions than are their more affluent/majority counterparts.
1. StatisticalAnalyses
The emerging national awareness about both racial and economic
disparities in exposure to environmental hazards can be traced, in part, to the
release of two studies: a 1983 study by the United States General Accounting
Office ("GAO")5 9 and a 1987 study by the United Church of Christ,

See Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "EnvironmentalJustice:" The DistributionalEffects
of EnvironmentalProtection, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 787, 792-96 (1992). Lazarus states that
"[e]nvironmental protection confers benefits and imposes burdens in several ways. To the
extent that the recipients of related benefits and burdens are identical, no problem of
discrimination is presented.... But identical recipients are rarely, if ever, the result." Id. at
792. It also should be noted that the disproportionate allocation of environmental
disamenities is not limited to the United States. See generally, Hussen M. Adam, Somalia:
Environmental Degradation and Environmental Racism, in FACES OF ENVIRONMENTAL
56

RACISM

181, supra note 37.

5' Racial minorities include African-Americans and others of African, Asian, Hispanic,
Indian Sub-Continental, Native American, and Pacific Islander descent. Ethnic minorities
in this country, particularly recent immigrant populations, may experience similar problems
of distribution.
" Many studies have been conducted which demonstrate that race, not economic status,
is the best predictor for exposure to environmental toxins. See, e.g., TOXIC WASTE AND
RACE, supra note 1, at xiii, 15. Of course, people of color are significantly more likely to
be in a "low-income" category. For purposes of this article, the analysis will focus upon
racially disproportionate exposure to environmental toxins. Although many of the references
pertain to studies of race based disparities, I believe that the solutions proposed may be
viable in predominantly white, low-income communities that can demonstrate a
disproportionate environmental burden.
" UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE
LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING

COMMUNITIES (1983) [hereinafter GAO].

There is some debate about whether the
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Commission for Racial Justice ("UCC").6 ° These studies came about as a
direct result of an unsuccessful grassroots effort to stop the siting of a
hazardous waste facility in Warren County, North Carolina.6
The GAO study found that three of the four major hazardous waste
landfills in the South62 were located in communities that were predominantly
African-American and living below the poverty line.63 The Report further
concluded that the siting pattern could not be attributed solely to socioeconomic status because similar facilities in the South were not located in
low-income white communities.'
The UCC study examined the location and distribution of controlled
and uncontrolled hazardous waste facilities throughout the United States and
determined that there was a national pattern demonstrating a disproportionate
allocation of commercial hazardous waste sites in minority communities.65
Specifically, the UCC study found that, on a nationwide basis, the greatest
number of hazardous waste facilities were located in communities with the

methodology used in the studies, can be used to determine the "chicken and egg" dilemma,
that is, whether the sites were located in communities because the residents were black and
poor or whether the poor and racial or ethnic minorities ended up living near the industrial
sites because they are affordable. See Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Environmental Racism:
Reviewing the Evidence, in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS: A
TIME FOR DISCOURSE 163 (Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai eds., 1992). For purposes of this

article, the author believes that those studies reliably illustrate that there presently exists a
disproportionate allocation of environmental burdens. For reasons later stated, the proposed
tort analysis will apply whether the pollution came to the people or the people came to the
pollution.
60 Toxic WASTES AND RACE, supra note 1.
6 See Warren County Case Study discussion infra notes 151-58 and accompanying text.
62 Specifically, the GAO study looked at Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi,
North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee. See ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN
DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 32 (2d ed. 1994) (citing GAO, supra
note 59).
6 See id. at 33 (citing GAO, supra note 59, at 4). The study found, for example, that four
of the South's nine hazardous waste landfills were located in minority zip codes,
representing approximately 63% of the South's total hazardous waste disposal capacity.
64 See id.
65 See TOXIC WASTES AND RACE, supra note 1, at xiii-xv, 15-17.
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highest composition of racial and ethnic minorities." The study further
demonstrated that the proportion of minorities residing in communities that
had a commercial hazardous waste facility was about double the proportion
of minorities in communities without such facilities." Where two or more
such facilities were located, the proportion of residents who were minorities
is more than triple.68 Further, the report indicated that three out of the five
largest commercial hazardous waste landfills in the United States, accounting
for approximately forty percent of the total commercial landfill capacity, were
69
overwhelmingly located in African and Hispanic-American communities.
The two studies compose part of a larger body of evidence
demonstrating that people of color suffer a disparate impact due to the
location of environmental disamenities and exposure to environmental
toxins.7" Benjamin Goldman, in a 1994 report prepared for the National
Wildlife Federation's Corporate Conservation Council, reviewed and
summarized empirical findings from sixty-four studies: all but one of those
studies, the one conducted by WMX Technologies (formerly Waste
Management Technologies), found environmental disparities either by race
or income.7 The studies were grouped into five basic categories of concern:
72
location of industrial waste facilities that pose environmental hazards,

6 See id. at xiii.
See id.
68 See id.
9 See id.; see also Godsil, supra note 1, at 398 n.26. Note that at the time of the study
African-Americans comprised only 11.7% of the population. See TOXIC WASTE AND RACE,
supra note 1, at 19. The percentage of Hispanics was even less. See id.
70 See Mohai & Bryant, supra note 59, at 163. The UCC study is not without its critics.
See e.g., CHRISTOPHER BOERNER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE? 4-6 (1994) (criticizing
the methodology used in the EPA and UCC studies and questioning whether the findings are
valid); Douglas L. Anderton et al., Hazardous Waste Facilities: "EnvironmentalEquity"
67

Issues in MetropolitanAreas, 18 EVALUATION REV. 123, 135-36 (1994).
BENJAMIN GOLDMAN, NOT JUST PROSPERITY: ACHIEVING SUSTAINABILITY WITH
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 8, 13 (1994) (study commissioned by National Wildlife Federation

"'

Corporate Conservation Council).
72 See id. at 4. Twenty-seven studies included facilities that generate, process, or contain
hazardous, radioactive, or solid wastes, and enterprises that have reported the release of
conventional pollutants into air, water, or land. See id. Studies of hazardous waste facilities
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human exposures to toxic substances,

73
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ambient concentrations of

conventional air pollutants, 74 estimates of regulatory costs and benefits, 75 and
reports of adverse health effects. 76 Race proved more important than socio77
economic status as a predictor in nearly three-quarters of the tests.

Goldman found that all but one of the twenty-seven studies of noxious
facilities and toxic releases showed environmental disparities by race or

controlled for economic status showed that in 22 of 30 tests (73%) race was more important
a predictor than income with respect to toxic and radioactive releases. See id. at 8, Table 4.
71 See id. at 4. Twelve studies of this type "included levels of pesticides or lead present
in
blood and fat, consumption of fish contaminated by toxic chemicals, and occupational
exposures to hazardous chemicals that exceeded 'Permissible Exposure Limits' set by the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration." See id. Occupational health exposures,
pesticide exposures, and toxic fish consumption, when controlled for economic factors, all
showed that race was a better predictor of exposure than any other factor. See id. at Table
3.
14 See id. 4. Ten studies measured the ambient concentrations of such
conventional air
pollutants as: carbon monoxide, lead, nitrogen dioxide, ozone, particulates, and sulfur
dioxide. See id. at 4. Several studies found that minorities were significantly more likely
to live in non-attainment areas than whites. See id. at 15.
" See id. at 4. Nine studies measured "estimated regulatory costs or benefits in terms of:
the economic value of per capita impacts; the severity of penalties; the priority, speed, and
rigor, of clean-up; and the strictness of state environmental policies." Id. Of the three studies
in this group that looked at regulatory costs and benefits to determine whether race was more
important than income, each showed race to be a better indicator. See id. at Table 3.
76 See id. at 4. Goldman considered nine studies to be focused upon adverse health effects
encompassing "injuries, illnesses, or fatalities, that can be directly attributed to specific
exposures, accidents in the work environment or outside of the home." Id. See also Mary
Haan et al., Poverty & Health.- Prospective Analysis From Alameda County Study, 125 AM.
J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 989, 994 (1987). Similarly, researchers from Human Population
Laboratory in Alameda, California, conducted a study analyzing the differences in overall
morbidity and mortality between low income and minority groups and their more affluent
white counterparts. The researchers compared health levels of Oakland residents living in
the city's federally designated poverty area to those that lived in remaining areas of the city.
Researchers controlled for certain risk factors including blood pressure, heart disease,
employment status, access to medical care, health insurance coverage, smoking, alcohol
consumption, physical activity, body fat, and marital and social status and found an average
age adjusted difference in mortality of over fifty percent. The ninety-five percent confidence
interval, is approximately 1.5-2.20.
" See GOLDMAN, supra note 71, at 8.
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income.7 8 He observed that there appeared to be greater racial disparities for
communities with the newer operating facilities than for those with older,
closed, or abandoned waste disposal sites.79 This disparity may be explained,
in part, by the actions of the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
itself. In 1974, using a variety of evaluation factors, including demographics,
the EPA provided a list of ten counties it deemed most appropriate for
locating large hazardous waste processing facilities." An analysis of census
data for those designated counties revealed that "more than one million
people of color live in these EPA recommended counties for large hazardous
waste facilities, comprising a 58-percent greater share of their total
population than the average for the country as a whole (32% as compared to
20% in the U.S.)."8
In sum, Goldman suggests that 1) "race proved more significantly
associated with the location of commercial hazardous waste facilities than
any other factor examined;"82 2) researchers applying multi-variate statistical
techniques concluded that race is the single best predictive factor with respect
to the siting of commercial hazardous waste facilities, even when other socioeconomic characteristics of communities are taken into account; and 3) race
has been found to be an independent factor, irrespective of economic class,
in predicting the distribution of air pollution in our society,13 the site location

See id. The WMX study failed to show race or income related disparities. See id. at 13
7 See id. at 12. One study discloses that while planned expansion of commercial waste
facilities were not significantly greater in non-white or lower income communities than those
without such plans, communities with planned reductions in hazardous waste capacity were
significantly greater in white communities. See id. (citing James T. Hamilton, Politics and
Social Cost. Estimating the Impact of Collective Action On Hazardous Waste Facilities,24
RAND J. ECON., 101-25 (Spring 1993)).
o See id. at 13.
IId. at 13.
82 Id. at 11 (citing Toxic Wastes and Race, supra note 1); see also Bryant & Mohai, supra
note 59, at 925-27.
" See A. Myrick Freeman III, Distributionof EnvironmentalQuality, in ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY ANALYSIS 264-65 (Allen V. Kneese & Blair T. Bower eds., 1972); Leonard Graners
et al., The DistributionalEffects of Uniform Air Pollution Policy in the U.S., 93 Q. J. ECON.
281-301 (1979); D.R. Wemette & L.A. Nieves, Breathing Polluted Air: Minorities are
DisproportionatelyExposed, EPA J., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 16-17.
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of municipal landfills and incinerators, 4 and lead poisoning in children.8 5
The evidence demonstrating the disproportionate burden of exposure
to environmental toxins neither begins nor ends with hazardous waste facility
siting determinations. Nor does the environmental burden occur exclusively
from industrial processes. Bullard notes that "[w]hether by conscious design
or institutional neglect, communities of color in urban ghettos, in rural
'poverty pockets,' or on economically impoverished Native-American
reservations, face some of the worst environmental devastation in the
nation."86 Exposure to harmful environmental burdens is, in many respects,
associated with living in communities of color. The environmental burdens
may include vermin-infested living conditions, poor public sanitation and
trash removal, and dilapidated housing stock. 87
Taken together, inadequate living conditions and industrial processes
can lead to devastating results. Increasingly, researchers recognize that there
are strong links between "environmental toxins" such as airborne particulates
in smog, and "natural causes" such as exposure to roaches, pollen or mold
that can lead to the onset of asthma in adults, as well as the worsening of
conditions in children. 8 For example, in certain areas of the South Bronx,
residents, especially children, suffer from an extremely high incidence of

See BULLARD, supra note 62, at 32-36, 102-03.
" See id. at 99 (citing AGENCY FOR Toxic SUBSTANCES

84

AND DISEASE REGISTRY, THE
NATURE AND EXTENT OF LEAD POISONING IN CHILDREN IN THE UNITED STATES (1988)).
86 Robert D. Bullard, Anatomy of Environmental Racism and the EnvironmentalJustice

Movement, in CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS

(Robert D. Bullard ed., 1993).

"' See Adam Nossiter, Asthma Common and on Rise in Crowded South Bronx, N. Y.

Sept. 5, 1995, at Al. Similar problems were reported recently both in Roxbury and
Dorchester, Massachusetts, predominantly African-American communities where asthma
rates reflect the national trend-one that indicates asthma rates among young AfricanAmericans have doubled between 1980 and 1993. See Delores Kong, Out of Breath,
BOSTON GLOBE, May 13, 1996, available in 1996 WL 6861283.
88 See David Berglund & David Abbey, Long-Term Effects of Air Pollution, W.J. MED.,
Sept 1, 1996, at 140, available in 1996 WL 9351442 (reporting study that found a significant
link between air pollution and respiratory diseases such as asthma).
TIMES,
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asthma.89 In those Bronx neighborhoods served by Lincoln Hospital, dubbed
"Asthma Alley," an average of 2500 asthma cases are admitted to the hospital
each year. 9' Dr. Harold Osbom, on staff at Lincoln Hospital, reports that in
the past two years, twenty-two people-ten times the national average-have
died of asthma-related causes.9" The emerging asthma epidemic in the South
Bronx is reflected in hospitalization rates as high as 17.3 per 1000 people and
death rates as high as 11 per 10,000-eight times the national average. 92 It
is reported that as many as one out of three students in a local elementary
school has asthma and carries a bronchodilator each day.93 Indeed, in a 1994
published study94 of New York City residents, researchers found that,
compared with Caucasians, the rate of hospital admissions for asthma-related
problems was 4.91 times greater for Hispanics and 4.16 times greater for
African-Americans."
Hazardous waste treatment facilities increasingly are being placed into
these communities, which already are staggering under the burden of
disproportionate public health concerns. The Hunts Point and Port Morris
areas of the South Bronx, predominantly Hispanic and African-American
communities, became home in 1993 to the Bronx-Lebanon medical waste
incinerator, which bums twenty-four tons of medical waste each day. 96 In

" Asthma is a disease affecting the ability of sufferers to breath. It arises from an irritation
of bronchial passages that leads to severe breathing impairments. During a severe attack, the
limited amount of oxygen in the blood can lead to death.
' See Valerie Burgher, Rail Against the Machine, Environmentalists Go Head to Head
in the Bronx, THE VILLAGE VOICE, May 14, 1996, at 13.
' See id.
92 See Nossiter, supra note 87 at Al.
g See id. at B2.
See Vera A. De Palo et al., DemographicInfluences on Asthma Hospital Admission
Rates in New York City, 106 CHEST 447, 448 (1994).
14

9'See id. at 448.

See Raphael Sugarman, Hunts Point Has Gripe to Air, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 4, 1996,
at 1(reporting that the Bronx-Lebanon Hospital Incinerator has been cited with more than
561 violations of state pollution standards since it opened in 1993); see also, Raphael
Sugarman, They'd Trash Hospital Incinerator,N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 14, 1995, at 82.
Sister Pat Hovell, principal of St. Lukes School located just a few blocks away from the
incinerator, is quoted as stating that "[a]t lunchtime, when our students are out playing, the
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1993, the same area became home to the New York Organic Fertilizer
Company.9" Introduction of these facilities into communities already
burdened with poverty and other environmental disamenties may have an
exacerbating impact on those communities that is significantly greater than
if the same facility were introduced into a middle-class community.9"
The disparate impact of environmental burdens is similarly evident
in the enforcement of environmental regulations. In a detailed and
comprehensive analysis of every environmental lawsuit concluded from 1985
through 1992, the National Law Journal ("NLJ") found that penalties for
pollution law violations in minority communities are lower than those
imposed for violations in largely white communities.99 In an analysis of
every residential toxic waste site in the then twelve-year-old Superfund
program, the NLJ discovered that, with regard to minority communities, the
government takes longer to address environmental hazards, and it accepts
solutions less stringent than those recommended by the scientific

smell from the incinerator is so bad their eyes start watering, their noses run, and the children
with asthma or other lung problems can't breathe." Browning Ferris, who recently has
acquired the incinerator, is planning to implement new safeguards-and increase capacity
to 48 tons per day. See id.
" See Sarah Kershaw, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1996, at B8. The New York Organic
Fertilizer Company, (NYOFC) daily converts 40-50 truckloads, carrying an average of 750
total tons of sludge, about 70% of New York City's sewer sludge, into fertilizer.
98
See BARBARA BLUM, CITIES: AN ENVIRONMENTAL WILDERNESS 3 (1978).
"Suburbanites are exposed to less than half of the environmental health hazards inner-city
residents face .... The inner-city poor-white, yellow, brown, and black-suffer to an
alarming degree from what are euphemistically known as diseases of adaptation. These are
not health adaptations, but diseases and chronic conditions from living with bad air, polluted
water and continued stress." Id.Moreover, diseases such as asthma have been found to be
aggravated by the presence of roaches. While roaches are somewhat ubiquitous, their
concentration in urban areas causes them to be especially problematic. See generally David
L. Rosenstreich, et al., The Role of CockroachAllergy and Exposure to Cockroach Allergen
in CausingMorbidity Among Inner-City Children With Asthma, 336 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1356
(1997).
" See Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection: The Racial Divide in
EnvironmentalLaw, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S2. The study was based upon computerassisted analysis of census data, the civil court case docket of the Environmental Protection
Agency, and the agency's own record of performance at 1117 Superfund sites. See id.
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community." ° The most striking imbalance between white and minority
communities in the NLJ analysis of EPA enforcement efforts was a 506%
disparity in fines under RCRA.'0 The average fine for the areas with the
greatest white population was $335,566, as compared to $55,318 in the areas
with the greatest minority populations. °2 Thus, in areas where the
environmental burden is already significant, remedial assistance is
disproportionately deficient.
Further evidence supports assertions that people of color are exposed
04
to greater quantities of toxins both in the workplace' 0 3 and in the home."

"o See id. Treatment of contaminated waste sites is a preferred remedy. See 42 U.S.C. §
9621(b) (1994). The study showed that in white communities treatment of the waste at
contaminated sites, a process designed to eliminate its toxicity, was chosen twenty-two
percent more often than containment. In African-American communities, containment was
chosen seven percent more frequently than treatment. See Marianne Lavelle, Examining
EPA's Scoring System, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S6.
01 See Marianne Lavelle, The Minorities Equation,NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S2.
102 See Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 99, at S2. The NLJ found that penalties under
hazardous waste laws at sites having the greatest white population were about 500 percent
higher than penalties at sites with the greatest minority population. The NLJ study reached
several other significant conclusions.
Hazardous waste, meanwhile, is the type of pollution experts say is most
concentrated in minority communities. For all federal environmental laws
aimed at protecting citizens from air, water and waste pollution, penalties
in white communities were 46 percent higher than in minority
communities. Under the giant Superfund Program, abandoned hazardous
waste sites in minority areas take 20 percent longer to be placed on the
national priority list than those in white communities .... At the minority
sites, the EPA chooses containment, the capping or closing off of a
hazardous waste site, 7 percent more frequently than the clean-up method
preferred under the law, permanent "treatment," to eliminate the waste or
rid it of its toxins. In white communities, the EPA ordered treatment 22
percent more often than containment.
Id.
o"'See generally Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection:
The Needfor an Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 628 (discussing a
number of empirical studies demonstrating that people of color are concentrated in jobs that
present a high risk of harm from exposure to toxic substances); see also Ivette Perfecto,
Pesticide Exposure of Farm Workers and the InternationalConnection, in RACE AND THE
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Lead poisoning is a particularly cogent example of an adverse impact
resulting from a racially disproportionate exposure to environmental toxins. 05
As of 1988, lead poisoning affected between three and four million children
in the United States-primarily African-American and Latino children
residing in urban communities. The federal Agency for Toxic Substance and
Disease Registry found that sixty-eight percent of African-American families
earning less than $6000 annually, as compared to thirty-six percent of
Caucasian children in the same depressed economic category, had lead
poisoning.1 6 Even in families whose incomes exceeded $15,000 a year, more
than thirty-eight percent of African-American children had lead poisoning,
as compared to twelve percent of Caucasian children. 10 7 Although lead
poisoning is largely attributable to exposure to lead paint in the home,0 8 in
many urban locations external environmental exposures also play a
significant role."0
The Center for Disease Control classifies a blood lead ("BPb") level
of 10 /.tg/dL as lead poisoning."0 Lead is a heavy metal with no known

supra note 59, at 180;
James C. Robinson, Racial Inequality and the Probabilityof Occupation-RelatedInjury or
Illness, 62 MILBANK. Q. 567 (1984).
104 See ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY WORKGROUP, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUiTY: REDUCING RISKS FOR ALL COMMUNITIES, 11-12 (1992)
(finding that lead levels in the blood of urban African-American children under the age of
five greatly exceed the levels found in similarly-aged white children living in various cities).
105 See discussion of effects of lead poisoning infra notes 106-14 and accompanying text.
106 See BULLARD, supra note 62, at 99 (citing AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND
INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS: A TIME FOR DISCOURSE,

DISEASE REGISTRY).

See id.
" See Committee on Environmental Health, Lead Poisoning: From Screening to Primary
107

Prevention, 92 PEDIATRICS 176, 178 (1993).
1o9 See Peter A. Baghurst et al., Environmental Exposure to Lead and Children's
Intelligence at the Age of Seven Years: The Port Pirie Cohort Study, 327 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1279, 1282-83 (1992); Committee on Accident and Poison Precautions, Committee on
Environmental Hazards, Statement on ChildhoodLead Poisoning,79 PEDIATRICS 457, 45860 (1987). See infra Part I.C. for a discussion of the causes of disproportionate
environmental risks in minority communities.
"0 See Committee on Environmental Health, supra note 108, at 176.
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physiological value in humans."' It is "an extremely toxic metal: even a
single atom of lead, once in the human body, binds to a protein and induces
some damages; the greater the exposure, the more serious the effects.""' 2
Relatively low blood lead levels have been shown to "be associated with IQ
deficits, behavior disorders, slowed growth and impaired hearing. ' "
Asymptomatic exposure to lead, reflecting low to moderate levels of blood
lead, may be associated with decreased bi-lateral coordination, visual motor
control, and fine-motor development.14
As a society, we are only beginning to assess the social, physical, and
economic costs attendant to this disproportionate exposure to environmental
toxins. Some researchers contend that even relatively low levels of lead may
cause serious adverse psychological and developmental effects upon children
that may in turn, lead to life long consequences.' ' Certainly, lead is not the
sole cause of low academic achievement or crime in communities of color."6
A myriad of social processes contribute to those phenomena. However, the

.. See Committee on Accident and Poison Precautions, Committee on Environmental
Hazards, supra note 109, at 457; Susan R. Lucas et al., Relationship Between Blood Lead
and NutritionalFactors in Preschool Children: A Cross-SectionalStudy, 97 PEDIATRICS 74,
74(1996).
'2 Sergio Piomelli, Childhood Lead Poisoning in the '90s, 93 PEDIATRICS 508, 508
(1994).
"' Committee on Environmental Health, supra note 108, at 176. Recent evidence suggests
that early exposure to lead can result in lasting detrimental effects. In one study, first and
second graders with high lead levels were seven times more likely not to graduate from high
school and six times more likely to have difficulty performing at grade level. See id. at 175.
"4 See Kim N. Dietrich et al., Lead Exposure and the Motor Developmental Status of
Urban Six- Year-Old Children in the CincinnatiProspective Study, 91 PEDIATRICS 301, 301,
305-06 (1993).
IS See Herbert L. Needleman, et al., The Long-Term Effects of Exposure to Low Doses
of Lead in Childhood, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 83, 86 (1990); Anthony J. McMichael, et al.,
PortPirie Cohort Study: EnvironmentalExposure to Lead and Children's Abilities at the
Age of Four Years, 319 NEw ENG. J. MED. 468, 474 (1988).
'" It has been suggested that there exists a strong relationship between lead poisoning and
disciplinary problems in school, juvenile crime, and adult crime. See Deborah W. Denno,
Considering Lead Poisoning as a Criminal Defense, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 377, 384-93
(1993); DEBORAH W. DENNO, BIOLOGY AND VIOLENCE: FROM BIRTH TO ADULTHOOD 4,
106-07 (1990).
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potential that there exits an environmental basis to difficult social problems
argues for greater attention to be paid to environmental inequity.
2. Case Studies
Case studies reinforce the conclusions of the statistical analyses.
Robert Bullard, a sociologist, has written extensively over the past decade
about the problem of racially disproportionate allocation of environmental
burdens. One such study involved community efforts to rid a Dallas, Texas,
community of an environmental pariah. 7 At the time of Bullard's case study
in 1980, Dallas was the seventh-largest city in the nation, with a population
of 904,078."8 The 265,594 blacks who lived in Dallas constituted
approximately 29.4% of the city's overall population. 9 At that time, more
than eight of every ten blacks lived in majority black enclaves such as West
Dallas. 20 The total population of the West Dallas study area at the time of
2
the study was 13,161, of whom more than eighty-five percent were black.1 '
This West Dallas neighborhood initially developed as a rural black settlement
on the fringe of Dallas. 2 2 In 1909, citizens built the Thomas R. Edison
2
School, a facility that continued in use through the time of the case study.
Historically, West Dallas has been a dumping area for the city's solid
waste. 2 4 In 1934, Murph Metals, later known as the RSR Corporation, began
operating a smelting operation on a sixty-three-acre lot in the West Dallas
community near the Thomas Edison School.' 25 As was typical of many
African-American communities in the South, West Dallas was not annexed
to the City of Dallas, nor provided with basic services, until 1954. 16

117See BULLARD, supra note 62, at 45.

See id.
,9See id.at 45-46.
,20See id.
at 46.
'"See id.
,2See id.
23 See id.
114See id.
': See id.
, See id.
11

510

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L.

& POL'Y REV.

[Vol. 21:485

In 1956, despite the presence of industry spewing a highly toxic
material into the environment, the Dallas Housing Authority built a 3500 unit
public housing project in West Dallas that covered more than 500 acres.' 27
Two-thirds of the families in West Dallas had incomes below poverty level.' 28
Many of the local residences were torn down to make way for the public
housing development.2 9 The project was sited just north of the lead smelter
property line and in the direct path of the prevailing southerly winds. 30 There
also existed a secondary smelter that recovered lead from used automobile
batteries and other materials.' 3 ' The company also disposed of unused battery
chips by turning them into landfill to be used throughout West Dallas.'
During peak operations in the 1960s, the plant pumped more than 269 tons
of lead particles a year into the West Dallas air. 33 Few households were airconditioned. 34 Therefore, particles were blown by prevailing winds through
open windows and doors of residences and onto streets, ballparks, and
children's recreational facilities, where they could be inhaled by residents and
ingested by young children who placed dirty and dusty hands into their
mouths. 3 5 At the time RSR first moved into West Dallas, at the time the
public housing authority built projects adjacent to the facility, and throughout
the city's history of enforcement "efforts," the community was, by reason of
its residential character and the location of its educational and recreational
facilities, wholly inappropriate as a location for a lead smelter.
For over five decades, the populace of West Dallas was exposed to

See id.
28See id.

27

129

See id.

o See id.
'"

I

2

See id.
See Ronald Robinson, West Dallas Versus the Lead Smelter, in UNEQUAL PROTECTION

92, 97 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1994).
'
See BULLARD, supra note 62, at 46; Bob Paynter, Legacy of Lead: Children in
Smelter's Shadow compensatedfor Life Impairment, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 7, 1986,
at IA, available in 1986 WL 4353859.
See BULLARD, supra note 62, at 46.
'
3

See id.
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ongoing and unabated lead particulate contamination. 6 Although an
ordinance placing strict limitations on lead emissions was passed in 1968,'
Dallas officials failed to enforce it.'
As a result, children-the group most
vulnerable to lead poisoningg"-were exposed to elevated levels of lead in
soil, air, and households."4 Although in 1974 the City of Dallas finally sued
RSR and other local smelters to enforce compliance with environmental
regulations (and later settled for only $35,000 in fines), the emissions did not
abate." 1 It was not until 1981, when the DallasMorning News ran a story
about "potentially dangerous" lead levels having been discovered by EPA
officials, that the City of Dallas and State of Texas took stronger legal
action.1 42 At the same time several class action suits were filed.143 It was
1984 before the smelters were closed permanently.44
The environmental impact upon West Dallas of years of unremitted
lead particulate contamination was staggering. Soil lead levels found near the
West Dallas Boys Club-located a short distance from the 300 foot smoke
stack of the RSR smelter-were sixty times higher than those considered

13 See id. at 47.
,' See id. The ordinance prohibited the emission of lead compounds in excess of 5 p.g/m3.
See id.
' See id. In 1972, the Dallas Health Department study found that living near smelters was
associated with a thirty-six percent increase in blood lead level. See id. No action was taken
by city officials. See id. at 48.
' See Dietrich et al., supra note 114, at 301-07. It is reported that one woman, Alicia
Hracheta, ordered gravel for her driveway in 1982. See Robinson, supra note 132, at 97. The
gravel company delivered crushed battery casings instead of soil. See id. The lead level in
her home was tested at 99,000 parts per million ("ppm"), far in excess of the 250 ppm
considered a health risk for residents. See id. at 98.
140 See BULLARD, supra note 62,
at 47.
14' See id. at 48.
142 See id.
141 See id.
"' See Bruce Tomaso & Bob Paynter, City's Lead Pollution Saga Began More Than 40
Years Ago: The Legacy of Lead, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 7, 1986, at 3 IA, available
in 1986 WL 4353861.
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potentially dangerous to children.' 45 The West Dallas Boys Club and the
Maro Booth Day Care Center were forced to close in 1983 because of lead
contamination problems.'46 In 1990, when Dumping in Dixie'47 was first
the smelter was closed, much of the contaminated soil
published, although
48
remained on-site.'
West Dallas residents could demonstrate, relatively easily, the
potential harm to them from the failure to comply with, and to enforce,
environmental regulations. In one sense, West Dallas residents were "lucky"
they were burdened by a single toxin where the source of the exposure was
easily demonstrated, the extent of exposure was documented, and the
potential for resulting health risks well-established. 49 Thus, proof of harm
in a traditional environmental tort action was possible. Unfortunately, in
many environmental tort actions, there are a number of potential defendants,
a variety of toxic substances, and only a paucity of persuasive medical or
scientific data establishing clear causal links between chronic exposure and

See BULLARD, supra note 62, at 48-49. The potential danger to children may extend
beyond those discussed in notes 105-111 and accompanying text. A recent study suggests
that lead contamination in young, inner city children is associated with increased levels of
violent or otherwise anti-social conduct. See Denno, Considering Lead Poisoning as a
CriminalDefense, supra note 116, at 384-93.
146 See BULLARD, supra note 62, at 49. The West Dallas Boys Club enrolled more than
1200 youths between the ages of 6 and 28; the Maro Booth Day Care Center, a facility served
children from seventy-five low income families. See id. These closures suggest that the
children were not only subjected to toxic levels of lead, but that they lost access to important
social organizations intended to promote their social and educational development.
'"" See generally id.
148 See id. at
50.
14
In connection with the West Dallas case study, it should be recognized that the plaintiffs
in that case were ultimately able to bring a class action lawsuit against the smelter on behalf
of 370 children and in fact settled the case for a purported 20 million dollars. See Tomaso
& Paynter, Secret Settlement to Victims Estimatedat $20 Million, Dallas Morning News, Dec
7, 1986, at IA, available in 1986 WL 4353864. It may have been that a separate cause of
action was not necessary in that case, or it may have been that an intentional personal injury
cause of action, if available, would have allowed the residents to go forward to shut the
smelter down without waiting for the Dallas officials to take action.
145
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physical harm. 50° These factors render it extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to establish the elements of traditional environmental tort
doctrine.
In another case study, Bullard relates that, in 1978, a Jamestown, New
York trucking operation obtained, for purposes of resale, 32,000 cubic yards
of soil contaminated with poly-chlorinated bi-phenyl ("PCBs") from a
Raleigh, North Carolina, transfer company. 5 ' At about the same time, the
EPA banned the resale of toxic soil.' The waste haulers, unable to resell the
contaminated soil, dumped it along 270 miles of roadway in North Carolina
where it remained for four years.' In 1982, the governor of North Carolina
decided to bury the contaminated soil in the community of Afton in Warren
County.'54 Afton was one of the poorest counties in North Carolina and had
the highest percentage of African-Americans in the state.' The Afton site
was not geologically suitable for the burial of this waste.' 56 In particular, the
water table at the site of the landfill was only five to ten feet below the
surface, and the residents of the community derived all of their drinking water
from those wells.'57 Thus, the risk of contamination was significant, and the

'o See Christopher McAuliffe, Comment, Resurrecting an Old Cause of Action for a New
Wrong: Battery as a Toxic Tort, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 265 (1993).
151 See BULLARD, supra note 62, at 30. In 1982, state officials in North Carolina decided
to locate a PCB landfill near a predominately black community. See id. at 30. A large group
of African-American citizens engaged in protests reminiscent of the 1960s Civil Rights
movement. See id. at 31. More than 500 people were arrested in the course of the protests.
The protests were unsuccessful in preventing the siting of the landfills. See id. Congressman
Walter E. Fauntroy, who had participated in the protests, subsequently requested that the
United States General Accounting Office ("GAO") investigate the socio-economic and racial
composition of the communities surrounding the four major hazardous waste landfills in the
South. See id. at 32.

See id. at 30.

's

See Ken Geiser & Gerry Waneck, PCBs and Warren County, in UNEQUAL
PROTECTION, supra note 54, at 43, 50.
14 See BULLARD supra note
62, at 30.
155Warren county had a population of 16,232 in 1980. See id. at 30. Afton was more than
84% black. See id.
1.6 See Geiser & Waneck, supra note 153, at 51.
'

57

See id
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presence of the disposal site decried. The protests, however, fell on deaf ears.
These failed protests led to the GAO study in 1983.'
West Dallas and Warren County are examples of communities
burdened primarily by a single facility or enterprise. Other communities of
color endure a much more staggering scenario; they are, in effect, the
dumping grounds for this nation. This concentration of environmentally
burdensome facilities is illustrated by Alsen, Louisiana, an unincorporated,
African-American community that is home to the fourth-largest hazardous
waste facility in the country, a facility owned by the Rollins Corp. 5 9 The
landfill, and an incinerator that processed 80 million pounds of hazardous
waste in 1992, disposed of medical waste, heavy metals, pesticides, and
radioactive wastes. 6 ' The Rollins Co. is responsible for groundwater
contamination and has received numerous fines for violations of
environmental laws. 6 ' The Rollins facility is not the only environmentally
burdensome enterprise that calls Alsen home. Petro Processors (which has
created two Superfund sites), the Grow Chemical Company, the Union Tank
Company, Schuylkill Metals, Allied Signal, La Chem Chemical Co., Deltech,
Reynolds Aluminum Petroleum Coke division and62an Exxon Resin plant also
are located in and around the Alsen community.
Similarly, in Noxubee County, Mississippi, the African-Americans for
Environmental Justice Organization opposed the siting of additional
hazardous waste landfills and an incinerator in their community. 163 Noxubee
County has the highest percentage of non-white residents and the lowest per
capita income of any county in Mississippi considered suitable for a
hazardous waste facility."'4 The complaint filed by the group alleges that the
proposed facility sits on top of the same drinking water aquifer as the

58

See BULLARD, supra note 62, at 32.

See id. at 55-56; Michael Fisher, EnvironmentalRacism Claims Brought Under Title
's
VI of the Civil Rights Act, 25 ENVTL. L. 285, 307 n.103 (1995).
"o See Fisher, supra note 159, at 307 n. 103.
161 See id.
162 See id.
16

See id. at 323.

164 See id.
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hazardous waste landfill at Emelle, Alabama, just fifteen miles away from the
Noxubee County line. 6 5 In neighboring Lowndes County, a permitted
hazardous-waste-burning kiln was located just five miles from the Noxubee
County line. 66 Although Lowndes County was primarily white, the location
of the kiln in Lowndes County was in close proximity to a predominately
African-American community.6 7 In addition, at the time of the complaint in
1993, the town of Brooksville in Noxubee County was the proposed location
for a 50,000 ton per year incinerator and a 340,000 ton per year landfill. 61
Nearby Shuqualok Mountain was the proposed site for a second landfill with
a 200,000 ton per year capacity.169 Taken together, although the entire state
of Mississippi produces about 45,000 tons of hazardous waste each year,
Noxubee County was intended to become the annual dumping ground for
over 130,000 tons of hazardous waste.70 Anecdotal evidence, and case
studies such as these, serve to illustrate further the disproportionate
environmental burdens experienced by racial and ethnic minorities in this
country.
C. Causal Factors in the Creation and Perpetuation of Environmental
Racism
Although the above statistical analyses and case studies support a
growing consensus that there exists a racially disproportionate allocation of
environmental burdens and misallocation of environmental enforcement
mechanisms, there is less consensus as to the cause of the disparities."'
Much of the discussion and analysis pertaining to the disproportionate
allocation of environmental burdens focuses upon one aspect of the

165

See id. at 323-24.

" See id. at 324.
167 See id.
168

'
7o
'7'

See id. at 324 n.200
See id.
See id. at 324.
See Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods:

DisproportionateSiting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L.J. 1383, 1398-1406 (1994)

(reviewing several studies on siting disparities).

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.

[Vol. 21:485

' 72
phenomenon described above-that of "environmental racism.
Environmental racism is defined as racial discrimination in environmental
policymaking and the unequal enforcement of environmental laws and
regulations.'73 "In short, when we label an environmental practice as an
example of environmental racism we are saying that the predictable
distributional impact of that decision contributes to the structure of racial
subordination and domination that has similarly marked many of our public
policies in this country." '74 Torres acknowledges that "[i]n many cases, this
subordinating impact will be the result of an unconscious process, . . . if the
perception of the affected class is that the impact is fundamentally racially
targeted then we must assume that the substantive effect is racist unless a
better or different justification can be put forward."' 75 Thus, willful
ignorance of the fact that seemingly neutral environmental regulations and
administrative practices have the potential for causing racial impact, even in
the absence of overt racial animus, itself may be racist in that such ignorance

' There are several explanations for this focus. First, as discussed above, the statistical
information, when controlled for income and other facts, continues to demonstrate a strong
correlation between race and exposure to environmental toxins. See Nancy A. Denton &
Douglas S. Massey, Residential Segregation of Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians by
Socioeconomic Status and Generation, 69 Soc. Sci. Q. 797 (1988) (Describing U.S. census
data showing racial discrimination was just as significant when controlling for other factors
such as income, education, and occupation status levels, and concluding that race limited
their mobility more than income). Second, the "mere" fact that poorer districts are subjected
to significantly higher levels of exposure to toxic substances is unlikely to trigger a strict
scrutiny equal protection analysis. See, e.g., San Antonio Ind. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 2324 (1973) (stating that where wealth is involved, equal protection analysis does not require
absolute equality or precisely equal advantages).
"' See ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: HEARINGS BEFORE THE HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON CIVIL
RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (Mar. 3, 1993) (testimony of
Dr. Benjamin F. Chavis, Jr.); James H. Colopy, The Road Less Traveled: Pursuing
EnvironmentalJustice Through Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
125, 129 n.7 ("This author [Colopy] defines environmental racism as the burdening of
communities of color with higher than average amounts of pollution without a concomitant
equitable share of benefits from environmental regulations.")
174 Gerald Torres, Introduction: UnderstandingEnvironmental Racism, 63 COLO. L. REV.
839, 840 (1992).
175

Id.
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results in a racially disproportionate allocation of environmental burdens. 176
Although an in-depth analysis of the causes of environmental racism/injustice
is beyond the scope of this Article, 177 some discussion is necessary in order
to understand the limitations of current theory that provides the rationale for
the proposed tort action.
The term "environmental racism" carries with it a great deal of social
and legal history. In a social context, the term "racism" evokes strong
reaction arising from this nation's history of slavery and both overt and covert
race-centered oppression. 7 1 Courts have construed the label "racist" or
"racism" to apply to conduct that is intentionally or purposefully governed by
79
consideration of race, or where consciousness of race is a motivating factor. 1
Thus, "[1]abelling the outcomes that correlate race and exposure to
environmental hazards as 'racist' invites the demand for evidence of an overt,
race-conscious impetus and a 'single bad actor."" 80 In cases alleging race
discrimination in the siting of hazardous waste facilities, such evidence is
extremely difficult to provide.

176

See id.
For excellent discussions of the root causes of environmental racism, see generally

177

FACES OF ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: CONFRONTING ISSUES OF GLOBAL JUSTICE, supra note

37; Torres, supra note 152, at 840 (defining racism as "those activities which support or
justify the superiority of one racial group over another"); Edward Patrick Boyle, It's Not
Easy Bein' Green: The Psychology of Racism, Environmental Discrimination,and the
Argument for Modernizing Equal Protection Analysis, 46 VAND. L. REv. 937, 967-79
(1993).
178See Torres, supra note 174, at 839 ("The term racism draws its contemporary moral
strength by being clearly identified with the history of the structured oppression of AfricanAmericans and other people of color in this society.")
' See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 318-19 (1987) (explaining the establishment
of the intent/purpose requirements in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and Village
ofArlington Heights v. MetropolitanHousing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), and
their further inculcation in equal protection/race discrimination jurisprudence as a necessity
in establishing actionable racism. Because of the intent requirement, a showing of racial
disparate impact of a facially neutral law or decision is insufficient without demonstrating
specific racial animus.)
IS' Sheila Foster, Race(ial) Matters: The Quest for EnvironmentalJustice, 20 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 721, 732 (1993).
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Moreover, there is, to some extent, a "chicken and egg" problem
presented with respect to determining the cause of the disproportionate
distribution of environmentally burdensome facilities. For example, it is
unclear whether some communities were "minority" communities at the
initial siting of the facility, and its status as a minority community contributed
to the siting decision, or whether the community only became a "minority
community" when everyone else who was able to do so moved out.' There
is some evidence that the presence of hazardous waste and other
environmental disamenities will cause those who have sufficient residential
mobility to move out of an environmentally impacted community. The
relative lack of mobility for many racial or ethnic minorities, resulting both
from poverty and housing discrimination, traps them in communities where
such facilities come to be located.' 82 If the value of housing stock is lowered
by unwanted land uses moving into a neighborhood, whether a minority
community or not, persons of color previously unable to afford housing in the
area may thereby be drawn to the neighborhood, creating a cycle of increasing
disparate impact. The decline in relative value of the surrounding properties
may, in turn, attract even more locally undesirable environmental land uses. 183
In most causes of action that provide redress for harms resulting from racist
conduct, plaintiffs must demonstrate a well-delineated correlation between
the cause of the racial injury and intentional conduct on the basis of race.
Without evidence that communities had a disproportionate minority
population at the time the facilities are sited, in addition to other evidence
that the siting decision was racially motivated, the charge of environmental
racism will likely not stand up in court. 84 "Indeed, the invariable judicial
response to claims of environmental racism has been a rejection of those

The GAO and UCC studies, and the multitude statistical analyses that followed, focused
upon current allocational practices and resulting environmental impacts, not upon the
historical demographics. See supra Part I.B. 1.
181 See Robert D. Bullard & Beverly Hendrix Wright, Environmentalism and the Politics
ofEquity: Emergent Trends in the Black Community, 12 MID-AMER. REV. OF Soc. 21, 32-33
(1987); Robert D. Bullard and Beverly H. Wright, The Politics of Pollution: Implications
for the Black Community, 47 PHYLON 71, 71-72 (March 1986).
183 See Been, supra note 171, at 1388.
1S

'8

See infra Part IV.B.
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claims for failure to prove the requisite discriminatory intent and causation,
notwithstanding demonstrations of disparate impact and discriminatory
outcomes."' 85 Thus, in traditional legal contexts used to combat racism, it
matters whether communities of color are "targeted" by the government or
private industry for siting such facilities because of their racial composition
or "merely" because low-income communities have lower property values.
The conclusion that toxic waste or other environmentally burdensome
facilities are disproportionately located in communities of color is, therefore,
not enough to attach liability.
However, there is significant anecdotal evidence that communities of
color, long viewed by public officials and others as less valued residential
areas, attract locally unwanted land uses. The underlying reasons are both
simple and complex.' 86 Blatantly race-motivated conduct, and the residual
implicit, institutional, or unconscious effects of that racism, market forces,
regulatory influences, and political opportunism further cause or contribute
to the presently demonstrable disproportionate allocation of exposure to
environmental hazards. Thus, "[t]o appreciate the meaning of environmental
racism, ... one must acknowledge the institutionalization of unconscious
biases, exclusionary processes, and normative judgments that influence
racially meaningful social structures, which in turn manifest racially disparate
outcomes."' 87

185Foster,

supra note 180, at 733.

" See Michael

Gelobter, Toward a Model of "Environmental Discrimination, " in RACE

supra note 59, at 73-76. Gelobter argues
that an understanding of environmental racism requires a framework that retains a broad
structural view of economic and social forces in influencing discriminatory outcomes. A
realistic analysis of structural processes must include a consideration of social forces that
influence market operation and the activities of bureaucracies. Thus, factors both external
to environmental enforcement agencies, such as demographic changes and the locational
patterns of polluters, and internal to those agencies, such as patterns of environmental
regulation, enforcement, and implementation should be used to develop the concept of
environmental racism. See id. at 73-80.
187 Foster, supra note 180,
at 735.
The historical racism that influences these processes and structures is
antecedent to the effects produced by those structures and exposes forces
that are already at work. There is no distinct phenomenon of
AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS,
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1. HistoricalZoning Practices
The history of environmental discrimination in America is welldocumented.' 88 Overt racial practices have influenced housing patterns in a
way that significantly contributes to environmental discrimination. 89 Racial
discrimination in the sale and rental of private housing often relegates people
of color to the least desirable neighborhoods, regardless of their income
level. " Housing options may be limited by individual real estate brokers and
rental agents refusing to show available houses, local refusal to establish
public housing, and redlining by insurers and lenders.' 9 ' Much of the racial

environmental racism, if seen as a manifestation of historical racism and
antecedent structural forces influenced by that racism. Environmental
racism is thus less prescriptive and more descriptive of forces that
manifest themselves in racially disparate outcomes in hazardous
environmental exposure. In that sense, "environmental:" not only
modifies "racism," but ultimately corroborates it.
Id.
88 See Leslie Ann Coleman, It's the Thought That Counts: The Intent Requirement in
EnvironmentalRacism Claims, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 447, 450-55 (1993) (detailing judicial
and legislative support for patterns of discrimination); Robert W. Collin, Environmental
Equity: A Law and PlanningApproach to EnvironmentalRacism, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 495,
497 (1992) (recognizing this nation's history of exploiting African-Americans and other
people of color, especially with respect to land use issues); Jon C. Dubin, From Junkyards
to Gentrification: Explicating a Right to ProtectiveZoning in Low-Income Communities of
Color, 77 MINN. L. REv. 739, 757-64 (1993) (discussing discriminatory zoning practices and
their effects on African-American communities and addressing the history, development, and
legal ramifications of government's failure to provide protective zoning to low-income
communities of color).
'
See Denton & Massey, supra note 172, at 803-05, 814; Karl Taeuber, The
Contemporary Context of Housing Discrimination, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 339, 339
(1988); Robert D. Bullard, The Threat of Environmental Racism, NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T., Winter 1993, at 23 (claiming that exclusionary zoning practices perpetuates
discrimination); see generally PETER MIESZKOWSKI, STUDIES OF PREJUDICE AND RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION IN URBAN HOUSING MARKETS (1979) (discussing the continuing prevalence
of racial discrimination in housing markets).
See Denton & Massey, supra note 172, at 805; Bullard, supra note 189, at 24; Taeuber,
supra note 189, at 344-45.
"' See generally id.
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segregation in urban neighborhoods historically arises from exclusionary
zoning practices designed to keep poor people out of suburban or affluent
neighborhoods.' 92 Exclusionary zoning practices have long held the attention
and attracted the opprobrium of legal scholars. 93 These exclusionary zoning
practices include setting of lot sizes, frontages and other "aesthetic"
requirements that preclude the development of low- or moderate- income
housing. There may be prohibitions on multi-unit dwellings or other
limitations that have similar effects. For example, in Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township ofMount Laurel ("Mount Laurel f")194 citizens
challenged certain zoning ordinances that, in effect, prohibited low-income
housing from existing within its municipal limits.'95 These ordinances
included, among other things, a five-acre minimum lot requirement for a
single family in a non-residential zone.' 9 6 The court ordered the
municipalities to affirmatively afford a realistic opportunity for the
construction of low- and moderate-income housing. 197 Mt. Laurel continued
to oppose the implementation of the court's order. Thus, in a second
appeal,' 98 the court acknowledged that the municipal authority purposefully
zoned land for public housing in an inaccessible, and environmentally
hazardous, industrial zone. 9 9 Specifically, the court found that
13 acres ... totally surrounded by industrially zoned land,
virtually isolated from residential uses, has no present access
to other parts of the community, no water or sewer

'9
See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION OF CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (U.S.
Gov't Printing Office, 1968 (citing suburban exclusion as one of the principal causes making
America "two societies, one black, one white--separate and unequal.")
"i9 See, e.g., JAMES A. KUSI-NER, FAIR HOUSING § 7.08 (1995) (collecting cases and
observing "the extraordinary attention of scholars to the problems of exclusionary zoning").
194 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975).
"5 See id. at 729
'96 See id. at 720-21.
197 See id. at 724.
'" See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel (Mount Laural II),
456 A.2d 390, 462 (N.J. 1983).

'"

See id. at 462.
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connections nearby, is in the path of a proposed high speed
railroad line, and is subject to possible flooding. It would be
hard to find.., a less suitable parcel for lower income or any
other kind of housing.2 °0
The widespread practice of housing the economically disadvantaged,
a group containing a disproportionate number of racial and ethnic minorities,
in large public housing projects further exacerbates the problem of
exclusionary practices. Those who rely upon public housing often are
forced 01 to live in economically depressed areas,202 or in close proximity to
environmental hazards. Indeed, public housing projects frequently are
proposed to be, or are built on or adjacent to, industrial complexes and other
hazardous waste sites. 2 3 For example, in Chicago, one can find Altgeld
Gardens, a housing project surrounded by municipal and hazardous waste
landfills. 2 4 More than seventy percent of the residents of Altgeld Gardens
are African-American, and eleven percent are Hispanics. It is alleged that
community residents suffer from elevated levels of cancer and birth
defects.20 5 The 2000 families who reside in the Altgeld Gardens call it "the
toxic doughnut" because they are inundated with pollutants from a nearby
mill, a paint company, a huge incinerator, and an eightysludge plant, a steel
26
landfill.
foot-high

200

Id.

use of the word force is deliberate. Some have argued that people of color could
always relocate, move away from the unwanted land use, and therefore their continued
presence in an area in which they are subject to exposure to environmental toxins is by
choice. For those who rely on public housing, the "choice" often is to live in the designated
housing project or on the streets. Acquiescence where there are no viable alternatives is not
"choice," rather, in this context, it is the functional equivalent of force.
202 See Walker v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, 734 F.
Supp. 1289 (N.D. Tex. 1989) (finding that housing authority deliberately located public
housing in "Negro slum areas").
203 See supra text accompanying notes 189-93.
204 See Bullard, Environmental Justice ofAll, in UNEQUAL PROTECTION, supra note 54, at
201 The

14.

See Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 99, at S3.
20' See John Elson, Dumping on the Poor, TIME, Aug. 13, 1990, at 46.
205
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Just as racially discriminatory exclusionary zoning patterns and
housing practices have had a significant impact upon the disproportionate
allocation of environmental disamenities, so too has so-called "expulsive
zoning." Expulsive zoning is a term coined by Yale Rabin to apply to the
practice of depriving communities of color the benefit of protective zoning
and of superimposing incompatible zoning on such communities. °7 The net
effect of such zoning practices is to cause piecemeal replacement of residents
with the superimposed uses and their owners."' Professor Rabin concludes
that the imposition of lower-grade zoning, or zoning authorizing noxious
commercial or industrial uses, undermines the quality of the residential
environment and discourages continued residencies."
Thus, these residents
deprived of zoning protections are vulnerable to various problems ranging
from commonplace inconveniences to dangerous or environmentally toxic
hazards.210 Thus, expulsive zoning decisions, specifically with reference to
expanding permissible industrial uses in communities of color, often result,
not in people "coming to the hazard," but in the hazard coming to the them.
An early litigated example of this practice is illustrated in the case of R.I.S.E.
Inc. v. Kay,"' an action involving environmental racism. Plaintiffs alleged
that the county supervisors had rezoned a rural, traditionally black
community for the location of a landfill that would receive waste for an entire
region.'
The county's other existing landfills were also in areas containing
between ninety and one-hundred percent African-American populations." 3
The only landfill that had been located in a predominately Caucasian
community was closed down after residents protested.2t 4 The expulsive

207

See Yale Rabin, Expulsive Zoning: The Inequitable Legacy of Euclid, in ZONING

THE AMERICAN DREAM 101,
208 See Durbin, supra note
209

AND

101 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Keyden eds., 1989).
188, at 742-43.

See id. at 742.

2'0 See id.
21 768 F. Supp.

1144 (E.D. Va. 1991), aff'd mem., 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992).

213

See id. at 1147-48.
See id.,at 1148.

214

See Robert W. Collin & William Harris, Sr., Race and Waste in Two Virginia

2

Communities, in CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS,

supra note 86, at 93, 97.
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zoning was upheld as a rationally based decision unrelated to racial animus.215
However, the court acknowledged that in a city in which fifty percent of the
residents were African-American, the multiple siting of such facilities did
have a disparate impact upon their communities.216
The interplay of these exclusive and expulsive zoning practices is a
significant cause of the disproportionate allocation of environmental burdens
on communities of color. However, social and political factors, while less
overtly racist, are equally problematic.
2. Social and PoliticalInfluences
Social and political dynamics play a crucial role with respect to a
corporation's decision regarding where to locate environmentally
burdensome enterprises. Efforts to site locally unwanted land uses are not
based solely, or even primarily, upon scientific or environmental grounds.
Such decisions are more often politically expedient than environmentally
justified. In the past twenty years, we have become much more informed
about environmental issues in general, and environmental risks in particular.
As we have acquired more knowledge about the risks of toxins in the
environment, we have become increasingly concerned (perhaps even
paranoid) about our own exposure to environmental toxins, the threat of
associated health risks, the diminution of quality of life, and the devaluation
of property. This rising level of concern has motivated politically powerful
and economically influential middle- and upper-income communities to
publicly and vociferously oppose the siting of locally unwanted and
environmentally burdensome land uses in or near their communities.217 The
response from these communities often involves protests, petitions, and other
activities designed to oppose a decision to locate an undesirable land use in

SeeR.I.S.E.,768F.Supp.at 1150.
See id. at 1149-50.
217 See Denton E. Morrison, How and Why Environmental Consciousness Has Trickled
Down, in DISTRIBUTIONAL CONFLICT IN ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCE POLICY 187 (Allan
Schnaiberg et al. eds., 1986).
2"5
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close proximity to one's home."' This refusal of middle- and upper-income
citizens to share in the burden of this highly industrialized society's
environmental waste dilemma, and the resulting organized opposition to the
siting of environmentally burdensome enterprises, gives rise to the "Not-InMy-Backyard" ("NIMBY") Syndrome. 9
As these communities become increasingly successful in their
opposition, demanding that the facilities be located "somewhere else,"22 the
disproportionate distribution of burdens is exacerbated. In order to avoid the
legal and other costs associated with fighting well organized NIMBY groups,
hazardous waste facility operators and local governments avoid those
neighborhoods in which organized resistance is likely to be forthcoming. 2 '
The political ramifications of siting unwanted land uses in politically
influential and economically affluent communities, and the legal costs
associated with fighting those battles, seems to have resulted in the
development of a related syndrome, "Place In Blacks' Backyards"
("PIBBY")."2 In Dumping in Dixie, Bullard contends that industry and
public officials anticipating an attack or a coordinated citizen reaction to a
decision authorizing the placement of a hazardous waste facility or other
environmental disamenity often respond by targeting less politically
powerful, less well-organized minority or low-income communities.223 Leslie

2

See Linda Stamato, In Their Own Backyards: Community Organizationsand Siting

Controversies, 77 NAT'L Civic REv. 315 (1988) (detailing the nature and strength of
response of community reaction to proposed siting of an unwanted land use).
219 See BULLARD, supra note 62, at 37-38.
221 Id. at 38.
221 See Bullard & Wright, The Politics of Pollution:Implicationsfor the Black Community,

supra note 182, at 74, 78.
22 See Vicki Been, What's FairnessGot to Do With It? EnvironmentalJustice and
the

Siting of UndesirableLand Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 1001, 1002-03 (1993); Fisher, supra
note 159, at 307-08.
223

See BULLARD, supra note 62, at 3-7 (asserting that African-American communities

historically have been targets of waste sites because of low resistance); Dubin, supra note
166, at 764-68 (1993) (recognizing the powerlessness of African-American communities as
a factor in siting decisions); David Lampe, The Politics of EnvironmentalEquity, 81 NAT'L
Civic REV. 27, 28 (1992) (arguing that process of siting hazardous waste facilities targets less
resistant communities).
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Coleman asserts that
the NIMBY and PIBBY syndromes demonstrate that the
decision to place undesirable land uses in minority
neighborhoods may not be so much an issue of intent as it is
a reaction to societal factors. External factors unrelated to the
formal decision-making process itself, such as NIMBY and
PIBBY, indirectly result in minority communities'
shouldering an unequal share of society's waste facilities.224
Moreover, public officials do not always respond equally to all
segments of the population.225 After facilities have been in operation, and the
threat of health risks or other environmental harms materialize, officials are
often reluctant to acknowledge the problem.226 When authorities do concede
the existence of a hazardous situation, they often are slow to respond and do
so with less vigor than in white, middle class communities.227

224

Coleman, supra note 188, at 477-78.

See Marianne Lavelle, A Toxic Refuge, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 23, 1992, at 1, 24. Marianne
Lavelle chronicles the efforts of some middle-class Hispanic families to improve their quality
of life by leaving congested New York City and moving to Warren Court, a largely minorityoccupied subdivision on the Hudson River. See id. at 1, 24. Three years later, the Guarinos
learned that the homes in Warren Court had been built on a waste site composed of
decomposing gypsum board that was emitting hydrogen sulfide gas, a substance poisonous
at high levels of concentration. See id. at 1. Over 10,000 cubic yards of rotting gypsum
board were buried under Warren Court. See id. The discovery of the gypsum board
accounted for the persistent rotten-egg smell and, plaintiffs alleged, revealed the cause of
their family's illnesses including headaches, irritated eyes, unexplained high fevers, rashes,
gastric distress, and an eye infection that required surgery. See id at 24. The response of
local authorities was less than overwhelming. Sellers' brokers claimed that the smell was
from the Hudson River and referred to it as an odor problem. See id.
226 See West Dallas Case Study, supra notes 117-49.
227 See Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 99, at S2. The conclusion of a study of Superfund
225

programs conducted by the National Law Journal found that the government took a longer
time to address environmental hazards in minority residential areas than in Caucasian
communities. See id. In addition, placement on the national priority action list of abandoned
hazardous waste sites found in minority communities took twenty percent longer than
placement of sites located in Caucasian areas. See id.
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One might conclude that if citizens in low-income communities of
color are concerned with the siting of environmentally burdensome facilities,
then they should just protest as vigorously as their more affluent counterparts.
Indeed, they often do. 22 ' For many reasons, such as the lack of adequate
political and economic influence, the results of such protests are not the
same. 229 For example, in a report commissioned by the California Waste
Management Board to identify those populations least likely to oppose the
siting of garbage incinerators, the Board determined that communities with
populations under 25,000, in rural areas, with "old timer" residents, blue
collar workers, conservatives, and those with less than a high school
education were viable sites.23° A more explicit and infinitely more telling
comment in the report favoring the strategy of siting environmental hazards
in less politically powerful neighborhoods states that "[a]ll socioeconomic
groupings tend to resent the nearby siting of major facilities, but middle and
upper socioeconomic strata possess better resources to effectuate their
opposition. Middle and higher socioeconomic strata neighborhoods should
not fall within the one- mile and five-mile radius of the proposed site.",23'
Thus, the efforts of grass-roots activists to influence environmental
policymaking in the absence of sufficient political and economic clout "may
not only fail to reduce political inequality, but may actually exacerbate the
division between those who can exploit the political culture and those who

22S Examples

include groups such as Toxic Avengers, West Harlem Environmental Action,
Mothers of East Los Angeles, Concerned Citizens of South Central Los Angeles, and Native
Americans for a Clean Environment. See Dorceta E. Taylor, Environmentalism and the
Politics of Inclusion, in CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES FROM THE
GRASSROOTS, supra note 86, at 53, 56; see also R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144
(E.D. Va. 1991), aff'dmem., 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992).
22 See Harvey L. White, Hazardous Waste Incineratorsand Minority Communities, in
RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS, supra note 59, at 126 ("Minority
communities do not have the resources, or contacts, to initiate or sustain the proactive
behavior found in more affluent communities.").
210 See Luke W. Cole, Remedies for EnvironmentalRacism.: A View
from the Field, 90
MICH. L. REV. 1991, 1994 n. 14 (1994) (citing CERELL ASSOCIATES, POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES
FACING WASTE-TO-ENERGY CONVERSION PLANT SITING 17-30 (1984)).
23 Bullard, supra note 86, at 18 (quoting CERELL ASSOCIATES, POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES
FACING WASTE-TO-ENERGY CONVERSION PLANT CITING 43 (1984)).

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L.

& POL'Y REV.

[Vol. 21:485

cannot, thereby increasing the alienation and232frustration that the whole
participatory process is designed to eliminate.Political influences are also important with respect to circumstances
in which there is "environmental blackmail." There is an internal struggle in
many communities of color: while the presence of waste disposal facilities
may provide the potential for exposure to a variety of toxins, they may also
provide a glimmer of hope, from promises made, if not yet realized, of
economic salvation for an impoverished community. 233 "Communities that
agree to host hazardous-waste and other noxious facilities are promised
compensation in an amount such that the perceived benefits outweigh the
risks., 234 The "economic trade-off' is that the existence of environmental
burdens in minority communities will bring jobs to "poverty pockets,"
creating, perhaps, the hope of earning enough money to move out and move
up. The carrot---extended by companies that offer economic incentives in the
form ofjob promises, infrastructure improvement, and increased tax base-is
often combined with the stick--companies threaten that a change in
environmental enforcement practices, or opposition to toxic facility siting,
will result in plant closures, layoffs, tax revenue depletion, and economic
dislocation. 235 The "incentives" are too often unrealized, and the "threats" are
too often carried out. Because they are beset by rising unemployment, abject
poverty, a diminishing tax base, and decaying business infrastructures,
communities of color, or at least their elected representatives, often are

W.R. Derrick Sewell & Timothy O'Riordan, The Culture of Participation in
EnvironmentalDecision Making, 16 NAT. RESOURCES. J. 1, 19 (1976).
233 See Michelle Campbell, Incinerators Divide Ford Heights-Neighbors See Risks,
232

PoliticiansSee Hope, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 7, 1996, at 1, availablein 1996 WL 6730644.
In Ford Heights, a lower-income suburb of Chicago, some residents fear the tire burning
incinerator, an enterprise that stores tires within thirty feet of the nearest public housing
complex. The plant is intended to burn 7.2 million tires a year. In contrast, "village officials
see economic salvation." Id. See also Keith Schneider, Planfor Toxic Dump Pits Blacks
Against Blacks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1993, at A 12 (describing debates over the siting of a
hazardous waste facility in Noxubee County, Mississippi between blacks concerned about
the area being a "dumping ground" for toxic wastes and blacks hopeful for jobs and minority
owned business opportunities).
234 BULLARD, supra note 62, at 84.
.35See id. at 84-85.
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vulnerable to the siren song inducements and thus minimize their opposition
to proposed facility sitings.
Even if the community agrees to accept the environmental burden and
some increased economic prosperity comes to the locality, the result may still
be manifestly unjust. "Environmental blackmail" policies raise a moral issue:
should one part of society (the affluent) pay another part of society (the
disadvantaged) "to accept risks that others can afford to escape? ' 236 The
"consent" of those who live in closest proximity to the facility, or those who
are subjected daily to its fall-out, may have been induced by false promises.
The promised benefits are often not forthcoming, and the true extent of the
potential detriment is not disclosed. As demonstrated by the NIMBY
syndrome, the more informed the community is about the health risks, the
less likely it is to welcome potentially hazardous facilities or to tolerate their
negligent operation.
3. Market Force Factors
With respect to siting issues, hazardous waste facilities are locally
unwanted land uses that tend to be located upon the road to profit
maximization and along the path of least resistance. Thus, in addition to
social pressures, economic factors, or so-called "market forces," influence the
siting of hazardous waste facilities and often determine the likelihood of
environmental remediation. 2 7 Owners and operators of waste disposal and
reclamation facilities and landfills desire to make a profit. Compliance or
non-compliance with environmental regulations is similarly profitmotivated,238 and to the extent that costs can be avoided or minimized, they

Id. at 85. The process is reminiscent of another process that was prevalent in the last
century, that of permitting persons with money to avoid conscription by paying another to
go in their place.
27 See Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessnessof Pareto."CarryingCoase Further, 100 YALE
L.J. 1211, 1214 (1991); BURTON ALLEN WEISBROD ET AL., Public Interest Law. An
Economic and InstitutionalAnalysis (1978).
238 See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW,
AND SOCIETY 29 (West 1992).
Rational choice theory aids those who seek to alter polluter behavior.
236

530

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.

[Vol. 21:485

are. Indeed, the explanation given by industry representatives who select
certain sites for the siting of hazardous waste or other environmental
disamenities has less to do with racial animosity than their desire to minimize
2 39
costs and maximize profits.
Private industry tends to give race-neutral explanations for its
decisions. Indeed, its decisions often are made with an express purpose of
"helping" these communities, or returning economic prosperity to the region.
Thus, entrepreneurs in the hazardous waste management business tend to
favor sparsely populated locations where land can be obtained at low cost;
land tends to be cheaper in low-income and minority communities, especially
in rural enclaves. 4 In urban or semi-urban areas, land in and around lowincome and minority communities already may be zoned for commercial use,
a factor that further reduces the start-up costs of a new operation.1241 This
desire for wealth maximization, though "rational," causes a concentration of
wastes in portions of the common often resulting in a disparate impact upon

Presumably, excessive air and water pollution will continue to recur until
rational maximizers find it less profitable to pollute than to make other
arrangements for disposal of unwanted by-products. Rational choice
theory predicts that making pollution more expensive to the polluter than
other environmentally less harmful methods of disposal will effect a
reduction in pollution with a corresponding improvement in environmental
quality. Law intersects with this simple economic analysis because the
devices that change the calculus facing polluters are imposed by the legal
system .... Regardless of the legal means adopted, belief in rational
choice theory undergirds the strategy: those making the law expect that
regulated parties, [or those subject to common law liability] in order to
minimize costs, will reduce pollution.
Id.
29 See Joan Z. Bernstein, The Siting of Commercial Waste Facilities:An Evolution of
Community Land Use Decisions, 1 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 83, 83-84 (1991) (describing
historical site selection as being governed by economic factors).
240 See Mohai & Bryant, supra note 59, at 169-74 (discussing study of the siting of
hazardous waste sites in Detroit).
241 Minority and low-income communities that are located in areas not currently zoned for
commercial facilities or for hazardous waste purposes cannot count on that zoning not to
change as a result of the legal and financial pressures brought by commercial facilities
wishing to establish themselves in those areas. See generally Dubin, supra note 188.
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people of color and the poor.
The burgeoning literature on the topic of environmental racism/justice
attempts to discern not only the causes of the disproportionate allocation of
environmental burdens, but also tries to devise solutions to the problem.
Various disciplines have addressed how to create a set of incentives that will
motivate hazardous waste companies to make siting and operational decisions
that will cease to have a disproportionate impact upon minority communities.
They have suggested persuading industry to remediate hazardous
environmental conditions and to force compliance with environmental laws
in low-income or minority communities, at least as thoroughly and
expeditiously as in white, middle-income communities (in their own
backyard).
II. CURRENT APPROACHES TO THE REDRESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,
that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness. 242
Historically, these truths have been neither self-evident or self-actuating.243

242

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

At the time these words were written, Native Americans were "savages," a people
whose land was to be taken at almost any cost, including the decimation of Native American
cultures. Persons of African descent, slave or free, were considered chattel-fit only to be
bought and sold upon the open market place. See Scott v. Sanford, ("Dred Scott"), 19 How.
399, 406 (1856). In Scott Justice Taney stated:
[N]either the class of persons who had been imported as slaves, nor their
descendants, whether they had become free or not, were then [at the time
of the Constitution's adoption] acknowledged as a part of the people, nor
intended to be included in the general words used in that instrument; [that]
the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit.
He was 'bought and sold' and treated as an ordinary article of merchandise
and traffic, whenever a profit could be made by it. This opinion was at
that time fixed and universal in the civilized portion of the white race.
Justice Taney further summarized,
[t]he question is simply this: Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported
into this country, and sold as slaves, become a member of the political
243
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However, with the passage of time, and great social upheaval, these truths
have become, if not "self-evident," more widely espoused. In the United
States, there is now a broad consensus that people are equal before the law,
and are entitled to equal treatment under the law, without regard to race,
gender, ethnicity, or nationality. The goal of environmental racism theory is
to implement equality and treatment with respect to the distribution of
Current environmental racism
environmental benefits and burdens.
jurisprudence rests upon traditional discriminatory intent and disparate
impact analysis. Such analysis, at its core, reflects these essential founding
principles.
In our jurisprudence, the protection of life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness is realized in two relational contexts. First, these rights are
discerned in the relationship of individuals to their government-the context
preeminent in the Declaration of Independence. Rights established in the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights have been extended to people of color and
others through constitutional amendment and legislative enactment. These
"civil" rights are based, in part, upon citizenship (status as a member of this
society), and in part upon group identity (status as a member of readily
identifiable "communities" within the broader society). Civil rights are
concerned largely with protecting individuals against invasions of protected
interests by the actions of government and those acting on its behalf.
The right to protect life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness may be
discerned in the relationship of individuals to each other. A myriad of tort,
contract, and property doctrines seek to balance an individual's right to

community formed and brought into existence by the Constitution and as
such become entitled to all the rights, and privileges, and immunities,
guaranteed by that instrument to its citizens ....
We think they are not.
Id. at 403-04. Asians, although suitable to be used as laborers in the development of the
railroad, were likewise excluded from the vision set forth in the Declaration of Independence:
"There is a race so different from our own that we do not permit those belonging to it to
become citizens of the United States, persons belonging to it are, with few exceptions,
absolutely excluded from our country. I allude to the Chinese race." Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537, 561 (1895) (Justice Harlan, dissenting). In his dissent, Harlan argued that Negroes
were allowed to become citizens and should have certain rights accorded to them. The
allusion to the Chinese race was to demonstrate that Negroes were not similarly excluded.
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protect his own person, pursue his own interests, and to make use of his own
property against the exercise of similar rights by others. There is a unifying
theme undergirding both civil rights and individual interests jurisprudence.
Principles of equity, dignity, and fairness underlie the breadth of civil rights
legislation and jurisprudence and infuse the environmental justice movement.
A similar concern for individual dignity, equitable treatment, and personal
autonomy pervades tort law-for a wrong done, or a right denied, there may
be found access to a remedy at law or in equity. Increasingly, where the free
exercise of "individual" rights clashes with the enjoyment of "civil rights" the
result is an expansion of common law doctrine. 2"
Environmental racism causes those who reside in communities of
color to suffer both a deprivation of their civil rights and an invasion of their
individual interests. However, neither the current civil rights litigation
strategy, nor an individual rights tort law approach, fully addresses the
panoply of issues arising in the context of environmental racism. For a
complex, multifaceted problem such as environmental racism there is no
panacea. Accordingly, proposed strategies must recognize the strengths and
weaknesses of both traditions and build upon them.
At present, the panoply of legal and political approaches available to
address the environmental racism problem is expanding-but is far from
complete. 4 ' They include sociological analysis,246 civil rights litigation, 247

Thus, for example, under the employment-at-will doctrine an employer may fire an
employee for a good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all. An employer has the right to
decide who it will employ and for how long. However, if the termination contravenes
established public policy, i.e. state anti-discrimination law, common law tort remedies may
be available in addition to, and in support of, statutory relief. See Tate v. Browning-Ferris,
Inc., 833 P.2d 1218, 1220 (Okla. 1992). Thus, "[w]here an at-will employee terminated by
a private employer files suit alleging facts that, if true, violate state and federal statutes
providing remedies for employment discrimination" the employee may state a cause of
action,
based upon the same facts, for racially motivated or retaliatory discharge.
24
See Poirer, supra note 25, at 1097-98 (delineating a variety of approaches and some of
the main proponents of each approach). The following updated, but not exhaustive, listing
belies the complexity not only of the problem, but the solution(s) as well.
246 See Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Environmental Injustice: Weighing Race and Class
as Factors is the Distributionof EnvironmentalHazards,.63 U. COLO. L. REV. 921 (1992);
Carolyn M. Mitchell, EnvironmentalRacism: Race as a Primary Factorin the Selection of
244

1
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environmental law legislation,248 the poverty law/organizer tradition,249 the
land use approach, 50 a jurisprudential approach,23 ' various native sovereignty
perspectives, 212 and sustainable development paradigms.253 These legal and
regulatory approaches to remedy disparity in the allocation of environmental
burdens essentially boil down to two devices: (1) regulations that would
directly limit or prohibit future industrial siting in minority and disadvantaged
communities, and (2) penalties against presently active polluting and waste
facilities that disproportionately impact minorities. 254 The threat of such
penalties "would motivate facility owners to relocate or site future
developments in non-minority neighborhoods. 255 In this section, I address

Hazardous Waste Sites, 12 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 176 (1993).
247 See Fisher, supra note 159, at 311-33; Boyle, supra note 177, at 950-62; Godsil, supra
note 1, at 408-21; Lazarus, supra note 56, at 827-42 (summarizing additional sources).
248 See Colin Crawford, Strategiesfor Environmental Justice: Rethinking CERCLA
Medical MonitoringLawsuits, 74 B.U. L. REV. 267, 293-97 (1994).
2419See Cole, supra note 103, at 661-72; Cole, supra note 230, at 1997.
50 See generally Been, supra note 171; Been, supra note 222; Collin, supra note 188.
25' See Joseph P. Tomain, DistributionalConsequences of Environmental Regulation:
Economics, Politics, and Environmental Policymaking, 1 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 101
(1991).
22 See Kevin Gover & Jana L. Walker, Escaping Environmental Paternalism: One
Tribe's Approach to Developing a Commercial Waste Disposal Project in Indian Country,
63 U. COLO. L. REV. 933 (1992).
23 See generally Laura Pulido, Sustainable Development at Ganados del Valle, in
CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS, supra note 86.
254 See BOERNER ET AL., supra note 70, at 7-10, 18-19. Such a threat, if credible, also
might influence facility owners to move from pollution control to pollution prevention. Cole,
supra note 103, at 645.
Grassroots activists around the country, by stopping the siting of toxic
waste disposal facilities in their communities, have begun to force industry
to move from pollution control to pollution prevention. Put simply,
because so few waste disposal sites exist, and because it is so difficult to
establish new sites, the price of toxic waste disposal has risen to the point
where companies are seriously working to replace toxic inputs to their
manufacturing processes in order to minimize the production of toxic
waste.
Id.
255 Cole, supra note 103, at 645.

1997]

BATTERY AND BEYOND

535

current legal approaches to the problem of environmental racism and the
limitations of those approaches.
A. EqualProtection Litigation-DiscriminatoryPurposeAnalysis
One of the primary goals of the environmental justice movement is
to prevent new waste disposal facilities from being located in communities
of color that are, or will become, disproportionately impacted with
environmentally burdensome enterprises. Evidence exists that federal, state,
and municipal authorities have disproportionately operated, and/or issued
permits to operate, landfills, hazardous waste incinerators, and noxious
industrial processes in communities of color. The same federal, state, and
local governmental authorities have been remiss in enforcing environmental
standards in these neighborhoods. Based upon this evidence of unequal
treatment under the law, civil rights activists instituted litigation based upon
the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of equal protection. 256 The guarantee
of equal protection to all persons is designed to prohibit state actions that
treat classes of people differently based upon arbitrary facts such as race or
national origin. However, the mere fact that governmental action has a less
favorable impact on one race than it does on another is not sufficient to
infringe this guarantee. Rather, plaintiffs must demonstrate an intent to
discriminate on the basis of race; racial animus must motivate the
governmental policy or practice.257
Civil rights based litigation strategies offer several advantages to the
litigant. First, civil rights statutes are concerned with injuries that arise by
virtue of one's membership in a group; therefore, the available remedies,
often equitable in nature, benefit not just the individual, but the group as well.
Second, governmental authorities are entitled generally to sovereign
immunity from suit, or immunity from judgment, for "discretionary

256The Fourteenth Amendment provides in relevant part: "No state shall make or enforce

any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States ...
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
257 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
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' s Discretionary functions include legislative and adjudicatory
functions."25
decision-making processes. 259 Although many states have waived their
sovereign immunity for certain classes of torts, specifically in the
regulatory
responsible
for
context,
agencies
environmental
oversight-enforcing zoning regulations, licensing waste disposal facilities,
or issuing operations permits-are not typically subject to liability for any
harm that flows from their decisions.2 60
However, even in the context of the exercise of discretionary
functions, where the acts of a governmental authority261 infringe upon
constitutionally protected or statutorily created rights, sovereign immunity
will not bar suit. 262 In The Civil Rights Act of 1871,263 Congress provided:

...See Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2680(a) (1988) (providing a
general waiver of sovereign immunity and permitting tort actions to be filed against the
federal government, it does not include in this waiver the implementation or exercise of
policy functions: "[a]ny claim.., based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an
employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.").
29 See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953). The purpose of the discretionary
function exemption is to permit the Government to make planning-level decisions without
fear of suit. That discretion "includes more than the initiation of programs and activities.
It also includes determinations made by executives or administrators in establishing plans,
specifications or schedules of operations. Where there is room for policy judgment and
decision there is discretion." Id. at 35-36. However, the Dalehite test has been narrowed to
exclude what are essentially operational functions. See Dickerson, Inc. v. United States, 875
F.2d 1577, 1584 (11th Cir. 1989) (asserting discretionary functions exception did not apply
to governmental liability under the Tort Claims Act for failure to ensure that contracts hired
to dispose of PCB if did not do so properly); see also Diagle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527,
1541-42 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating exemption does encompass the decision of how to
remediate the contamination).
260 See, e.g., Kenny v. Scientific Inc., 497 A.2d 1310, 1314 (N.J. Super. 1985) (finding
state immune from liability for licensing or failure to revoke licensing of companies
transporting wastes); Rumbough v. City of Tampa, 403 So. 2d 1139, 1142 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1981) (explaining decision to expand landfill in direction of plaintiff's property
constituted a discretionary function that could not create liability).
26" See. e.g. Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (holding
municipalities are persons within the scope of § 1983).
262 See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4-8 (1980).
263 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1871).
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Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State of Territory,
subjects, or causes to be subjected any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress' 64
Thus, where a state or local municipal official makes decisions that violate
equal protection guarantees, individuals may sue to prevent the violation or
sue for damages resulting from it. This waiver of sovereign immunity
otherwise may not be available to the community harmed by the decision to
site a waste disposal facility and, is seen as a significant factor favoring a
"civil rights," as opposed to a tort law approach.
Finally, litigation undertaken pursuant to civil rights statutes such as
42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Title V1265 have an important additional advantage-if
the plaintiff prevails in the action, attorney's fees may be recovered from the
defendant in addition to any equitable relief or monetary damages that are
awarded. 266 This ability to shift legal fees to the proven wrongdoer is atypical
in American jurisprudence, but is attractive to individuals who struggle to
provide their families with daily necessities and who cannot afford to finance
protracted complex litigation. More important, because the goal in these
cases is to prevent the siting of a facility, the remedy of injunctive relief is
explicitly available.
Unfortunately, thus far, efforts to obtain legal redress through
traditional civil rights litigation approaches have proven largely unsuccessful.
This lack of success is largely attributable to the requirement that the

264

Id.

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-7 (1988); see also discussion of Title VI infra Part II.B.
266 See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988) ("[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of
265

Section... 1983, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d, et seq....
the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a
reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.").
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defendant be proven to "have intended" the harm, a standard that is construed
as requiring proof of a racially invidious motive or purpose. Proof on this
issue often is found wanting when there is no direct evidence of a racially
invidious motive and statistical evidence of discrimination can be attributed
to socio-economic factors other than, or in addition to, race.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s residents in communities targeted
for the siting of a waste disposal facility filed several lawsuits raising Equal
Protection challenges. 267 For example, in Bean v. Southwestern Waste
Management Corp., 68 plaintiffs sought to enjoin the decision of the Texas
Department of Health that granted the Southwestern Waste Management
Corporation a Type I solid waste facility permit to operate in East Houston.269
Plaintiffs alleged that the decision was part of a pattern and practice of
discrimination in the placement of solid waste sites and was therefore in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.270 The court acknowledged that siting a solid
waste facility so close to an unairconditioned high school and to a residential
area did not make sense. 27 ' The court agreed that plaintiffs had established
the existence of a substantial threat of irreparable harm to their constitutional
rights; "the opening of the facility will affect the entire nature of the
community-its land values, its tax base, its aesthetics, the health and safety
of its inhabitants, and the operation of the Smiley High School located only
1700 feet from the site. ' '272 However, the court held that plaintiffs were
required to show "not just that the decision to grant the permit is
objectionable or even wrong, but that it is attributable to an intent to
discriminate on the basis of race. '27 3 Thus, the mere existence of a racially
disparate environmental impact, in the absence of overwhelming statistical
evidence establishing that a specific defendant followed a pattern or practice
of discrimination in the siting of similar facilities from which one could

267
268

See Crawford, supra note 248 (summarizing these efforts).
482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979), aff'd mem., 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986).

269

See id. at 675.

270

See id.

271

See id. at 681.

22 ld. at 677.
273

Id.
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conclude that a racially motivated discriminatory purpose exists, is not
27 4
enough to succeed on the merits on an equal protection claim.
Similarly, in East Bibb Twiggs NeighborhoodAssociation v. MaconBibb County Planningand Zoning Commission,25 and R..S.E., Inc. v. Kay,276
the courts acknowledged that the permitted facilities would have a
disproportionate adverse impact upon a minority community,277 yet rejected
plaintiffs' §1983 claims based upon a failure to establish a clear pattern of
racially motivated siting determinations. 278 Both courts stated that traditional
civil rights protections are in place to protect against racially motivated action
or purposeful discrimination, therefore, proof of disparate impact in the siting
of one or more hazardous waste facilities was not enough to demonstrate a
racially invidious motive.279 Proof of racially invidious motive is most often
less than persuasive because of the predominance of evidence implicating
2°
financial and political considerations as the basis for site selection.
Therefore, in order to apply the principle of equality before the law to the
distribution of environmental hazards, an effects, rather than an intent,
standard is necessary.28'
The requirement of state action, the difficulty in proving racial

See id.
706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga. 1989), aff'd, 896 F.2d 1264 (1 lth Cir. 1989).
768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991), aff'd mem., 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992).
In R.I.S.E., Inc., county supervisors rezoned a rural, traditionally black community for
a landfill which would receive waste from an entire region. The county's three existing
landfills were located in areas with ninety to one-hundred percent African-American
populations, and one waste site that had been operated for a brief time in a white suburb had
been shut down. See id. at 1148-49. The court admitted that the county's placement of
landfills "had a disproportionate impact on black residents," but that was not enough to infer
invidious intent. See id. at 1149-50.
278 See R.I.S.E., Inc., 768 F. Supp. at 1149-50; East Bibb Twigs NeighborhoodAss 'n, 706
F. Supp at 887.
279 See R.I.S.E., Inc., 768 F. Supp. at 1149; East Bibb Twigs NeighborhoodAss 'n, 706 F.
Supp at 885-86.
2 0 See R.I.S.E., Inc., 768 F. Supp. at 1150; East Bibb Twigs Neighborhood Ass'n, 706 F.
Supp at 886.
"' See Peter Reich, Greening the Ghetto. A Theory of Environmental Race
Discrimination,41 U. KAN. L. REv. 271, 290-97, 298-305 (1992).
114

275
276
277

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L.

& POL'Y

REV.

[Vol. 21:485

animus, the lack of sufficient statistical analysis to resolve the "chicken or
egg" conundrum, and the multi-faceted nature of factors leading to
disproportionate siting practices all but preclude effective use of traditional
what is, in reality, both a race-influenced and
civil rights statutes to resolve
282
dilemma.
class-influenced
B. Title VI-DisparateImpact Analysis

Environmental justice proponents also have suggested litigation under
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,283 which prohibits discrimination
based on race or national origin in federally funded programs and activities.284
Unlike Section 1983 litigation, which is based upon equal protection
language in the Fourteenth amendment and requires proof of discriminatory
motive or purpose, Title VI only requires proof that an action has resulted in

See Crawford, supra note 248. The central difficulty for environmental justice lawyers
who attempt to succeed on an equal protection theory is that "although toxic activities may
disproportionately burden racial and ethnic minority communities, the causes are complicated
and thus difficult to separate and to prove." Id. at 282. Further, plaintiffs arguments suffer
from inevitable imprecision in application of the term "minority," both as used by
environmental justice advocates and the community at large, the disallowance of relevant
economic status in an equal protection analysis, and the fact that equal protection analysis
is limited to target area demographics at the time the facility is opened. See id. at 283. The
latter requirement constitutes a significant barrier in minority communities with a high
concentration of hazardous waste sites where it is not known what the racial composition was
at the time the facility opened or where the predominant minority composition was attained
only after the sites were opened, a status one might presume was caused, in part, by the
presence of the waste sites. See id.
28 See, e.g,. Fisher, supra note 159, at 311-33; Colopy, supra note 173; Lazarus, supra
note 56, at 827-39.
28 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-7 (1988). Title VI provides: "No person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color or national origin, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance." Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(1988). Pursuant to statutory language, Title VI applies across a range of federally funded
activities including, but not limited to schools, highways, depressed areas, housing, urban
renewal, and public health. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, at 93 (BNA Operations Manual
at 1964).
282
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a racially disparate impact-a "lesser" showing.'

5

Thus, where a plaintiff

could demonstrate that an agency's siting decision, or its environmental

policy governing waste disposal facilities, would have or has had a racially
disparate impact, Title VI provides a basis for equitable relief.286
In this regard, Title VI offers a significant advantage over Section
1983. In a thorough discussion of the merits of a Title VI approach, Michael
Fisher states that "Title VI can be a potent weapon for the environmental
justice movement, both in its basic legal application, and in its aptness as a
'
tool for building and broadening the movement."287
Fisher delineates Title
288
VI's administrative complaint process, identifies proper defendants in a
Title VI action,28 9 discusses the merits of a Title VI action, 290 and describes
the proof necessary to demonstrate disparity, impact, and feasible, non-

285
286

See Fisher, supra note 159, at 316.
See Lazarus, supra note 56, at 836.

2 Fisher, supra note 159, at 311. Fisher describes the basic Title VI argument as follows:
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) provides large amounts
of federal funds to state environmental agencies. These state agencies, in
turn, are the governmental bodies responsible for much of the nation's
environmental policy-the enforcement of pollution standards, the
permitting of waste treatment and disposal facilities and industrial
polluters, and the siting of those facilities. If the actions of those
federally-finded state agencies create a racially discriminatory distribution
of pollution, then a violation of Title VI has occurred and a civil rights
lawsuit is warranted.
Id. at 287.
288 See id. at 315-16.
289 See id. at 317. "In

general, two types of suits can be filed under Title VI: suit against

the recipient of federal funds, or a suit against the funding agency itself." Id. Suits against
state departments of natural resources that implement a RCRA, CWA, or CAA enforcement
program would be permitted. See id.
290 See id. at 319-21. Fisher observes that federal courts have interpreted Title VI
according to Title VII case law, and discusses in some detail a proposed analysis of
environmental racism under Title VII jurisprudence and the Civil Rights Act of 1991. He
concludes that environmental justice activists would be required to make a prima facie
showing that a particular practice results in a disparate impact and the defendant would then
be subject to liability unless it could prove the non-racial nature of the program and the
necessity for retaining it in its current form. See id. at 321.
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discriminatory alternatives.29 He sets forth a strong argument that Title VI
suits promise significant strategic advantages to the environmental justice
movement and facilitate positive changes by unifying the efforts of the civil
rights community and environmental activists. 2
However, Title VI litigation has certain serious limitations. For
example, it is not applicable to government authorities or private entities that
do not receive federal financial assistance.293 Thus, there may be corporate
defendants not subject to the reach of Title VI. In addition, in the
environmental racism context, Title VI would be, for the most part, limited
to equitable relief.294 While desirable, equitable relief does not provide a
complete remedy to those who have been injured by exposure to
environmental toxins. Title VI may be instrumental in bringing about
prospective relief by facilitating an end to, or amelioration of, race "neutral"
policies having racially discriminatory effects in the siting of hazardous waste
disposal facilities and the allocation of environmental remediation resources,
but in order to redress more fully the harm resulting from environmental
racism, additional solutions, ones that focus upon remedies for past and

29

See id. at 321-28.

292

See id. at 331-33.

The utility and applicability of Title VI, however, goes beyond its legal
effectiveness ....
[It] can serve as a conceptual bridge between the
environmental and civil rights legal communities.... [T]he fact-intensive,
statistical, and scientific nature of a Title VI disparate impact showing will
hopefully continue to draw resources and support from mainstream
environmental groups.
Id. at 332-33.
293 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1988); Lazarus, supra note 56, at 835 & n.214.
294See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1988); Fisher, supra note 56, at 328-29 (stating "[u]nder Title
VI, declaratory and injunctive relief are available once disparate impact has been
demonstrated to a court. Damages, however, seem precluded except in cases of intentional
discrimination."); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 599-600,
607 & n.27 (1983). Justice White explains that a majority of the divided Court "would not
allow compensatory relief in the absence of proof of discriminatory intent." Id. at 607 &
n.27. As noted above, proof of discriminatory intent is a significant, often insurmountable,
burden. Moreover, to the extent such cases involve "environmental classism," Title VI does
not apply.
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present harm, are required.
C. Environmental Tort Actions-Interference with Interests in Person and
Property
The disproportionate allocation of environmental burdens to
communities of color, and the belief that such disparity interferes with the
civil rights of persons living in those communities, has been the central focus
of the environmental racism movement.
However, the quest for
environmental justice is not solely concerned with "civil rights." The
ultimate consequences of environmental racism can include: adverse
physical reactions, increased risks of disease brought about by chronic
exposure to environmental toxins, and a marked reduction in the use and
enjoyment of property, both public and private. Such consequences are the
central concern of tort law.
Traditional environmental tort causes of action include trespass,
nuisance, negligence, and strict liability for abnormally dangerous
activities.295 These doctrines impose liability upon actors who interfere with
protected personal or property interests, thereby causing presently manifested
physical injury and/or property damage that substantially interferes with the
possession, use or enjoyment of property. In personal injury actions,
significant problems of proof often preclude a finding of liability against the

29s

For an excellent delineation and analysis of these remedies, see GERALD W. BOSTON

& M. STUART MADDEN, LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND Toxic TORTS

21-139 (1994). The
authors distinguish between environmental torts and toxic torts.
The term "toxic" is more narrow than the term "environmental," for while
many environmental tort cases do involve exposure to toxic substances,
certainly many do not. For example, litigation concerning disagreeable
odors from a landfill, or airborne ash from an incinerator, may not have
toxic implications, although they do represent environmental harm or
degradation. To be contrasted, the term "toxic," while lacking a consistent
application to all cases, is understood generally to mean substances that by
inhalation, ingestion, dermal exposure or otherwise can or do cause
personal physical injury or disease ....
[N]early all toxic tort cases are
comprehended by the phrase "environmental torts."
Id. at 1-2.
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defendant enterprise. Limitations upon the nature of compensable harms are
also problematic. Moreover, in the majority of cases, these doctrines do not
adequately address the threat of future invasions, 296 nor are they intended to
protect against interference with mental or emotional tranquility, individual
dignity, and/or civil rights.29 7
1. Trespass Actions

Trespass actions are particularly useful for recovering damages, and
in some cases injunctive relief, where the release of noxious or toxic
substances into the environment has interfered with an owner's possessory
interest in real property. 298 A trespass action requires that a person, his agent,
or an instrumentality he has set in motion physically enter the property of
another.299 Generally, an intentional trespass entitles the property owner to
compensation for the invasion itself and for all harm to the property or to
other protected interests that flow from the trespass, whether or not such
harm is foreseeable. 3°° A trespass, when caused by either the negligence of

296 See Williams, supra note 30, at 239-49 (1995) (suggesting that in a limited number of
circumstances, trespass and nuisance doctrine may allow for prospective injunctive relief).
297 While a tort such as the intentional infliction of emotional distress provides relief in the

context of "extreme and outrageous" misconduct, conduct so extreme in degree as to go
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and may be available in cases in which the defendant
has been guilty of repeated and egregious violations of environmental law, it is not a
"typical" environmental tort claim. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 46 cmt. d (1979).
2" See Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1192 (6th Cir.1988); Grant v. E.I.
Dupont de Nemures & Co., 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 15345, at *10-13 (E.D.N.C. 1995);
Bradley v. American Smelting & Ref. Co., 709 P.2d 782, 786 (Wash. 1995); AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 93-97 (J. Kole & L. Espel eds., 1991).
299 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1979).
One is subject to liability to another for trespass irrespective of whether he
thereby causes harm to any legally protected interest of the other, if he
intentionally, a) enters land in the possession of the other, or causes a thing
or a third person to do so, or b) remains on the land, or c) fails to remove
from the land a thing which he is under a duty to remove.
300 An intentional trespass may occur by way of the invasion of particulate matter, the
typical scenario in environmental tort litigation. However, in the case of particulate matter,
plaintiff typically must show that the trespass has resulted in actual and substantial damage,
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another, or another's engaging in abnormally dangerous activity, 30 must
cause significant harm to a protected interest to justify the award of damages.
Trespass actions are used often in environmental tort litigation and can be
quite successful. 0 2
Although it is a useful weapon against interference with possessory
interests in the land, the trespass doctrine has important limitations in the
environmental racism context.30 3
Persons living in communities
disproportionately affected by environmentally burdensome enterprises
cannot make use of trespass theory unless they can prove that the harm they
have suffered, whether personal injury, psychological trauma, or property
damage, is a result of the presence of toxic substances on their property.
Trespass does little to afford a remedy to persons whose injuries derive from
the overwhelming presence of environmentally burdensome enterprises in the
community or from exposures that come by avenues other than the invasion
of toxins into one's own home or yard. Thus, where residents are subject to
exposure to environmental toxins when they are going about their daily
activities in the impacted community, the law of trespass is not intended to
afford relief.
Even if trespass is shown, the actual damages award may be limited.
Typically, damages in a trespass action are measured upon proof of actual
damage to property or diminution in property value resulting therefrom. If
the plaintiff is the property owner, and is entitled to damages for a diminution
in property value, such damages may be relatively small given the already
low value placed upon properties in urban minority neighborhoods. Low
property values often derive from the fact that those communities are
disproportionately low-income and from other societal factors such as
perceived high levels of crime and violence. Moreover, in urban

to a protected interest. See Bradley v. American Smelting & Ref. Co., 635 F. Supp. 1154,
1156-57 (citing Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523, 529 (Ala. 1979)).
3"' See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §519 (1965).
302 See Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1192 (6th Cir. 1988); Miller v. Cudahy Co., 592 F. Supp. 976,
1007 (D. Kan. 1984), aff'd in part,rev'd in part, remanded,858 F.2d 1449 (10th Cir. 1988).

For a detailed analysis of the problems with trespass causes of action see McAuliffe,
infra note 345.
303
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communities of color, residents might not own their own homes, but may be
tenants in private housing stock or in public housing projects. Tenants may
suffer no lost real estate value. Moreover, to the extent that particulate matter
is present in "common areas," it is unclear that trespass theory applies.
2. PrivateNuisance
Environmentally burdensome activities that do not result in an actual
invasion of one's property, but instead substantially" interfere with its
30 5
reasonable use, enjoyment, or value are actionable as private nuisances.
One is subject to liability for a private nuisance if, but only if, his conduct is
a legal cause of an invasion of another's interest in the private use and
enjoyment of land and the invasion is either intentional and unreasonable, or
unintentional and otherwise actionable under rules controlling liability for
negligence or strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities. A plaintiff
in a private nuisance action based upon intentional conduct must demonstrate
that she has suffered substantial, unreasonable interference with her use or
enjoyment of property, that the interference was caused by the defendant's
use of its land, and that the defendant acted with knowledge, or substantial
certainty, not that harm would ensue from its conduct, but that an interference
with the plaintiffs protected interest would take place.3" 6
Private nuisance actions are viable in many instances in which the
exposure to environmental toxins results in an interference with use and
enjoyment of property. On its face, private nuisance would appear to be a
viable basis for recovery in environmental racism cases. Enterprises that
choose to locate their environmentally burdensome enterprises in close
proximity to residential communities or in appropriate hydrogeologic
locations may be proven to have acted with knowledge or substantial

o See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 82 1F (1979) ("There is liability for nuisance
only to those to whom it causes significant harm, of a kind that would be suffered by a
normal person in the community or by property in a normal condition and used for a normal
purpose.").
305

See id. § 821D.

o See id.
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certainty that its activities would interfere with the residents' use and
enjoyment of property. Residents in many cases would be able to
demonstrate that the interference was both substantial and unreasonable.
Thus, as the facts in Bean v. Southwestern Management Corp. would
illustrate, the actual operation of a Type I facility that would "affect the entire
nature of the community," and that of the individual property owners, might
constitute a private nuisance. 0 7
Plaintiffs in a private nuisance action may seek damages or injunctive
relief.3"' In an action for damages, plaintiffs may demonstrate that the
intentional interference with the use and enjoyment of their property is
unreasonable 309 if the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actor's
conduct,310 or if the resulting harm is serious and the financial burden of
compensating for this and similar harm to others would not render the
continuation of the conduct infeasible.3 1' Typically, an award of damages is
appropriate even if the utility of the conduct outweighed the significance of
the harm.312 Thus, an award of damages may be available if the
environmentally burdensome facility was a "best available alternative" for the

See Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 677 (S.D. Tex.
1979), aff'd mem., 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986).
308 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 88A, at
30

631 (5th ed. 1984).
" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (1979).
310
In determining the gravity of the harm from an intentional invasion of
another's interest in the use and enjoyment of land, the following factors
are important: a) the extent of the harm involved; b) the character of the
harm involved; c) the social value which the law attaches to the type of use
or enjoyment invaded; d) the suitability of the particular use or enjoyment
invaded to the character of the locality; e) the burden of the person harmed
of avoiding the harm.
Id. § 827.
...In determining the utility of conduct that causes an intentional invasion of another's
interest in the use and enjoyment of land, the following factors are important: a) the social
value that the.law attaches to the primary purpose of the conduct; b) the suitability of the
conduct to the character of the locality; and c) the impracticality of preventing or avoiding
the invasion. See id.
12

See id. § 826 cmt. f(1979).
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disposal of certain hazardous wastes and the harm though significant, is not
critical. However, the ability to recover damages may be limited by the
magnitude of the award. The more serious and widespread the interference,
the more significant the award of damages. If the award of compensatory
damages to plaintiffs and others similarly situated is so great as to cause the
enterprise to close down-if the harm is widespread the enterprise would be
forced to internalize the true costs of its operation-a court might decide that
a request for monetary relief is tantamount to a request for injunctive relief
and consider whether, in effect, the facility should be shut down. In cases of
widespread environmental contamination, courts resort to the standard
typically used in conjunction with requests for injunctive relief-whether the
gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actor's conduct. 3 ,3 In such
cases, especially where the nature of the harm is intangible, as in cases of
emotional or psychological harm, this balance test would likely come out in
favor of the defendant.
In environmental cases involving enterprises that already have caused
a significant amount of pollution and demonstrable injury to the person or
property, plaintiffs frequently use private nuisance as a means of recovery.
The same should be true in cases where the nuisance derives from racially
disproportionate effects of an environmentally burdensome enterprise. In
resisting the determination that its conduct constitutes a nuisance, a defendant
may submit proof concerning the social value the law attaches to the primary
purpose of the conduct; the suitability of the conduct to the character of the
locality; and the impracticality of preventing or avoiding the invasion.1 4

311

But see Carpenter v. Double R. Cattle Co., Inc., 701 P.2d 222, 227 (Idaho 1985).

Plaintiff homeowners lived near cattle feed lot that had expanded to contain over 9000 cattle.
See id. at 224. Plaintiffs alleged that the "spread and accumulation of manure, pollution of
river and ground water, odor, insect infestation, increased concentrations of birds ... ," and
other significant events interfered with their use and enjoyment of land. Id. at 224. The court
rejected § 826b and held that the utility of the conduct was a factor to be considered in
defendant's favor even though it was an action for damages only. See id. at 227. "The State
of Idaho is sparsely populated and its economy depends largely upon the benefits of
agriculture, lumber, mining, and industrial development. To eliminate utility of the conduct
and other factors... would place an unreasonable burden upon these industries." Id. at 228.
" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 828 a-c (1979).
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In the absence of demonstrable physical harm or significant property
damage, use of the private nuisance theory to vindicate the interference with
an individual's interest in being free from racially disproportionate exposure
to environmental burdens, while feasible, faces significant theoretical and
practical barriers. Assume that in Noxubee County, Mississippi, with a
population of approximately 12,000,315 5000 residents live within a three-mile
radius of the proposed hazardous waste landfills. Assume that those residents
will be exposed to some environmental burdens, whether in the form of
noxious odors, additional traffic, or the threat of the release of environmental
toxins. Environmentally overburdened communities, like Noxubee, often
have more than one facility located in or near the community, the area is
likely to be zoned for industrial purposes, and one or more governmental
agencies will have approved its operation. Assume further that twenty-five
residents from the area immediately surrounding the facility file a complaint
alleging that the hazardous waste facility has interfered with their use and
enjoyment of property, and that a court would find that each of the 5000
residents were potentially entitled to $5000 in damages for the interference
with their use and enjoyment of property. If the total damage award of
twenty-five million dollars could cause the owners of the facility to go out of
business the defendant is likely to argue that the court must weigh the
benefits provided by the enterprise with the harms resulting therefrom.
In this scenario, defendant will argue that the court must take into
account the utility of hazardous waste management, the suitability of the
enterprise's operation to the character of the locality, and the impracticality
of preventing or avoiding the invasion. Hazardous waste facilities are
necessary evils, and they have to be placed somewhere. In essence, defendant
will argue that the enterprise confers a significant benefit on a broad range of
society, while causing harm to only a small segment of the population. The
character of the locale in Noxubee is already heavily industrialized: indeed,
it already has other landfills in place. Moreover, to the extent that zoning
rules apply, or regulatory provisions have been satisfied, it can be argued that
the governmental authorities have already determined Noxubee to be a

3 1990 Census of Population and Housing, Noxubee County, Mississippi. Search of
Westlaw, CENDATA database, Population of Counties: 1990 & 1980 (June 21, 1997).
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suitable location. Plaintiffs will have a difficult, if not impossible, task of
prevailing on a nuisance claim (at least in the absence of physical harm).
Finally, defendants may bring forth information that the enterprise must exist,
and that it is impossible to completely eliminate the harm.
Thus, in the context of environmental racism, the root causes of the
disproportionate allocation of environmental burdens, i.e. racially
discriminatory exclusive or expulsive zoning practices, the NIMBY
syndrome, and "market forces" may provide the best defenses in an action for
private nuisance.
3. Public Nuisance
Public nuisance is another option for use in environmental tort
actions, an option that may prove to be valuable in certain cases of
environmental racism.3" 6 A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference
with a right common to the general public; it has its basis in criminal law.3" 7
A person unreasonably interferes with a public right: 1) where the conduct
amounts to a significant interference with the public health, the public safety,
the public peace, the public comfort, or the public convenience; 2) where the
conduct is proscribed by statute, ordinance, or administrative regulation; or
3) where the conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced a permanent
or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has reason to know, has a
significant effect upon the public right.3" 8 Thus, a public nuisance
consists of conduct or omissions that offend, interfere with or
cause damage to the public in the exercise of rights common
to all in a manner such as to offend public morals, interfere
with use by the public of a public place or endanger or injure

36

A full explanation of the potential for public nuisance as an alternative basis for liability

will be undertaken in Environmental Injustice: The Quintessential Public Nuisance
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
...
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS § 82 IB (1979); KEETON ET AL., supra note 308,
at 587, 619.

" See RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 821B(2) (1979).
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the property, health, safety or comfort of a considerable
number of persons." 9
Some states define the pollution of public waters or open air as a public
nuisance for which an entity may be subject to penalty. 20
In the environmental racism context, it may be argued that a
defendant's decision to site a hazardous waste facility in a community based
upon the fact that its residents are old or uneducated, members of a racial or
ethnic minority, or politically and economically powerless to fight the
decision, will offend the public morals.32 The offense is exacerbated where
that decision reflects a pattern of discriminatory conduct or the substantial
threat of a racially disproportionate environmental impact. Certainly, the
operation of a hazardous waste facility in close proximity to residential
neighborhoods, where there exists any significant threat of the release of
environmental toxins, can constitute substantial interference with public
comfort or convenience. Moreover, operation of the facilities in an area that

State v. Schenectady Chems., Inc., 459 N.Y.S.2d 971, 976 (1983) (citations omitted),
aff'das modified, 479 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (1984).
320 For example,
Ohio Adm. Code 3745-15-07(A) states: ... the emission or escape into
the open air from any source or sources whatsoever, of smoke, ashes, dust,
dirt, grime, acids, fumes, gases, vapors, odors, or any other substances....
in such a manner or in such amounts as to endanger the health, safety or
welfare of the public, or cause unreasonable injury or damage to the
health, safety or welfare of the public, or cause unreasonable injury or
damage to property, is hereby found and declared to be a public nuisance.
Brown v. County Comm'rs of Scioto, 622 N.E.2d 1153, 1159 (1993). However, under Ohio
law, an individual plaintiff who claims that a waste facility operating pursuant to
governmental authority has created or is maintaining a public nuisance must demonstrate that
the defendant is negligent in its operations. See id. at 1160.
321 See discussion of the NIMBY syndrome supra text accompanying notes 219-27.
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is geographically3 22 or geologically 23 inappropriate is likely to restrict the
public's use of its public places, such as schools, churches, or recreational
facilities. A public nuisance cause of action might also provide relief when
public authorities or private developers have planned to locate a public
housing project or other public accommodations on top of or in close
proximity to a hazardous waste or other facility from which the release of
environmental toxins is likely to occur. The siting of a 3500-unit public
housing project fifty feet north of a lead smelting operation, or the
construction of a public housing project on top of a former landfill in the
midst of an already heavily industrialized zone, would arguably constitute an
act that offends and causes harm to the property, health, safety, or comfort of
a significant number of citizens.
One benefit of a public nuisance action is that persons who reside in
communities disproportionately impacted on the basis of race, or perhaps
class, can argue with some moral force that any additional burden is patently
offensive and will have a demonstrably adverse affect on the interests of the
community at large.324 The outrage at being subject to such risks because of
one's race or economic status may come about despite promises that the
facility will be "safe," or that it presents no real threat to the public. There
is harm that may occur because one believes he has been placed at risk of
physical injury as a result of his skin color. The legacy of racism in
communities of color, particularly in the context of environmental racism
where there is palpable day-to-day impact, gives rise to feelings of
hopelessness, frustration, and despair that may manifest themselves in

See discussion infra text following note 43 1. In essence, a location is geographically
unsuitable if, in the event there is a release of toxic substances, those substances are
substantially certain to expose local residents. Proximity to schools, public housing projects,
recreational areas, etc. are of this type.
.2 See discussion infra text following note 43 1. Geologically unsuitable areas would
include close proximity to vulnerable water supplies, fault zones, or other unstable areas.
124 See, e.g., R.I.S.E, Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1147 (E.D. Va. 1991), aff'd mem.,
977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992); Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp., 482 F. Supp
673, 677 (S.D. Tex. 1979), aff'd mem., 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986).
322
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socially undesirable behavior. 25 These factors, taken together, render the
disproportionate allocation of environmental burden as much of a public
nuisance in today's society as an adult bookstore or a topless bar.326
Public nuisance theory is particularly advantageous for victims of
environmental racism because it provides a vehicle for the award of equitable
relief. Consequently, a person seeking to enjoin or abate a public nuisance
has standing to do so if she is suing as a representative of the general public,
as a citizen in a citizen's action, or as a member of a class within a class
action. 27 This approach is frequently used in cases involving ongoing
pollution. For example, in Miotke v. City of Spokane,328 individual owners
of waterfront property and representatives of a local environmental
organization329 sued both state and local governmental authorities for
declaratory and injunctive relief after the city of Spokane discharged raw
sewage into the Spokane River. The discharge released fecal matter, solids,
toilet paper, prophylactics and other material into the waters of the river and
an adjoining lake. The plaintiffs alleged that the sewage filled the air with
rancid, noxious, and repulsive odors. Plaintiffs prevailed on their claims.

32'

For a look at how perceptions of racism can affect health and mental status, see David

R. Williams et al., The Concept of Race and Health Status in America, 109 PUB. HEALTH
REPORTS 26, 34-36 (1994). Increased synergistic effects of exposure to environmental

toxins and stress are related to smoking or alcohol use. See id. at 35. In turn, the
prevalence of alcohol problems is high for Native American, Mexican
American, Puerto Rican, and African American males. Alcohol is a mood

altering substance that is frequently used to obtain relief from adverse
living and working conditions induced by large social structures and

processes. Feelings of powerlessness and helplessness are predictors of
drinking frequency, quantity and problems.
Id.
326 See, e.g., State ex rel Miller v. Star Struck, Inc., 677 N.E.2d 1226 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996)

(finding adult bookstores a public nuisance); City of Cleveland v. Bosak, 662 N.E.2d 851
(Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (holding commercial trucks in parking lots longer than necessary
constitutes a public nuisance).
327 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 82 1C(2)(c) (1979).
3 678 P.2d 803 (Wash. 1984).
29

See Armory Park Neighborhood Ass'n. v. Episcopal Community Servs, 712 P. 2d 914

(Ariz. 1985) (recognizing the right of a citizen group to seek equitable relief for a public

nuisance).
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Having found that the plaintiffs had effectuated an important public policy
that benefited a large class of people, the court considered them to be acting
as private attorneys general and upheld the award of attorney's fees in
addition to damages for their efforts to obtain injunctive relief. The
Washington Supreme Court upheld the plaintiffs' right to bring a public
nuisance action based on the fact that they had experienced nausea,
headaches, nervousness, and insomnia, reactions not dissimilar to those
experienced by many residents in the "Toxic Doughnut" of Altgeld Gardens,
or by residents of Emelle, Alabama.
Most public nuisance actions are reactive, not proactive. The actions
are brought to enjoin or to abate an ongoing activity that constitutes a present
interference with public rights. Although quite useful in the context of
communities that already are impacted disproportionately by the
concentration of environmentally burdensome facilities, public nuisance
would not be as effective in combating prospective nuisances, at least where
the nuisance is defined as the release of environmental toxins, unless plaintiff
can prove that it is highly probable that the operation of a facility will lead to
the release of toxic substances. 330 However, one might argue, to the extent
to which it can be demonstrated, it is highly probable that the siting of a
facility will have a disproportionate racial impact, and that the
disproportionate racial impact is deemed to be a substantial interference with
a public right. In appropriate circumstances, a court may grant prospective
injunctive relief. The likelihood that such an approach might enjoy some
success will be enhanced if used in conjunction with the proposed tort.
4. Negligence and Strict Liability
Negligence theory is used often in causes of action for personal injury
due to exposure to environmental toxins. In traditional tort actions for
personal injury based upon negligence, the primary goal is to compensate the
victim for physical injuries suffered as a result of the defendant's creation of
an unacceptable risk of injury. In addition to a wrong, there must be a

330 See, e.g., Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Servs. Inc., 426 N.E.2d 824 (Ill. 1981);

KEETON ET AL., supra note 308, § 89, at 641.
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recognized physical loss or detriment. Thus, in order for plaintiff to recover
in a toxic tort action for personal injuries, she must prove that the
environmental toxins that defendant released into the environment were a
cause-in-fact of a presently manifested physical injury. If a negligent act does
not result in a demonstrable physical injury such as cancer or neurological
harm, liability is not imposed. This "no [physical] harm-no [legal] foul"
may present a substantial barrier for plaintiffs in toxic tort litigation.33 The
plaintiff in a toxic tort action is in a quandary. If he files within a few years
following knowledge of his exposure to a toxin, usually with the desire to
deter further exposure as well as to obtain compensation for past exposures,
he may not be able to demonstrate a present manifestation of an injury or
disease process.332 Plaintiffs in this position may allege causes of action for
fear of cancer, the increased risk of cancer, and potential damage to the
immune and other biologic systems. Although there are exceptions, these
claims have met with limited success.333 Thus, under traditional tort
principles regarding personal injury, it is often the case that an individual
exposed to a toxic substance has suffered no legally recognized injury
entitling him to compensation unless or until he manifests a detectable
disease.
If the plaintiff waits until he has manifested a disease or other
physical injury known or reasonably believed to be caused by chronic
exposure to an environmental toxin, he must attempt to identify the source of
his exposure or exposures over the course of a ten- to thirty-year period, must
attempt to identify with some specificity which toxins are involved, and
otherwise follow what may be a very stale trail of evidence to support his

Copious academic and judicial resources have been expended describing this dilemma.
For a small sample of the literature see Daniel A. Faber, Toxic Causation, 71 MINN. L. REV.
1219 (1987); William R. Ginsburg & Lois Weiss, Common Law Liabilityfor Toxic Torts:
A Phantom Remedy 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 859 (1981); Allen T. Slagel, Note, Medical
Surveillance Damages: A Solution to the Inadequate Compensation of Toxic Tort Victims,
63 IND. L.J. 849 (1988).
332 See Slagel, supra note 331, at 851-52.
. See Ayers v. Jackson Township, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987); but cf Sterling v. Velsicol
3

Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988); see, e.g. KEETON ET AL., supra note 308, at §
30, at 165 ("The threat of future harm, not yet realized, is not enough.").
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claim. Witnesses may no longer be available, and the defendant itself may
no longer exist. These problems, in addition to the difficulty of identifying
responsible defendants from the field of possible defendants, often render
proof of a causal connection between the exposure and the harm difficult, if
not impossible, to establish.334 Even if a causal connection is established, the
delay in the imposition of liability severely undercuts the tort system's
deterrence objectives.335
Recognizing the limitations of traditional approaches to tort
compensation, courts have begun to accept theories of liability that allow
plaintiffs to recover damages without having to satisfy the traditional causal
nexus between exposure and manifested disease. The most widely
recognized alternative to traditional damages for presently manifested injury
are those available for medical monitoring. These damages, while significant
with respect to the increased risk of disease, can do little or nothing to
compensate for the unique harms suffered as a result of environmental racism
or to prevent the siting of a disproportionate allocation of hazardous waste
facilities.
Traditional approaches in environmental tort claims have been
somewhat successful in providing redress where the defendant's intentional
or negligent conduct interferes with individual rights, and the individual
suffers a present physical injury, sustains demonstrable property damage, or
endures the loss of use and enjoyment of property. The law also provides
some relief for harms resulting from an unreasonable interference with rights
common to the public in general. However, specific aspects of each of these
traditional torts call into question whether, as they are currently understood,
any one of them can be expanded to provide a sufficient remedy for the
distinct harms falling upon those who are disproportionately burdened with
environmental toxins by virtue of their membership in a community of color.
Where constitutional construct, legislative enactment, executive edict,
and common law doctrine prove unable to resolve fully conflicts between

" See Slagel, supra note 331, at 853; John S. Forstrom, Victim Without a Cause, The
Missing Link Between Compensation and Deterrence in Toxic Tort Litigation 18 ENVTL L.
151, 156, 157 (1987).
...See Slagel, supra note 331, at 849-50; Forstrom, supra note 334, at 151.
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individuals and their government or between individuals and commercial
enterprise, tort law is equipped to evolve in such a way as to provide justice
for wrongdoing and remedy for harm done. Tort law is an ideal mechanism
to permit society to respond to deprivations of "civil rights" by private actors
or to invasions of individual rights that take place in non-traditional ways.
Traditional tort law theories may be adapted to meet new social and
technological realities. A successful response to the challenge of
environmental racism must take into account the complexity of the issues
involved. This article focuses upon one aspect of that response and proposes
the use of tort law responses specifically directed to the problem of racially
disparate exposure to environmental hazards.
III. TRADITIONAL TORT LAW BATTERY DOCTRINE: A VIABLE RESPONSE TO
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM

While all of the law present in society is intended to influence human
behavior, tort law is unique in its ability to permit individual litigants not only
to receive compensation for harm done to them, but to influence the behavior
of others and to affect how society resolves conflict.336 "Perhaps more than
any other branch of law, the law of torts is a battleground of social
theory ....[T]he twentieth century has brought an increasing realization...
that the interests of society in general may be involved in disputes in which
the parties are private litigants. 337 An essential premise in tort law is that in

For an enlightening analysis of current thought with regard to the deterrence value of
tort law see generally Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law:
Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 377 (1994).
...KEETON ET AL., supra note 308, § 2, at 6.
The influence of public policy on tort law is apparent,... when a court is
deciding a 'case of first impression'.. . [s]ociety has a twofold interest.
First, society has an interest in having a single dispute between individuals
resolved fairly and promptly. Second, society has an interest in the
outcome because of the system of precedent on which the entire common
law is based. Thus, others now living and even those yet unborn may be
affected by a decision made today.
Id. at 15-16.
36

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.

[Vol. 21:485

a civilized society individuals need a peaceful and orderly means to redress
invasions of, or interferences with, their rights and interests. 38 Indeed, the
purpose and function of tort law is to resolve disputes and to facilitate a
structure for the organization of a just society-in a word, to provide
justice.339
Tort law is, therefore, well suited to provide redress for harms caused
by environmental racism. Tort law's paradigm is one of evolution;34 it
expands and adapts to changes in social policy and advances in technology.
New and nameless torts are being recognized constantly, and
the progress of the common law is marked by many cases of
first impression in which the court has struck out boldly to
create a new cause of action, where none was recognized
before.... The law, of Torts is anything but static, and the
limits of its development are never set.
On occasion, a new tort arises out of the recognition that the constraints of
present doctrine cannot, or ought not, be stretched to meet an existing

"[T]he purpose, or function, of the law of torts can be stated fairly simply.
Arising out of the various and ever-increasing clashes of the activities of
persons living in a common society, ... owning property which may in
any of a thousand ways affect the persons or property of others - in short,
doing all the things that constitute modem living - there must of
necessity be losses, or injuries of many kinds sustained as a result of the
activities of others."
Cecil A. Wright, Introduction to the Law of Torts, 8 CAMB. L.J. 238, 238 (1944). "The
purpose of tort law is to adjust these losses and to afford compensation for injuries sustained
by one person as the result of the conduct of another." Id.
131 See Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Corp., 593 A.2d 733 (N.J. 1991).
" "The common law does not consist of absolute, fixed and inflexible rules, but rather of
broad and comprehensive principles based on justice, reason and common sense. It is of
judicial origin, The principles of the common law are determined by the needs of society and
are changed with changes in such needs." Kane v. Quigley, 203 N.E.2d 338, 343 (Ohio
1964) (Gibson, dissenting).
"' KEETON ET AL., supra note 308, § 1, at 3.
33
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problem.342
Present environmental tort doctrine may address some, but not all, of
the harms resulting from environmental racism. However, those who have
endured the disruption of their mental or emotional well being, physical
health, or personal dignity, because of environmental racism, are entitled to
utilize tort law to assist in the legal effort to allocate fairly the loss arising out
of environmental pollution control activities and to distribute justly the
environmental burden.
A. The Law of Battery Provides an AppropriateModel to Impose Liability
in Certain Cases of Toxic Exposures Due to EnvironmentalRacism
Persons living in communities of color experience racially disparate
exposure to environmental toxins: 1) where there are a disproportionate
number of environmentally burdensome enterprises such as landfills, waste
treatment facilities, or polluting enterprises located in or in close proximity
to the community; 2) where government officials fail to provide equal and
effective enforcement of environmental regulations on behalf of, or withhold
adequate remediation resources from the community; or 3) where an
individual company's record of compliance with environmental regulations
in other similar communities is disproportionate to its record of compliance
in white communities. The following sections suggest ways in which the
laws governing intentional torts are presently suited, or can be adapted, to
meet the challenge of providing a viable remedy at law, and in equity, for
harms resulting from racially disproportionate exposure to environmental
toxins.
The traditional tort of battery, which provides a remedy for harmful
or offensive contacts, is a viable alternative to traditional civil rights and
personal injury litigation. It may overcome certain limitations inherent in
those approaches and help to redress the adverse effects upon physical health
and individual dignity resulting from racially disproportionate exposure to
environmental toxins.

141

See id. § 3, at 15-20 & Supp. at 3-9.

560

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L.

& POL'Y REV.

[Vol. 21:485

In the context of environmental racism, the law of battery may
provide two separate bases for liability. First, a failure to comply with
environmental regulations or to remediate environmental pollution that
results in a person coming into direct contact with environmental toxins may
be "harmful," and therefore actionable, according to "traditional" battery
analysis. Second, to the extent that "environmental racism" causes an
exposure to environmental toxins, it can be argued that, as a violation of both
civil and personal rights, such contacts are patently offensive and are the
basis for liability.
The cause of action for battery rests upon what has long been
recognized as the basic right to have one's body protected from intentional
and non-consensual physical contact by another or by an agency the other has
set in motion.343 A person is subject to liability for battery if that person acts
intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with another person, and a
harmful or offensive contact occurs. 3 "
In order to establish the first element in a cause of action for
environmental battery, 34 a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant has
caused him to come into contact with a toxic or noxious substance. A person
may come into contact with a toxic substance when she breathes in
contaminated air, drinks contaminated water,3 " or touches contaminated soil.

141 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 308, § 9, at 40 ("Proof of the
technical invasion of the
integrity of the plaintiff's person by even an entirely harmless, but offensive, contact entitles
the plaintiff to vindication of the legal right by an award of nominal damages.").
144 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1979).
141
The basic argument for the use of the traditional battery doctrine in the context of
environmental torts is set out in McAuliffe, supra note 150, at 265. (stating that under
modem battery law plaintiffs are to be compensated for non-consensual violations of their
bodily integrity and this makes battery uniquely adopted to hazardous substance injuries.
Extension of battery to include exposure to environmental toxins is not without its critics).
" See, e.g., Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N. J. 1988). Defendant landfill
operator had failed to monitor quantity and types of liquid wastes stored at its dump and
ignored its duty to control and limit the depth of the trenches. See id. at 292. As a result,
plaintiffs' wells were contaminated with acetone, benzene, chlorobenzene, methylene
chloride, and seven other toxic chemicals. See id. Contact was established, necessitating the
award of medical monitoring relief. See id. See also Elam v. Alcolac, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 42
(Mo. Ct. App. 1988). In Elam plaintiffs sought action against the owners and operators of
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The contact does not have to be a direct physical touching by the defendant;
it can result from a force or agency that the defendant has set in motion.347
Environmental toxins that disperse or persist in the environment, typically as
some form of minute particulate matter, constitute an agency set in motion
when released. Much of this particulate matter will eventually settle to the
ground, thereby invading a protected interest in property or person. In Martin
v. Reynolds Metal Co.,348 the courts first acknowledged the "trespassory"
nature of environmental pollution when it recognized that particulate matter
was capable of invading protected property interests in the context of actions
for trespass to land. The court held that gaseous and particulate fluorides
from an aluminum smelter constituted a physical invasion of the land.
Similarly, in Bradley v. American Smelting and Refining Co. ("ASARCO ),349
the court held that particulate matter emitted into the atmosphere during the
smelting process and deposited on plaintiff's property four miles away was,
under the Restatement, foreign matter capable of invading another's
possessory interest in their property.
Just as the essence of trespass to land is a physical invasion of an
interest in property, the essence of environmental battery is a trespass to
person, a physical invasion of the interest in bodily integrity. In both actions,
the defendant has set in motion a force or series of events resulting in a toxic
substance interfering with a protected interest.
As is true in trespass to land, in which toxic substances in drinking
water may be present unbeknownst to property owners for an extended period
of time, persons exposed to an environmental toxin may be unaware of the

a chemical manufacturing facility based on theories of nuisance (for diminished market value
of residences) and negligence (for personal injuries). See id. at 49. In this lengthy opinion,
the court details defendant's history of faulty plant operations, repeated chemical releases,
poor regulatory enforcement efforts, and resulting substantial environmental impact. See id.

at 50-68. Elam is worth reading for its unusually detailed discussion of individual factual
circumstances and the medical analysis underlying plaintiffs' allegations of harm.
"" See KEETON ET AL., supra note 308, § 9, at 40 ("[I]t is no longer important that the
contact is not brought about by a direct application of force such as a blow, and it is enough
that the defendant sets a force in motion which ultimately produces the result.").
"' 342 P.2d 790 (Or. 1959), cert denied, 362 U.S. 918 (1960).
14"709 P.2d 782 (Wash. 1985).
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contact. Many environmental toxins are odorless or tasteless, and have no
immediately recognizable physical effects. For example, one can ingest
contaminants in the water supply and be unaware of the contact. Such
contact is actionable, even if the plaintiff was unaware of the contact at the
time.350 The cause of action for battery would not arise until one knows, or
should know, that the harmful or offensive contact has taken place.
Arguably, one may have a continuing battery analogous to a continuing
trespass where the toxin is not removed from the body.
Once the fact of a contact has been established, plaintiff must
demonstrate that the contact was either harmful or offensive. For purposes
of the battery doctrine, a harmful contact is broadly defined as any physical
impairment of the condition of the body, however slight.51 It can include a
change in body function, a disruption of ordinary body processes, an
alteration in body chemistry, or a change in a biological system. 352 Few
courts have addressed whether exposure to environmental toxins constitutes
an actionable battery. Although plaintiff's mere exposure to contaminated air
and drinking water may not have caused him to suffer from injury in the form
of chromosomal damage, or a presently manifested disease or illness,
damage to the cardiovascular and immune systems may have taken place
already. It can be argued that these types of precursor injuries, i.e. subcellular
changes that may one day generate disease processes, are harmful contacts.353

supra note 308, § 9, at 40. "Interest in personal integrity still is
entitled to protection, although the plaintiff is asleep or under an anesthetic, or otherwise
unaware of what is going on." Id. For example, the physician who fondles a patient while
the patient is under anesthesia is subject to an action for battery. See id.
"' See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §15, cmt. a (1979) (explaining bodily harm is
any physical impairment of the condition of another's body, or physical pain or illness).
352 Not all chemicals released into the environment cause harm, even at a subcellular level.
The types of chemicals that can cause harm, and the concentrations necessary to bring about
a physiological change, would continue to be subject to proof at trial. See. e.g., Sterling v.
Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Tenn. 1986), aff'd in part, rev'd in part.
remanded, 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
' See Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887, 901 (D. Minn. 1990), vacated by 794
F. Supp. 898 (1992); Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1226-27 (D. Mass.
1986) (explaining subcellular harm is not speculative where it can be proven to exist through
expert medical testimony); see also Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14, 17-18
350

See KEETON

ET AL.,
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An argument can be made based upon some medical monitoring
decisions that contact with an environmental toxin gives rise to an actionable
harm.354 Moreover a harmful contact resulting from exposure to an
environmental toxin may be demonstrated by examining human tissue
samples. Relatively low blood lead levels have been shown to "be associated
with IQ deficits, behavior disorders, slowed growth and impaired hearing."35
Low to moderate levels of blood lead, reflecting asymptomatic exposure to
lead, may be associated with decreased bi-lateral coordination, visual motor
control, and fine-motor development.356 These types of alterations in normal
physiological and development processes would constitute a harmful contact.
Finally, the requirement for a harmful contact may be satisfied by persons
who are presently suffering from illnesses such as asthma, and those who
experience the aggravation of pre-existing physical conditions, where the
aggravation or exacerbation is known to be causally connected to chemical
exposure.357 Thus, use of an environmental battery action may, in appropriate
circumstances, provide a viable claim for damages where a negligence claim
would otherwise fail for lack of a presently manifested physical injury.
Non-consensual contacts with environmental toxins need not result
in bodily harm in order to provide a basis for an action in battery; an
offensive contact is sufficient. A cause of action for battery may be stated
against anyone who acts intending to cause an offensive contact with the
person of another and an offensive contact either directly or indirectly takes

(D. Colo. 1984) (explaining that a claim for physical injury was allowed to proceed where
evidence showed that chromosomal damage caused by radiation operated to deprive plaintiffs
of a certain degree of immunity); Barth v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 661 F. Supp. 193,
196 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (holding injury to the immune system, if proven, is sufficient to
constitute a present injury even in absence of clinically diagnosable illnesses).
35 See, e.g., Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 806 (Cal. 1993).
3'"Committee on Environmental Health, supra note 108, at 176.
"s See Dietrich et al., supra note 114, at 305-06.
"5
Examples of such illnesses would be chloracne from exposure to Agent Orange,
developmental difficulties from exposure to lead, leukemia from exposure to benzene, and
asbestosis or mesothelioma from exposure to asbestos. See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Product
Liability Litigation v. Dow Chemical Company, 611 F. Supp. 1267, 1276 (E.D.N.Y. 1985);
Industrial Union Dep't. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 619-25 (1980)
(discussing link between benzene and leukemia).
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place.35 While the determination that a contact with an environmental toxin
is harmful must be based upon expert testimony, the determination that it is
offensive will be within the jury's province.359 An actionable contact is one
that offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity.36 To "offend" means
"[t]o create or excite anger, resentment, or annoyance in; to affront... [t]o
cause displeasure... [t]o violate a moral or divine law."36 ' "Offensive" has
been defined as "disagreeable or nauseating or painful because of outrage to
taste and sensibilities or affronting insultingness. 362 McAuliffe has put forth
a plausible argument that in the ordinary environmental tort context,
intentionally causing environmental toxins to contact another's person, in the
absence of consent-indeed in the face of protest is-at the very least,
disagreeable or insulting.363 The basic cause of action for environmental
battery would be available without regard to the racially or economically
disparate nature of the impact.
The argument for expanding traditional battery doctrine to encompass
environmental battery resulting from an offensive contact resonates with the
underlying concerns of environmental justice. Persons addressing broader
issues of environmental justice can argue that acting with knowledge, or
substantial certainty, that one's conduct will place an identifiable group of
persons at significant risk of exposure to an environmental toxin, especially
when that risk results from a decision to site one's facility where there is
already a high concentration of environmental burdens, is offensive to a
reasonable sense of personal dignity. Similarly, the failure to comply with
environmental laws or remediate environmental contamination are acts

.. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18b, cmt. a (1979) (particulate matter is
capable of making contact).
"5 See id. § 18, at 30.
o See Leichtman v. WLW Jacor Communications, Inc., 634 N.E.2d 697, 699 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1994) (citing Love v. Port Clinton, 524 N.E.2d 166, 167 (Ohio 1988)).
361 AMERICAN HERITAGE DESK DICTIONARY 862-63 (2d ed. 1982).
162 State v. Phipps, 389 N.E.2d 1128, 1131 (Ohio 1979).
"' See McAuliffe, supra note 150, at 286-90.
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offensive to a reasonable sense of personal dignity." The premise that
uninvited contacts with an environmental toxin is offensive is supported by
studies done with regard to the public's perception of risk.
Currently, public concern about the health risks associated with
exposure to toxins released from hazardous waste facilities or other
environmentally burdensome enterprises is substantial. Public concerns
about such health risks extend beyond, and may be unrelated to, scientific
assessment concerning the actual annual mortality rate from exposure to
environmental toxins.365 However, an act need not be physically harmful to
be deemed legally offensive. Public beliefs about these risks, and attitudes
toward the non-consensual exposure to such risks, are the key factors in
determining whether a particular contact with an environmental toxin will be
deemed to be offensive for purposes of a battery cause of action. A
consideration of factors influencing public beliefs about risks supports the
argument that such contacts are offensive.
Risk perception scholars identify at least eighteen so-called "outrage"
factors that influence public perception of risk.3 66 In addition to real or
perceived understanding of the risks generated by an enterprise,3 67 these

31 It is beyond the scope of the present article to address all of the factors supporting socioeconomic discrimination as an "offensive act" in a market based economy-it is, however,
an argument I believe can be made in the environmental justice context.
365 See Peter M. Sandman, Risk Communication. FacingPublic Outrage, EPA J., Nov.
1987, at 21-22.
" These factors include: catastrophic potential, familiarity, understanding, uncertainty,
controllability, voluntariness of exposure, effects on children, manifestation of effects on
future generations, identification of victims, dread, trust in institutions, media attention,
accident history, equity, benefits, reversibility, personal stakes and origin. See Vincent T.
Covello et al., Guidelines for Communications About Chemical Risks Effectively and
Responsibly, in ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE: SCIENCE AND VALUES IN RISK MANAGEMENT 67 (D.
Mayo & R. Hollander eds., 1991).
37 See Holly L. Howe, Public Concern about Chemicals in the Environment: Regional
Differences Based on Threat Potential, 105 PUB. HEALTH REPORTS 186 (1990). Public
health survey encompassing area in western New York where there is a high density of toxic
dump sites, Long Island where there is a shallow ground water aquifer, and the remainder of
the state, [excluding New York City] demonstrated that public's concerns about
contaminations of the environment were highest among respondents who believed they lived
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factors include voluntariness, control, diffusion in time and space, and
fairness. For example, researchers have found that a voluntarily encountered
risk is more acceptable to people than one that is coerced.36 Risk perception
is affected by one's sense of control over the risk-producing event; if the
opportunity to prevent or mitigate harm is perceived to be within one's
control, the perception of risk is correspondingly lessened.369 The public's
perception of risk also is related to diffusion in time and space. If hazard A
kills fifty anonymous people a year across the country, and hazard B has one
chance in ten of wiping out its entire neighborhood of 5000 in the next
decade, the two groups have the same expected annual mortality rate, i.e. the
same statistical risk, but risk A is experienced as a more acceptable risk than
risk B.37° Fairness considerations are also important to one's perception of
risk; researchers have found that people who must endure greater risks than
their neighbors, without access to greater benefits, i.e. those who are denied
distributive justice, are naturally "outraged" and have a higher perception of
risk-a result compounded if the rationale for burdening them looks more
political than scientific.37 Further exacerbating one's perception of risk is the
ability to become informed about the risk producing activity and to

either close or very close to a toxic dump site or an area of high commercial or residential
pesticide use. See id.
368 For example, we witness the number of people who smoke, abuse alcohol, or over eat
even though they place themselves at a greatly increased risk of lung cancer, liver disease,
or heart disease. This distinction is also recognized in the law of torts. It is a fundamental
principle of the common law that volenti nonfit injuria-toone who is willing, no wrong is
done. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 308, § 18, at 112.
369 See id. Witness the number of people who are fearful of flying, but who drive without
a second thought each day even though one is much more likely to be injured in a car
accident than an airplane mishap.
370 See Covello et al., supra note 366, at 74-75. For example in the airplane/road mishap
scenario, sustaining injury in an automobile accident is a more diffuse risk than having an
entire airplane. crash. Thus, as a society we are much more accepting of the risk that cars will
crash than the risk that the airplane will although statistics weigh heavily in favor of death
in auto crashes.
' See id. at 72.
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participate in the process by which the risk is imposed.372 Researchers have
determined that if the decision maker comes across as trustworthy,
concerned, and responsive to community concerns, the public's risk
perception is likely to be reduced.373 However, if the decision maker comes
across as dishonest, arrogant, or unresponsive to citizen concerns, risk
perception is increased.3 74 Another important factor in the public's
perception of risk is the element of dread. Certain diseases, especially
immune system deficiencies and cancer, are more feared than others. 375 The
long latency period preceding many cancers, the difficulty of knowing
whether one has been exposed to a carcinogen, and the nature of the disease
process, add to the dread and thus to the perceived risk from the exposure.37 6
Each of these risk-exacerbating factors is present with respect to a
minority community that has been disproportionately affected by
environmental toxins.377 In many instances, living in close proximity to a
waste disposal facility is not voluntary. In tort law, a choice to encounter a
risk is not truly voluntary if the person is not fully informed as to the nature
and extent of the risk or has no viable opportunity to avoid encountering the
risk. The lack of voluntariness is true whether a governmental authority has
decided to locate a public housing project on a landfill, or a waste
management company seeks to site a waste incinerator in or near a lowincome residential area or a community of color. 378 The lack of voluntariness
may be present even if someone moves into the community after the waste
disposal facility is in place and in operation. In many instances, persons
moving into communities may or may not know that a hazardous waste
facility is within a one-to-five-mile radius. Often, persons living in proximity

31

See id. This aspect of receiving information and participating in the decision making

process are the factors essential to one's ability to consent to a risk.
...See id. at 68-72.
314 See id. at 71-72
311 See id. at 69-70; see also Sandman, supra note 365,
at 22.
376 See Cavello et al., supra note 366, at 68-72.
...Similarly, the same factors may account for the NIMBY Syndrome. See supra text
accompanying notes 219-27.
378 Such factors, if present, would support a claim for offensive environmental battery
based upon disproportionate economic impact as well as disproportionate racial impact.

568

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L.

& POL'Y REV.

[Vol. 21:485

to a facility that releases environmental toxins are not advised that such a
release is ongoing. Moreover, persons potentially affected by such releases
may have neither the information nor ability to avoid contact. In addition to
a lack of voluntariness, a lack of honesty in the siting and operation of many
waste disposal facilities, the utter absence of responsiveness to citizen
concerns, the lack of control or opportunities for effective participation in
decisionmaking processes, and a perceived lack of fairness all characterize
many zoning and siting scenarios. These factors can cause significant outrage
in communities of color-further indication of a high perception of risk.
Indeed, persons making siting decisions often seek out communities they can
effectively ignore and control.37 9 Risk perception also is heightened in a
community when residents believe that the facility has released toxins into
the environment and responsible officials are being dishonest with regard to
the release and/or attendant risks.
Assume HazMatCo, a hazardous waste disposal enterprise, seeks to
locate in Home County. HazMatCo undertakes a feasibility study based upon
the advice contained in the Cerell Associates report.38 ° HazMatCo
determines that CenterLake Heights is located in a semi-rural community
near the northeast quadrant of Home County. HazMatCo further determines
that the surrounding community is a low- to low-middle-income blue collar
community with a population that is twenty-five percent African-American,
twenty percent Hispanic, and twelve percent Asian-American, with
reasonable access to major thoroughfares. The rest of Home County has less
than a five percent minority population. Property values have been depressed
in recent years due to a number of plant closings or "downsizings."
HazMatCo further determines that no local ordinances require public notice
of intent to site a waste disposal facility. When it first acquires its permit to
site a facility, local residents ask for information regarding the nature of the

..
q See Cole, supra note 230, at 1994, n.14 (citing CERELL ASSOCIATES, POLITICAL
17-30 (1984) (finding
those least likely to oppose siting of garbage incinerators are "communities with populations
less than 25,000, rural communities, 'old timer' residents, blue collar workers, conservatives,
and those with less than a high school education")).
...See id.
DIFFICULTIES FACING WASTE TO ENERGY CONVERSION PLANT SITING
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materials to be deposited at the site. The community perceives a risk that the
transportation of wastes through, and the disposal of hazardous substances in,
their community presents a significant threat. They believe if a release takes
place, they will be exposed to the environmental toxins. This heightened
degree of risk perception is based in part on the fact that HazMatCo is not
providing adequate information, and knowledge that HazMatCo has had
some "problems" in the past at another of its facilities. In addition, the solid
waste disposal facility just over the county line already has had problems.
The residents in northeast Home County, especially in the Heights, use well
water for household purposes and are concerned further about risks of
underground water pollution.
HazMatCo applies for and receives the applicable construction
permits and zoning variances. There is a hearing before the zoning board,
and a number of residents living in the Heights show up to state their
opposition to the facility siting. Other speakers, primarily local business
owners and residents from other locations in the county, argue that the facility
will bring much needed jobs to the county and will enhance its tax base.
Residents from the other communities further argue that the Heights has
proven to be a good location for such facilities; there is already a landfill in
that area. In fact, other disposal sites had previously been sited in or near the
CenterLake Heights area in an adjacent county. Unfortunately, none of the
zoning board members are residents of the Heights and the Board has never
been particularly responsive to that community's concerns. The waste
disposal facility is approved.
In this scenario, residents of CenterLake Heights attempt to protest
vigorously the siting of the hazardous waste disposal facility. Company
representatives refuse to divulge to the community leaders precisely what
wastes will be processed and where those wastes will originate. However,
HazMatCo has sought EPA permits that would allow extremely toxic
substances to be placed in the planned landfill or processed through the waste
incinerator.
Residents have not volunteered to have a hazardous waste disposal
facility located in the area contiguous to their community; in fact, they have
attempted unsuccessfully to block the facility siting. The absence of
voluntariness, the lack of political control, and the perceived discounting of
their concerns in the political process may bring about a high level of
outrage-an indication of a high level of perceived risk. CenterLake Heights
residents do not want the facility sited in their backyards or on the edges of
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their community-but it is not their decision to make. This perceived lack
of control, over both the decision making process and the risk producing
activity, as well as the fear that an "accident" could lead to cancer or other
latent disease processes, contribute to a heightened perception of risk.
Additionally, CenterLake Heights residents are left knowing that their
community literally has, once again, been dumped on by the more affluent
residents in central and southern Home County. Taken together, these factors
exacerbate the perception of risk and the sense of outrage. If the facility is
sited, and if residents experience physical contact with those toxins, residents
should be able to successfully argue that the contact was, at the very least,
offensive. Similarly, even if the release has taken place in violation of
applicable permits, if the company develops a history of regulatory violations,
or if the company has in any way "covered up" the release, there is a sense of
outrage and a jury may well find that an offensive contact has occurred.
In response to the proposal for an environmental battery based upon
the offensiveness of the contact, opponents will argue that merely offensive
contacts should not be actionable because they are a necessary concomitant
of living in a highly industrialized, technologically driven, consumptionoriented society."' This argument relies on the idea that all unconsented-to
contacts that an individual may deem to be offensive should not be treated as
such by the courts. In a crowded, industrial society, some amount of
unpermitted contact is inevitable, customary, and reasonably necessary.
Consent to these minimally offensive contacts is presumed of one's
membership in the community. Thus, courts may take the view that such

See Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Company, 863 P.2d 795, 811-12 (Cal. 1993)
(citing to Terry Morehead Dworkin, Fearof Disease and Delayed Manifestation Injuries:
A Solution or A Pandora'sBox? 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 527, 576 (1984)).
As a starting point in our analysis, we recognize the indisputable fact that
all of us are exposed to carcinogens every day .... It is difficult to go a
week without news of toxic exposure. Virtually everyone in society is
conscious of the fact that the air they breathe, water, food, and drugs they
ingest, land on which they live, or products to which they are exposed are
potential health hazards. Although few are exposed to all, few also can
escape exposure to any.
381
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exposure is not a battery, but rather an ordinary contact that is customary and
reasonably necessary to the common intercourse of life.382 The circumstances
surrounding the act will necessarily affect whether it is perceived as
unpermitted, and so will the relations between the parties.383
In most environmental racism contexts, such unwelcome contacts
with environmental toxins would be "offensive to an ordinary person not
unduly sensitive to personal dignity.- 38 4 However, the NIMBY syndrome,
caused in large part by public perception of risk, the filing of myriads of
environmental tort actions, and the nascent trend toward adopting
environmental justice statutes, demonstrate rather convincingly that most
people do not consider exposure to environmental toxins as ordinary or
reasonably necessary to the common intercourse of life.385
Assuming that the exposure to environmental toxins is an offensive
contact, then how much greater is the offense, the affronting insult, for

38.

In effect, courts hold that such contacts take place in the context of implied consent -

if there is consent to the contact, there is no battery. See, e.g., McCracken v. OB. Sloan, 252
S.E.2d 250 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (finding that smelling smoke from a cigar being smoked by
a person in his own office is a contact, but that such contact was customary and reasonably
necessary to the common intercourse of life). Cases have reserved the question of whether
exposure to second-hand smoke would constitute a battery where harm can be shown. Cf
Pechan v. Dynapro, Inc., 622 N.E.2d 108 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (finding that physical reactions
to second hand smoke established contact for purposes of battery action and for purposes of
establishing injuries under Worker's Compensation law). It may be that the additional
studies suggesting a causal link between cancer and exposure to second hand smoke will
change a court's consideration of offense in this context. Because proof of offense is
contextual, one might expect second hand smoking decisions to change as societal tolerance
for such exposure changes.
383 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 308, § 10, at 43-46.
384 See Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Tex. 1967)
(explaining plaintiff sued in assault and battery for damages from humiliation when a
manager of the club at which he was attending a luncheon snatched his plate and indicated
he would not be served because he was a negro).
38. See Leslie S. Gara, Medical Surveillance Damage: Using Common Sense and the
Common Law to Mitigate the DangersPosed by EnvironmentalHazards, 12 HARV. ENVTL
L. REv. 265, 270 (1988) ( "The potential severity of the disease that could result from a toxic
contact makes the contact more than one of the inconveniences that citizens of a modem
industrial society must bear.").
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persons who experience disproportionately higher levels of contact with
environmental toxins in large part because they live in minority
communities? While battery is underappreciated in the typical environmental
tort context, it has special relevance to cases involving environmental racism.
The disproportionate siting of environmentally burdensome enterprises in
communities of color has excited anger, resentment, and annoyance among
residents and those who are affected thereby.386 Indeed, disproportionate
exposure to a presently unpleasant, and potentially harmful, substance, where
the disparity is related to the effects from conscious or unconscious racism,
must be deemed offensive. Situations where the disproportionate exposure
to environmental toxins results not from a "neutral" siting decision but from
an enterprise's pattern or practice of noncompliance with environmental
regulations magnify the offense. To the extent that the siting or concentration
of hazardous waste facilities in communities such as Afton, North Carolina,
Noxubee, Mississippi, Alsen, Louisiana, and Emelle, Alabama, is a result of
racism, overt or covert, direct or derivative, conscious or unconscious, their
presence is offensive to those who subsequently suffer the disparate impact.
Even in those cases where the facility preceded the coming together of a
community of color, a pattern or practice of unequal compliance with, or
enforcement of, environmental regulations is equally offensive.
To sustain a battery claim, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant
caused a harmful contact and that the defendant acted with intent.387 Intent
with respect to exposure to environmental toxins has been discussed most

..
6 See supra Part I.B.2.
117 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 308, § 8, at 36.
An actor is subject to liability to another for battery if(a) he acts intending
to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other.., and
(b) a harmful contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly
results; or (c) an offensive contact with the person of the other directly or
indirectly results.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965). In battery, the intent requirement is not
premised upon malice or evil motivation "[r]ather, it is an intent to bring about a result which
will invade the interests of another in a way that the law forbids." KEETON ET AL., supra note
308, § 8, at 36.
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frequently in the context of workplace exposures.388 In recent years, various
courts have held that exposure to toxic substances in the workplace could
give rise to a cause of action in battery, both civil and criminal.38 9 For
example, in Cunningham v. Anchor Hocking, Corp.39 0 plaintiff alleged that
the developer: diverted a smoke stack for dangerous fumes back into the
building, causing the fumes to come in contact with plaintiffs' skin, eyes, and
respiratory systems; failed to advise plaintiffs of known toxic exposure
hazards or to provide safety equipment; knowingly failed to heed levels of
toxic substances that were airborne in the plant; failed to repair ventilation
systems; removed manufacturer's warning labels; and, knowingly exposed
plaintiffs to a high concentration of the toxic substances with specific intent
to injure. 391 The court held that "[p]laintiffs' allegations that injury from such
conduct was a 'substantial certainty' were sufficient to state a cause of action
in battery. '392 Further support for a battery cause of action in the context of
environmental toxins may be found in the literature,393 especially with
reference to exposure to second-hand cigarette smoke.394

388 As

a general matter, worker's compensation laws preclude suit for injuries arising out
of workplace exposure to toxic substances. The primary exception to the exclusivity bar
occurs when an employer has acted with the requisite intent with respect to the worker's
injury. Accordingly, there are a number of reported cases in the employer/employee context.
389 See State v. Chicago Maquet Wire Corp., 534 N.E.2d 962, 963 (I11. 1989) (noting that
counts of indictment charged defendants with aggravated battery, alleging that "defendants
exposed the employees to the toxic substances with 'the awareness that a substantial
probability existed' that their conduct would cause the employees to take by deception [of
the employer], for other than medical purposes, poisonous and stupefying substances..
0 558 So. 2d 93 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
' Intent in the context of a worker's compensation case may require more stringent proof
of intent, and therefore some cases of toxic exposure do not satisfy the intent requirement in
this context. See Sanford v. Presto Co., 594 P.2d 1202 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979).
392 Cunningham, 558 So. 2d at 97.
...See McAuliffe, supra note 150, at 265 (stating that under modem battery law plaintiffs
are compensated for non-consensual violations of their bodily integrity, and that this
characteristic makes battery uniquely adapted to hazardous substance injuries).
...
See Irene Scharf, Breathe Deeply: The Tort ofSmokers' Battery, 32 HOUSTON L. REV.
615 (1995); David S. Ezra, Smoker Battery: An Antidote to Second-Hand Smoke, 63 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1061, 1085 (1990) (advancing proposition that "[a] sound legal approach to conflicts
that arise during the interactions between smokers and non-smokers includes civil actions for
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In the civil rights litigation context, the requirement that the plaintiff
prove intent is one of the most significant barriers to a plaintiff's recovery.
In the environmental battery context, proof of intent is likely to be a
plaintiff's greatest strength. Intent, in this context, encompasses not only a
purpose or desire to bring about a given consequence, but extends to those
cohsequences that the actor believed would be substantially certain to follow
from its conduct 395 even if the actor was well-meaning and his purpose
worthwhile. 396 The practical application of this principle to an action for
battery has come to mean that when a reasonable person in the actor's
position would believe that a harmful or offensive contact was substantially
certain to follow, he will be dealt with as though he had intended that
result. 397 In an environmental racism context, the cause of action for
environmental battery is dependent upon proof of invidious motive, racial
animus, or desire to harm--although such proof would, of course, satisfy the
intent requirement. In this context, plaintiff would need to demonstrate only
that a reasonable person in the defendant's position knew, or was

battery against smokers who subject unwilling persons to sidestream or exhaled smoke
produced by cigarettes, cigars, or pipes."); Leichtman v. WLW Jacor Communications, Inc.,
634 N.E.2d 697 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (ruling that the plaintiff stated a claim for battery by
alleging that defendant deliberately blew cigar smoke in plaintiff's face); Richardson v.
Hennley, 434 S.E.2d 772, 774-75 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
"' See KEETON ET AL., supra note 308, § 8, at 34.
6 Id. § 8, at 36. As discussed infra in text following note 430, intent in the context of an
intentional tort is, for this reason, a much broader concept than is intent in the context of a
§1983 discrimination action, or a Title VI disparate impact claim.
...See, e.g., Bradley v. American Smelting & Ref. Co., ("ASARCO"), 709 P.2d 782, 786
(Wash. 1985). ASARCO provides a statement of this proposition in an environmental tort
case. In ASARCO, the court noted that intent to trespass could be found where,
[t]he defendant has known for decades that sulfur dioxide and particulates
of arsenic, cadmium, and other metals were being emitted from the tall
smokestack. It had to know that the solids propelled into the air by the
warm gases would settle back to earth somewhere. It had to know that a
purpose of the tall stack was to disperse the gas smoke and minute solids
over as large an area as possible and as far as possible, but that while any
resulting contaminants would be diminished as to anyone area or
landowner, that nonetheless contamination, though slight, would follow.
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substantially certain, that the siting of a hazardous waste facility in
unreasonably close proximity to residential areas, domestic water supplies,
or public accommodations; the failure to comply with environmental
regulations; or the failure to remediate environmental contamination was
substantially certain to cause a harmful or offensive contact to persons
residing in the affected communities.398 Evidence that such conduct was
related to the low-income or minority status of the community, or knowledge
that such conduct would result in a racially disproportionate environmental
burden, goes to the nature and extent of the offense.
The defendant's liability for harm resulting from contact with
environmental toxins includes not only the resulting medical expenses, lost
wages, and pain and suffering, but also the mental disturbance, humiliation,
and anxiety resulting from an offensive contact.399 Moreover, liability for
damages is not limited to those harms reasonably foreseeable to the defendant
at the time of the contact.
The defendant's liability for the resulting harm extends, as in
most other cases of intentional torts, to consequences which
the defendant did not intend, and could not reasonably have
foreseen, upon the obvious basis that it is better for
unexpected losses to fall upon the intentional wrongdoer than
upon the innocent victim."
The battery cause of action emphasizes the right of the individual to be
protected from non-consensual bodily contacts, especially those that are
offensive. Therefore, claims that one has become ill because of an exposure
to a toxin, or that one has suffered a change in physiology, or endured an

.98Defendant could be owner/operator of facility or agency official-note that as to the
latter, certain defenses may result in Title VI being the only viable alternative.
"' See KEETON ET AL., supra note 308, § 9, at 40 ("Proof of the technical invasion of the
integrity of the plaintiffs' person by even an entirely harmless, but offensive, contact entitles
the plaintiff to vindication of the legal right by an award of nominal damages, and the
establishment of a tort cause of action entitles the plaintiff also to compensation for the
resulting mental disturbance, such as fright, revulsion or humiliation.").
400 Caudle v. Betts, 512 So. 2d 389, 392
(La. 1987).

576

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L.

& POL'Y REV.

[Vol. 21:485

offense because of disproportionate exposure to toxic substances based upon
one's minority status or residence in a community of color uniquely suits this
40
tort. '
Use of an environmental battery claim presents certain distinct
advantages. In addition to overcoming the strenuous proof requirement
present in civil rights litigation, if the plaintiff's claim is focused upon the
occurrence of an offensive battery, plaintiff only need prove that the
intentional act caused an offensive contact. Plaintiff would be relieved of the
burden to prove a presently manifested physical injury. Costs of litigation
could, therefore, be greatly reduced. If the circumstances giving rise to the
offensive battery were sufficiently outrageous, punitive damages would be
available. °2
Although the battery doctrine extends liability to certain of the
injuries involved in the environmental racism/justice situation, the doctrine's
limitations preclude it from providing a complete remedy. Battery requires
that actual contact with the environmental toxin take place. In some
circumstances, the proof of contact may be very difficult, and many persons
who reside in communities disproportionately exposed to environmental
toxins may not be able to provide adequate proof. The requirement of actual
contact does not permit a cause of action based on harm arising from the fear
and anxiety about the possibility of contact. Traditional battery tort doctrine
provides a cause of action for assault to address this "apprehension of
contact" problem. However, in order to establish an assault, the apprehension
must arise from the concern that a contact is imminent. Apprehension of
some future contact, which may or may not occur, is not enough. In a
traditional battery context, it is anticipated that persons can protect
themselves or otherwise avoid non-imminent threatening contacts. In fact,

4'0

The use of battery in the context of exposure to environmental toxins has been explored

to a limited extent. See Carl B. Meyer, The Environmental Fate of Toxic Wastes, the
Certainty of Harm, Toxic Torts and Toxic Regulation, 19 ENVTL. L. 32 1; McAuliffe, supra
note 150.
402 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 308, § 9 ,at 40 ("Since battery usually is a matter of the
worst kinds of intentions, it is a tort which frequently justifies punitive damages .... "); see,
e.g., Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 817 (Cal. 1993).
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if one anticipates, or should anticipate, the contact, and fails to avoid it,
courts could construe the non-avoidance of the contact as implied consent.
However, in the present context, persons apprehending exposure to
environmental toxins may have no way to anticipate when such a contact
might take place or whether it already has occurred. This very uncertainty,
to some degree, drives the anger, frustration, and anxiety inherent in the
environmental justice movement.
Finally, one of the greatest needs in environmental racism
jurisprudence is a theory that will enable plaintiffs to prevent the siting of
hazardous waste sites in communities already burdened with environmental
risks. It is not clear that a battery theory fully contemplates prospective
equitable relief as a viable remedy. Thus, a more complete remedy to
environmental justice harms necessitates traveling beyond battery.
IV. BEYOND BATTERY: INTENT TO CAUSE RACIALLY DISPROPORTIONATE
EXPOSURE TO ENVIRONMENTAL BURDENS

In the proposal to go beyond battery, my central concern is to
articulate a workable tort theory effective both at discouraging practices that
result in racially disproportionate environmental impacts and ensuring
compensation for any resulting harms. Current concern about and
condemnation of environmental racism-taken together the with recognized
rights of freedom from racial discrimination in property ownership, access to
housing and public accommodations-provide evidence of the strong public
policy that would favor the creation of a new tort.40 3 The proposed tort

represents a modest expansion of common law protections presently accorded
physical integrity, individual dignity, mental tranquility, the use and
enjoyment of property, and the enjoyment of rights common to the general

403

See RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS §

866 (1979). "[O]ne who is under a

noncontractual duty to furnish facilities to the public without discrimination is subject to
liability to a person entitled to the facilities for violation of the duty." Thus, "a person who
has been denied or discriminated against in the use of a public utility or other facilities that
by the rules of the common law is under a duty to furnish reasonable facilities to those who
apply, if the denial or discrimination is a breach of duty to him." Id. at § 866, cmt. a.
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public. This tort, the intent to cause racially disproportionate exposure to
environmental burdens, provides that one who owns or operates an
environmentally burdensome enterprise, and whose intentional conduct
imposes upon another a racially disproportionate environmental burden, is
subject to liability for resulting bodily harm, mental distress, or property
damage. This tort protects against intentional interference with another's
interest in freedom from racially disparate treatment. It provides a
mechanism to vindicate the important social and political interests
fundamental to discouraging racial discrimination, whether overt or covert,
conscious or unconscious, direct or consequential, where environmental
management practices threaten physical health, individual dignity, economic
well-being and public peace.
We do not live in an ideal world. We are unlikely to eliminate totally
our need for hazardous waste disposal facilities for some time, 404 and there
is no "safe" place to dispose of many environmental toxins. Few locations
are so remote that the presence of a waste disposal facility will not affect
some nearby community. Indeed, to serve their function, the facilities often
must be near adequate transportation routes and an available workforce.
Total remediation of environmental contaminants is an extremely costly
proposition; available resources are limited. Recognizing these practical
constraints, and acknowledging that for the foreseeable future we all must
bear a reasonable portion of the environmental burdens resulting from a
consumption-oriented lifestyle, my goal in proposing a new environmental
racism cause of action is to reduce, as much as possible, the current racially
inequitable distribution of those environmental burdens. The proposed cause
of action is intended to discourage owners and operators of environmentally
burdensome facilities from concentrating such facilities in communities of
color and from placing such facilities in geographically or geologically
unsuitable areas. Further, it is intended to encourage owners and operators
of facilities already located in communities of color to comply fully with

A cynic might argue that if the facilities were located near the homes of their owners
and operators, and the governmental officials that approve them, we quickly would see the
elimination of hazardous waste disposal facilities. That day might arrive sooner rather than
later.
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environmental regulations. A more even distribution of the environmental
burden may have the salutary effect of increasing the political will to reduce
the overall environmental burden on society. The proposed tort seeks to
redress the unique and troubling harms which are imposed upon individuals,
communities, and society as a whole, when subjected to racially
disproportionate levels of environmental burden, especially when the
disproportionate impact diminishes or destroys a reasonable quality of life.
A. Restatement Section 870 Analysis
An examination of recent expansions in common law intentional tort
doctrine led the American Law Institute ("ALl") to adopt the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 870. The ALl intended this section to establish a set of
coherent guidelines for determining "when liability should be imposed for
harm that was intentionally inflicted, even though the conduct does not come
within the requirements of one of the well established and named intentional
torts."4 °5 The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 870 provides in part: "One
who intentionally causes injury to another is subject to liability to the other
for that injury, if his conduct is generally culpable and not justifiable under
the circumstances."'' 6 In its determination whether to impose liability for an
intentional interference with another's person or property, a court is to
consider whether there is an invasion of a legally protected interest, the
culpable character of the actor's conduct, and the unjustifiable character of
the actor's conduct under the circumstances. 0 7 The Restatement proposes a
four factor test to be used in the evaluative process: "1) the nature and
seriousness of the harm to the injured party, 2) the nature and significance of
the interests promoted by the actor's conduct, 3) the character of the means
used by the actor and 4) the actor's motive.
As in other areas of intentional torts, my analysis begins with the
recognition that a certain degree of environmental burden must be tolerated

405

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §

0 Id. § 870.
See id. § 870 cmt. e.

407

408

Id.

870 cmt. a (1977).
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as an unfortunate necessity of life in modem society. 4°9 We all are "at risk"
of incidental daily exposure to environmental toxins from a wide variety of
sources: neighbors may use inordinate amounts of pesticides on their lawns
or gardens, there may be toxins in the workplace, we may become exposed
to secondhand smoke at home. Therefore, the mere fact that one is a person
of color, or resides in a community of color, and is exposed to an
environmental toxin is not a basis for liability under the proposed tort.
However, when an actor's intentional conduct causes significant
environmental burdens to be unevenly distributed along racial or ethnic
parameters, a legally cognizable harm has occurred. Accordingly, remedies
at law and in equity should be available to injured parties.
Under the proposed cause of action, one is subject to liability for
intentional conduct that is the legal cause of racially disproportionate
The racially
exposure to significant environmental burdens."'
disproportionate exposure to environmental burdens is significant if it results,
or is likely to result, in a harmful or offensive exposure to environmental
toxins; interferes with the use or enjoyment of private property; interferes
with an individual's access to or enjoyment of rights or legally protected
interests common to the general public; or unreasonably deprives one of a
sense of personal dignity. Thus, where an actor conducts his enterprise in a
manner that is known, or is substantially certain, to impose an environmental
burden upon a community of color, and the burden is disproportionate to that
imposed upon similarly situated majority communities, the actor should be
subject to liability.
In order to prevail, plaintiff must prove the defendant intended 4 1l that
its conduct have a racially disproportionate environmental impact upon a

411

4"'

See supra text following note 381
For purposes of analysis, the discussion focuses upon the problem of exposure to

environmental toxins. However, the analysis applies with equal force to other types of
environmental burdens.
41
The phrase "knew or was substantially certain" and "intended" will be used
interchangeably in this section of the analysis.
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community,4 12 or that the defendant intended a disproportionate exposure, or

significant risk of exposure, to environmental toxins upon a community of
color.413
In theory, persons that may be subject to liability under this proposed
tort include both private and governmental" 4 owners or operators of
environmentally burdensome enterprises. This article focuses upon the
liability of private owners and operators for damages to protected interests
arising from racially disproportionate exposure to environmental burdens." 5
Additionally, if a substantial likelihood that there will be an interference with
protected legal interests can be proven, those who oppose the initial siting of
a hazardous waste disposal facility may use the proposed theory to prevent

The adverse environmental impact could include, but is not necessarily limited to,
overall decrease in the quality of life in the surrounding community, a decrease in property
values, significant risk of harm to individuals residing within the "zone of danger," or
exposure to environmental toxins. This approach is analogous to the rationale underlying
equal protection analysis. Liability should attach wherein a defendant acts knowing that its
conduct will cause a racially disparate impact. Unlike the equal protection claims, however,
no racial animus must be shown. Substantial certainty that one's conduct will result in the
disparate impact is sufficient to trigger liability.
413 This approach is analogous to that found in Title VI. Often, a defendant acts with
knowledge or substantial certainty that its conduct will cause the surrounding community to
suffer an adverse environmental impact. If the impact that results is racially disproportionate
to that experienced in the general population, then a racially disparate impact has grown out
of a facially neutral pattern or practice.
"" Federal, state, and local governmental owners and operators are typically immune from
liability for damages in tort unless there has been legislative or judicial waiver of such
immunity. See, e.g., Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1994). Such entities may
be subject to actions for declaratory or injunctive relief. Many waivers of immunity do not
extend to intentional torts, or to the exercise of policy or discretion functions such as the
licensing or permitting of a hazardous waste facility. Title VI promises to provide some
relief in this regard.
" This limitation is undertaken for several reasons. First, a thorough analysis of the
proposed tort as applied against a public official or governmental agency would require an
analysis of state sovereign immunity, waivers or exceptions to such immunities, and related
issues with respect to local governmental authorities which are beyond the scope of this
article. Second, the remedies presently addressed in the literature, especially Title VI, tend
to be focused upon governmental actions; thus, focus on the liability of private enterprise is
desirable.
412

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L.

& POL'Y REV.

[Vol. 21:485

the siting from going forward. The tort is intended to encompass, inter alia,
currently operating hazardous or solid waste storage or disposal facilities,
chemical manufacturing or processing plants, and facilities that reclaim toxic
substances from recycled or waste products. The tort also includes owners
or operators of facilities at which hazardous wastes have been disposed of
improperly in the past but not yet remediated.
The proposed tort for harm arising from the racially disproportionate
exposure to environmental burdens differs in several respects from traditional
environmental tort causes of action. In battery, recovery is limited to those
who actually have suffered a harmful or offensive contact with an
environmental toxin. The proposed tort extends protection to those who
suffer harm or offense because of a significant threat of such contact.4" 6 In
private nuisance and trespass, recovery is limited to interference with an
individual's right to the use, enjoyment, and ownership of land. The
proposed cause of action extends the protection of private property based
rights and protects against interference with the community's interest in a
clean environment and freedom from unequal treatment. 1 7 To that extent,
the proposed tort expands an interest already partly protected by public
nuisance doctrine.
Two potential approaches to defining the environmental racism tort
exist. First, a defendant may act with knowledge or substantial certainty that
its conduct will have a racially disproportionate impact upon an identifiable
community, and members in that community suffer harm as a result of that
conduct. Alternatively, a defendant may act with the intent that its conduct
will impose a significant environmental burden upon an identifiable group,
and if that burden disproportionately impacts a community of color, then the
defendant is liable for any resulting harm. Like public nuisance, but unlike

"' In this regard, the tort is analogous to that of assault, which protects against the threat
of an imminent battery. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 308, § 10, at 43-46.
411 It is important to recognize the right for individuals to vindicate community interests.
Defendant enterprises may manipulate the political and regulatory process by targeting those
communities whose influence over the political process is minimal, by offering economic
inducements to municipal authorities (i.e., we will hire many new workers) or by exercising
economic coercion (i.e., we will take the project somewhere else). When this takes place,
the community is harmed.
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most other environmental torts, the proposed tort initially focuses upon group
interests. However, individuals within the community who suffer harm as a
result of the burden imposed upon the community may recover damages.
B. Intent to Cause Racially DisproportionateEnvironmental Burdens:
ProspectiveApproach to Siting Disputes
In the prototypical environmental racism case, specifically with
reference to cases such as R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay 8 or Bean v. Southwestern
Management Corp.," 9 plaintiffs will allege that the defendant's plan to locate
a waste disposal facility in their community is certain to impose upon them
a disproportionate environmental burden. In this type of environmental
racism case, plaintiffs' goal is to stop a corporation from siting its facility in
the neighborhood. In this category, a defendant is subject to liability if it
knows, or believes it to be substantially certain, that its decision to site the
facility will result in a minority community shouldering more than its
proportionate share of the city, state, region, or nation's environmental
burden. This aspect of the proposed tort is reflective of the current equal
protection analysis, but with one crucial difference: the showing of intent
does not require proof of racial animus or motive. Plaintiff only need show
intent as it has been defined for tort purposes. Thus, if the plaintiffs in Bean
pursued an action for injunctive relief under the proposed tort, they would be
able to prove that the operator of the hazardous waste facility knew that it
was going to site the facility in a community of color, that "[t]he opening of
the facility will affect the entire nature of the community-its land values, its
tax base, its aesthetics, and the health and safety of its inhabitants,""42 and
that, based upon the location of similar facilities in the same vicinity, this
adverse impact would be disproportionate to that shouldered by other nonminority communities.
The proposed tort is concerned with hazardous waste and other
facilities that impose disproportionate environmental burdens upon

418

768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991), aff'd mem., 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992).
F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979), aff'd mem., 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986).

4'9 482
420

Id. at 677.
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communities of color. Whether seeking to demonstrate that defendant acted
with intent as conventionally understood or with knowledge of a substantially
certain outcome, the plaintiff must first delineate the boundaries of the
"community" upon which the significant environmental burden has been or
is likely to be imposed.421 (This area may be thought of as the "zone of
impact.") The criteria for defining the community's parameters will depend,
in large part, upon the nature and extent of the environmental burden. In
most circumstances, this analysis would focus upon the location of the
burdened population, a group that may or may not be coterminous to those
who live in geographic proximity to the facility. 422 As discussed in Part I
with respect to the burden of exposure to environmental toxins, the
predominate mechanisms of exposure are through airborne distribution of
particulate matter and pollution of the water supply. 42 Once the extent of the
environmental burden and the varying degrees of impact within that area are
determined, the zone of impact may be defined. All persons living within the
defined radius of the offending facility, or within a non-contiguous zone of
impact, have standing to bring a cause of action. Liability could extend as far
as the demonstrable (or projected) dispersion of environmental toxins or
other burdens.42 4

421

See Rae Zimmerman, Issues of Classification in Environmental Equity: How We

Manage Is How We Measure, 21

R. Edelstein, CONTAMINATED

FORDHAM URB. L.J. 633, 645-59 (1994). See also Michael
COMMUNITIES: THE SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF

RESIDENTIALTOXIC EXPOSURE

17-42 (1988) (case study of Jackson Township, New Jersey).

While environmental impacts are often greatest within the region immediately
surrounding an environmentally burdensome facility, such is not always the case. It may be
that wind patterns, or the flow of water, carries an environmental toxin some distance. Thus,
the fact that fish in a river are consumed downstream by low-income people, where that
group is disproportionately composed of racial or ethnic minorities, may be a defining factor
42

in describing the zone of impact.
423 See supra notes 38-50 and accompanying text.
424 Some might argue that this expansive approach to defining an appropriate class of

plaintiffs will "open the floodgates" and invite unlimited litigation. If a company wishes to
limit its potential liability, however, it can do so by taking into account existing

environmental burdens before itsites a facility, by locating a reasonable distance away from
populated areas, or by complying with environmental regulations thereby limiting the amount

and distribution of toxins or other noxious substances into the environment.
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In appropriate circumstances, the definition of the "target" community
can extend to non-residents. If a person lives outside the "target" community,
but regularly and foreseeably uses public facilities located within the zone
such as public schools, parks, or day care facilities, then this associational
criteria is an appropriate basis to expand the class of potential plaintiffs.425
Thus, the anticipated mechanisms by which the exposure to an environmental
toxin would take place, or the context in which a burden is experienced,
would act as a defining limit on the plaintiff class.
Once the "target" community has been defined, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the significant environmental burden imposed is racially
disproportionate. A racially disproportionate environmental impact occurs
when a policy, pattern, or operational practice produces a substantially greater
effect upon a community in which racial minorities are found in proportions
greater than their overall representation in the relevant society.4 26 Identifying
disproportionate environmental impacts requires the examination of racial
disparities in the distribution of 1) environmental amenities, 2) environmental
disamenities, 3) benefits of environmental improvements, and 4) costs of
environmental improvements.4" 7 Thus, if the facility in question is a landfill,
and it accepts waste from a five-county area, the demographics of the
impacted community needs to be compared to the demographics of the region
served. If the minority population in the target region is twenty percent, but
the minority population in the affected community is forty percent, then the
environmental burden shouldered by residents in that community is racially
disproportionate. Similarly, if the facility is a waste incinerator, and it serves
an entire state or region of the country, the appropriate comparison is between
the community burdened by the incinerator and the communities served by

...For example, in West Dallas, not only were the individuals who lived in the public
housing adversely impacted by the lead released in the environment, so were those children

who used the day care facilities, and others who used the recreational areas. See supra notes
117-49 and accompanying text.
426 It is possible, albeit less likely, that a community of Hispanics,
Caucasians, or Native
Americans will be a racial minority in a predominately African-American city. If that

community is shouldered with a disproportionate environmental burden, its members would
have standing to pursue this claim.
427

See Goldman, supra note 71, at 3.
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the incinerator.428
If the community has been subjected to a racially disproportionate
environmental burden, plaintiff must then prove that the defendant knew, or
was substantially certain, that its conduct would, in fact, impose a significant
environmental burden on that community. Proof of intent may be either
objective or subjective. Objective intent may be shown based upon available
demographic information and upon the character of the locality chosen for the
facility. For example, given the demographics of the "zone of impact," if the
defendant knew that there were already a number of other environmentally
burdensome facilities in the zone, or knew that by reason of the facility's
geographic proximity to residential areas or public places that its conduct
would have a racially disproportionate impact, even if that impact were not
in any way a motivating factor in the conduct, defendant has acted in a
tortious manner towards the community as defined.
In the context of siting controversies, proof of intent to cause a
racially disproportionate environmental impact may be shown from a
consideration of the factors contributing to defendant's decision to site a

In some circumstances, pre-existing units of measurement based upon locational
proximity to the environmentally burdensome facility, such as census tracts or zip code areas,
may be used. See Zimmerman, supra note 421, at 652-59. However, such an approach may
prove problematic if used as the sole basis for defining the community whose rights have
been invaded. See Fisher, supra note 159, at 323. Discussing appropriate units of
measurement for Title VI disparate impact cases, Fisher notes:
The first problem is that the size of the study area bears no relationship to
the area impacted by the polluting facility. If the census tract is larger than
the impacted area, for example, whites might be counted as "impacted"
when they are not, reducing the statistical disparity apparent in the
plaintiff's study. Even if the census tract and the impacted area are
coextant, the degree of impact is ignored since the method equates the
effect on persons at the outer edge of the impacted area with the effect on
people of color who are the incinerator's neighbors. The second problem
with using "pre-studied" units of comparison is that the boundariesof the
study area are uncorrelated to the area affected by the facility. Thus if the
census tract lines cut close to an incinerator, minority residents who live
in close proximity to the facility but across the boundary line will not be
counted among the impacted.
428
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waste disposal facility in a community of color. Practically speaking,
communities of color may be the preferred location to site new waste disposal
facilities or other environmentally burdensome enterprises because of the
availability of relatively inexpensive land, pre-existing zoning patterns,
perceived lack of political influence, or historical patterns of placing locally
unwanted land uses in such communities. This preference may in turn lead
to a concentration of industry in communities of color; this greatly increases
the likelihood that a significant release of environmental toxin will take place
and harm its residents. However, in such circumstances it would be
substantially certain that any environmental burden imposed would have a
disproportionate impact. Certainly, evidence that race was a factor in the
defendant's decision to locate an environmentally burdensome enterprise in
a community would be sufficient to sustain plaintiffs burden on this issue.
Thus, evidence that the decision to site the facility was based, in whole or in
part, upon a recognition that minority citizens tend to have less political or
economic influence in a region, or are less organized within a given city or
state, (thus less likely to effectively combat the decision) may be probative
of the requisite intent.4" 9 Similarly, if a specific defendant has a pattern or
practice of siting its facilities in minority communities, that pattern or
practice would be evidence that the actor intended to locate its facility in an
area wherein it would have a racially disproportionate impact.4 30 Thus, if
plaintiffs can demonstrate that the owner or operator of a facility regularly
chooses to site its facilities in, or in close proximity to a minority community,
whether for reasons of economics, zoning, or NIMBY pressures from other
communities, and that the facility imposes an environmental burden

The facility owner must have the approval of local, state, or federal authorities in order
to build a waste disposal facility. Evidence that the governmental authority responsible for
the licensing or regulating the facility is aware of the disproportionate impact, that it was
responding to NIMBY pressures, or that it had a history of exclusive or expulsive zoning
practices would be relevant to this determination.
430 See Laura Westra, The Facesof Environmental Racism:
Titusville, Alabama, and BFI,
in FACES OF ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: CONFRONTING ISSUES OF GLOBAL JUSTICE, supra note
37, at 113. Author notes that a "True or False," handout by TAG, Total Awareness Group,
Titusville Neighborhood Association, stated that twenty-six of twenty-eight Browning-Ferris
Industries waste facilities in Alabama were located in African-American neighborhoods. Id.
429
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disproportionate to that of the burden shouldered by other communities
served by the facility, then plaintiffs have established their prima facie case.
Proof of intent also may be based upon the actor's knowledge that the
planned location of the facility is geographically or geologically unsuitable
for a hazardous waste or other environmentally burdensome enterprise and
is, therefore, substantially certain that the facility will impose a
disproportionate environmental burden.
In evaluating the geographic suitability of a new facility location,
consideration must be given to current uses. A location is geographically
unsuitable if it is located too near a residential community or a public facility,
such as a school or hospital, and/or would be located in an already
environmentally burdened community. Thus, a location may be deemed
geographically unsuitable for the proposed use even if that location is, or may
be, zoned for such use. Historical expulsive and exclusive zoning practices
often have resulted in lower income minority communities being deemed as
"appropriate" for unwanted land uses. These protective zoning ordinances
have contributed to the disproportionate concentration of environmentally
burdensome facilities in communities of color. An institutionalized pattern
of racism that has permitted, if not encouraged, unsuitable land uses in the
past should not provide the basis for a defendant to conclusively argue that
the proposed location is geographically suitable because similar facilities are
already in operation. Communities of color already burdened with more than
their fair share of environmental burdens should not be forced to shoulder an
even greater load.
The principle of geographically unsuited land uses is illustrated in
" ' where the Texas Department of
Bean v. Southwestern Management Corp.43
Health granted a Type I solid waste facility permit to Southwestern Waste
Management to build a hazardous waste disposal facility even though the
waste would be located within 1700 feet of a non air-conditioned high school
and in extremely close proximity to a residential area. The court in Bean
recognized that local residents ran the potential risk of exposure to
environmental toxins and acknowledged the variety of anticipated harms to

' 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979), aff'd mem., 782 F.2d r038 (5th Cir. 1986).
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property, but held that the stringent requirement of proving racial animus had
not been met. No matter how inappropriate the siting decision, the court
could not intervene. In contrast, the intent requirement in my proposed tort
is broad enough to encompass the decision to site the solid waste facility at
issue in Bean.
A location may be geologically unsuitable where surrounding
topographical or hydrogeological structures provide substantial certainty that
a release of environmental toxins would result in human exposure. Thus, in
Warren County, North Carolina, the decision to bury 32,000 cubic yards of
PCB laden soil in a small residential area where the water table at the site of
the landfill was only five to ten feet below the surface and the residents
derived all of their drinking water from wells supplied by that aquifer would
have constituted an "act intending to cause a harmful or offensive
environmental contact with an environmental toxin" within the meaning of
the proposed tort. A similar argument may be made with respect to Noxubee
County, Mississippi where the two proposed landfills and waste incinerators
were to be located on an aquifer already subject to harm from the hazardous
waste facility at Emelle, Alabama.
In the first category of environmental racism cases, plaintiffs' goal is
prohibit the siting or to alter the defendant's siting decision in such a way as
to minimize the anticipated environmental burden. In seeking an injunction,
plaintiff must persuade the court of the appropriateness of the remedy. 32
Relevant to this determination is:
(a) the nature of the interest to be protected, (b) the relative
adequacy to the plaintiff of injunction and of other remedies,
(c) any unreasonable delay by the plaintiff in bringing suit, (d)
any related misconduct on the part of the plaintiff, (e) the
relative hardship likely to result to defendant if the injunction
is granted and to plaintiff if it is denied, (f) the interests of
third persons and of the public, and (g) the practicability of
framing and enforcing the order of judgment. 4 "

41

433

See
[d.
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§ 936 (1979).
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Injunctive relief for anticipated harm is a well-established, if sparingly
applied, component of environmental tort remedy.434 Anticipatory nuisance
cases typically require the plaintiff to demonstrate that an action at law will
not provide adequate relief.435 Additionally, "where it is highly probable that
[the defendant's conduct] will lead to a nuisance, although if the possibility
be left to his remedy of damages
is merely uncertain or contingent he may
436
occurred.
has
until after the nuisance
In the typical environmental tort case, plaintiff would be required to
prove that future releases of toxic substances are highly probable and that
plaintiff will almost certainly sustain injuries as a result of their exposure.
That burden is often very difficult to meet. However, in the context of
environmental racism, the protected interests involve a community's right to
be free from the racially discriminatory siting of environmentally burdensome
facilities. If it can be shown, as in Bean437 and R.I.S.E.,438 that it is highly
probable that the "mere" siting of a facility will have a racially
disproportionate impact upon a community, and that the community will be
harmed by that impact, plaintiff may be able to demonstrate entitlement to
injunctive relief.439
A plaintiff organization acting on its own behalf, or as a private

See Village of Wilsonville v. S.C.A. Servs., 426 N.E.2d 824, 836 (Ill. 1981); Andrea
H. Sharp, Comment An Ounce of Prevention: Rehabilitating the Anticipatory Nuisance
Doctrine, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 627 (1988); Charles J.Doane, Comment, Beyond
Fear: Articulatinga Modern Doctrine in Anticipatory Nuisancefor Enjoining Improbable
Threats of CatastrophicHarm, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 441 (1990). However, a
detailed analysis of this tort's suitability to remedy through anticipatory injunctive relief is
beyond the scope of this article.
433See KEETON ET AL., supra note 308, § 89, at 640-41.
411 Id. For a detailed analysis of what tests courts use in anticipatory nuisance cases, see
Sharp, supra note 434.
43' 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979), aff'd mem., 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986).
438 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991), aff'd mem., 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992).
Some states have liberalized their anticipatory nuisance laws in a way that would
support this approach. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-125 (1993) ("Where the consequences of
a nuisance about to be erected or commenced will be irreparable in damages and such
consequences are not merely possible but to a reasonable degree certain, a court may
interfere to arrest a nuisance before it is completed."); GA. CODE ANN. § 41-2-4 (1994).
131
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attorney general, could seek to block the defendant from siting a facility on
the basis that the facility's operation was substantially certain to result in a
racially disproportionate environmental burden upon the designated
community. Environmental burdens can include disruption of peaceful use
of private or communal spaces because of increased dust, noise, or traffic.
Further, this approach addresses those intangible mental and dignatory harms
that inure to an individual or a community who will suffer from the
knowledge that, if they lived in a different neighborhood, the defendant
would not have placed the facility in their community or, at the very least,
would have worked with the community to alleviate its concerns. The focus
is, therefore, on the differential experience of environmental burdens even if
the disproportion was "because of' economic or other considerations. As in
Bean,440 plaintiffs can sustain the burden of proof that such an impact is
certain to occur. Unlike prospective nuisance cases wherein the plaintiffs
have to prove that the interference with the use and enjoyment their private
property is substantially certain to occur, in the present action plaintiffs do
not have to prove that toxins will encroach upon their property or that they
are reasonably certain to suffer actual physical harm. The harm derives from
the very presence of the facility. It is the facility's presence in a
geographically or geologically unsuitable location that "affect[s] the entire
nature of the community-its land values, its tax base, its aesthetics, the
health and safety of its inhabitants. '44' The racially disproportionate impact
deprives the residents in the community of rights to which they are entitled
by virtue of their membership in this society, i.e. the right to be free from
unequal treatment under the law.
C. Intention to Cause Racially DisproportionateEnvironmental Burdens:
Recovery of Damages
In many instances, at the time a facility began its operation, it would
not have created a racially disproportionate environmental impact. In some
cases, the defendant's facility existed prior to, or has grown up alongside, a

440

"I

482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979), aff'd mem., 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 677.
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community of color. It may be that the location was initially on the outskirts
of town, and the population has grown up around it. It may be that a local
government authority has chosen to build public housing in close proximity;
or it may be that the community was historically low-income and the racial
and ethnic make-up of the community simply has changed over time. In any
event, the facility is now located in or near a minority community. Although
its presence may adversely impact community residents, under these
circumstances presence alone should not be sufficient to impose liability.
However, if the owners or operators of the facility intends to impose an
unreasonable environmental burden upon the surrounding community, and
that burden disproportionately impacts persons of color, the defendant should
be subject to liability, both for resulting personal injury or property damage,
and for the interference with the community's and individual's right to be
free from racially discriminatory treatment. This approach reflects that found
in Title VI wherein a facially neutral policy or pattern of practice has a
racially disparate impact.
For example, assume that defendant's toxic waste incinerator is
located on the southern edge of a city and people live within a five-mile
radius. Within that radius, the majority of middle- and upper-income
residents live in the city and are connected to city water and sewer services.
The water is drawn from an aquifer approximately ten miles away from the
incinerator and is hydrogeologically separate from the area surrounding the
incinerator. On occasion, the incinerator emits fumes that are noxious and
residents within the five-mile radius experience transitory discomfort from
the fumes. However, the neighborhood to the south of the plant is more rural
and is not connected to city services. This neighborhood is predominately
African-American and Hispanic. Residents in that community derive their
water from wells that draw from an aquifer that has become polluted by the
company.
Complaints about fumes from the facility have caused the
company to install scrubber mechanisms that have reduced greatly both the
frequency and the concentration of the fumes emitted. However, complaints
concerning water quality from the community that relies upon well water
have gone unaddressed. Although the area within a five-mile radius affected
by the facility's fumes is predominately white, it can be shown that the
defendant has acted with the intent to cause a racially disparate environmental
impact.
The necessary intent to cause a racially disproportionate exposure to
an environmental toxin also may be shown in those circumstances where
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there is a failure to comply with or to enforce environmental regulations with
respect to an ongoing operation, or where there has been a failure or refusal
to remediate environmental contamination. These circumstances have been
used to establish intent in other environmental tort contexts and are useful
here. The failure to comply with environmental regulations, or remediate
environmental contamination, is a central concern of the environmental
justice movement. In many of the examples discussed in this article, the
unrepentant failure to abide by governmental regulations and the ineffectual
enforcement of those regulations by state and local officials are a significant
cause of harmful and offensive exposures to environmental toxins. The
attitude demonstrated by corporate or a governmental disregard for
environmental protection laws, and the resultant health risks and interference
with property rights, fuels the outrage of the environmental racism debate.
The proposed tort should, with its prospect of both compensatory and
punitive damages for physical injury, property damage, or emotional distress,
would serve as a clarion call for commercial entities to sit up and take notice
of environmentally related health and social concerns in communities of
color.
Once it is demonstrated that a person or entity has acted with the
intent to cause a racially disproportionate exposure to environmental toxins,
standing to assert a claim is conferred by membership in the community of
color that has experienced a racially disproportionate exposure to
environmental toxins: standing is not based upon the race or ethnicity of the
individual plaintiff. This tort is not designed to permit a person of color
living in a predominately white community to sue a nearby owner or operator
of an environmentally burdensome enterprise on the basis that she is a
minority and has been exposed to environmental toxins. The exposure must
result from the disparate impact upon a community of color. Conversely, one
who resides in or foreseeably and routinely uses affected public facilities in
a community of color, has standing to sue under this tort. Whether one is a
person of color or not, if one is disproportionately exposed to environmental
toxins because she resides in a community of color, then she has suffered a
legally cognizable injury within the scope of this tort. Otherwise, the
anomalous result would be reached that an African-American who was
placed at a disproportionate risk of exposure to environmental toxins could
recover, while his white neighbor could not. Traditional concepts of
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transferred intent support the approach to standing set forth above." 2
D. Affirmative Defenses
One of the defenses to the proposed tort, reflective of its roots in
battery, trespass, and other intentional torts, is the defense of informed
consent. The doctrine of informed consent is a necessary corollary to one's
right to be free from non-consensual interference with one's person or
property. As members in this society, citizens are entitled to consent to an
invasion of a legally protected interest, to assume the risks associated with the
acts of others. If one has effectively consented to the conduct of another that
intentionally invades her interests in bodily integrity, mental tranquillity,
possessory property interests, or rights as a member of the public, she cannot
recover for the conduct or for harmful contact resulting therefrom. 43
Effective consent must be given by one who has the capacity to consent, or
by a person empowered to consent for her.' Consent is effective only to the
particular conduct or substantially similar conduct understood and anticipated
by the person providing consent."' The consent may be conditioned or
restricted; it may be limited as to time, place, or circumstance." 6 If consent
to the conduct is in some way conditioned or restricted, and the actor fails to
comply with the condition or exceeds the specified limit, harm caused
thereby is actionable as battery." 7 Moreover, consent to an invasion of one's
interests may be vitiated if it has been obtained through the actor's
misrepresentation or duress." 8
If the person consenting . . . is induced to consent by a
substantial mistake concerning the nature of the invasion of

442 See KEETON ET AL.,
"4

supra note 308, § 8, at 37-9.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

...See id.
445 See id.
41 See id. § 892A(3).
447 See id. § 892A(4).
448 See id. § 892B.

§ 892A.
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his interests or the extent of the harm to be expected from it
and the mistake is known to the other or is induced by the
other's misrepresentation, the consent is not effective for the
unexpected invasion or harm." 9
One of the underlying rationales for this tort as it applies to the siting
of hazardous waste facilities is to provide a remedy for the lack of
distributional equity. Lack of distributional equity occurs when community
of color has been selected to bear the environmental burdens of a
consumption-oriented society even though it has not shared in many of the
benefits of that society. Lack of distributional equity is magnified when
benefits that are promised in the form of jobs and tax revenue do not
materialize-at least not with respect to persons of color living near the
facility. Recognizing that hazardous waste disposal sites are a growth
industry, some communities actively lobby, or tacitly welcome, a hazardous
waste disposal site. The acceptance may arise from the hope of secure
employment in the community. In Noxubee County, and in other places, the
community often is split-fear and hope set the community asunder.
Several proposals have been put forward to allow compensated siting
efforts.450 Compensated siting permits a company wishing to site a hazardous
waste facility to provide financial incentives to communities and residents in
exchange for their consent to the siting decision. If those lobbying for
hazardous waste disposal facilities secured informed consent from those
persons living in an appropriate spatial relationship to the facility, and if that
consent was truly informed, then the siting activity would not be actionable
under the proposed tort. Consent would act as an affirmative defense to
liability for the disparate impact of the siting. Moreover, if the basis for the
consent was later found to be fraudulent, the consent to the siting would be
vitiated and the privilege withdrawn. If the facility failed to put in place
promised safeguards, if it failed to comply with environmental regulations,
or if it otherwise exceeded the scope of the consent, then it would be liable
in damages.

449
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Another available affirmative defense might be that of public
necessity. The existence of a public necessity provides a privilege "to
commit an act which would otherwise be [an intentional tort] if it is or is
reasonably believed to be reasonable and necessary""45 to protect the actor or
a third party from serious harm. If at the time a siting decision was made,
there existed a demonstrable public necessity that its construction go forward
in an area already burdened by other facilities or in a geographically and/or
geologically inappropriate locale, then the construction could go forward
without liability under this tort. "The right of defense and self-preservation
is a right inherent in communities as well as individuals., 452 Although, it is
difficult to construct a scenario in which the exigencies of hazardous waste
storage would require its location in an inappropriate locale, if such a
situation should arise, the owner or operator of a facility would be able to
avoid liability.
Finally, where the enterprise is located in a community that attained
its status as a "community of color" subsequent to commencement of its
operation, the enterprise should not be subject to liability under this tort
because the enterprise becomes, over time, a part of the disproportionate
distribution of environmentally burdensome facilities. However, if that
facility can be shown to have created or contributed to a disproportionate
allocation of environmental burdens after the character of the community has
changed, or otherwise imposes environmental burdens upon the surrounding
community in a racially disproportionate manner, then liability would still
follow.
CONCLUSION

Individual harms from environmental racism may include a loss of
personal dignity, a disruption of mental tranquility, injury to bodily integrity,

4'

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 262.

Harrison v. Wisdom, 54 Tenn. (7 Heisk.) 99, 113 (1872) (holding that defendants
destruction of large stocks of whiskey during the Civil War, in advance of the arrival of
riotous soldiers who had just defeated the closest fort, was deemed justified by reason of the
exigencies of the moment).
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and interference with the use and enjoyment of property. Moreover, courts
already have recognized the significance of harm where the conduct alleged
consists of the release or threatened release of environmental toxins and such
release presents a significant risk of injury to person or property. In many
environmental racism cases, there is much anger, frustration, and fear that
results from the knowledge that the community is being exposed to
significant risks from the increased levels of environmental toxins in the air,
drinking water, food supplies, or the public areas in which children play.
This interference with mental tranquility is exacerbated because the exposure
occurs without the community's consent, perhaps even without its
knowledge.
Moreover, the knowledge that the community is
disproportionately subject to such exposure and that there is a relative lack
of political and economic clout to reduce or eliminate the threat of such
exposure contributes to the offense. Presently, the loss of mental tranquility
and a reasonable sense of personal dignity is protected against intentional
invasions. Especially when the invasion has a racially disparate impact,
courts may find that the nature and type of harm is actionable in tort.
Without question, this society has a significant interest and concern
related to, the disposal of hazardous wastes and the control of environmental
pollution. As a society, we are ready to recognize that environmental racism
is unjust, and that the imposition of disproportionate environmental burdens
upon low-income communities of color contravenes important societal and
individual interests in reducing or eliminating conduct that is discriminatory
in intent or in effect. 4" The importance of the interests promoted by
hazardous waste and other environmentally burdensome facilities is given
due consideration by available defenses and limitations placed upon the
proposed tort. The mere siting of a facility, or the presence of an
environmentally burdensome enterprise is not sufficient to subject the actor
to liability under this proposed tort. Defendants have no legally cognizable
interest in violating environmental regulations or in refusing to remediate

...United States courts have recognized wrongful discharge claims at the common law
where it is alleged that the defendant has terminated a worker for racial reasons. President
Clinton's Exec. Order No. 12866 and the proposed environmental justice initiatives
underscore this interest.
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environmental harms. Cases in which communities are "targeted" by reason
of political expedience or lack of political power; cases in which there is a
failure to fully inform the community of potential risks, hazards or the
existence of chemical releases; and cases in which there has been a
misrepresentation for the purpose of inducing community cooperation or
complacency, indicate improper means and motive and support imposition
of tort liability and damages. To the extent that the proposed tort is premised
upon such conduct, it is a useful supplement to the present approaches.
Although the defendants have an interest in conducting their businesses, and
in locating those businesses in areas where land is inexpensive, transportation
convenient, and workers available, that interest should not supersede the
rights of potentially impacted communities to keep the facilities out where
that community already is shouldered with other environmental burdens, or
where the proposed location is geographically or geologically unsound.
Finally, in cases of environmental racism, the actor's motive may not
be explicitly racist. More likely, it is grounded in political expediency and
economic efficiency. Although in our society these motives are not
necessarily rejected as immoral, they often must give way where the conduct
that results interferes with an individual's rights to live in a community in
which they have access to and enjoyment of rights common to the general
public, to make full use and enjoyment of their own property, and to protect
their physical health and well being.

